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Résumé 
Cette thèse porte sur le comportement des élites politiques durant les périodes de crise 
nationale et plus particulièrement sur leurs réactions aux attentats terroristes. Elle 
démontre que les crises terroristes sont tout comme les conflits militaires ou 
diplomatiques propices aux unions nationales et notamment aux ralliements des partis 
d’opposition auprès du gouvernement. 
 L’analyse statistique d’actes terroristes s’étant produits dans cinq états 
démocratiques (Allemagne, Espagne, États-Unis d’Amérique, France et Royaume-Uni) 
entre 1990 et 2006 révèle que l’ampleur d’un attentat en termes de pertes humaines ainsi 
que la répétition de ces attentats influencent dans une large mesure la réaction des élites 
politiques. Ainsi plus l’ampleur d’un attentat est élevée, plus la probabilité d’un 
ralliement est grande. En revanche, la multiplication des attentats augmente la possibilité 
de dissension entre l’opposition et le gouvernement. Par ailleurs, l’opposition est plus 
susceptible de se rallier au gouvernement lorsque l’attentat est perpétré par des terroristes 
provenant de l’étranger. L’analyse quantitative indique également que l’existence d’un 
accord formel de coopération dans la lutte antiterroriste entre le gouvernement et 
l’opposition favorise l’union des élites. Enfin, les données analysées suggèrent que la 
proportion des ralliements dans les cinq pays est plus importante depuis les attentats du 
11 septembre 2001. 
 Une analyse qualitative portant exclusivement sur la France et couvrant la période 
1980-2006 confirme la validité des variables identifiées dans la partie quantitative, mais 
suggère que les élites réagissent au nombre total de victimes (morts mais aussi blessés) et 
que la répétition des actes terroristes a moins d’impact lors des vagues d’attentats. Par 
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ailleurs, les analyses de cas confirment que les élites politiques françaises sont plus 
susceptibles de se rallier quand un attentat vise un haut-fonctionnaire de l’État. Il apparaît 
également que les rivalités et rancœurs politiques propre à la France (notamment suite à 
l’arrivée de la gauche au pouvoir en 1981) ont parfois empêché le ralliement des élites. 
Enfin, cette analyse qualitative révèle que si l’extrême gauche française soutient 
généralement le gouvernement, qu’il soit de gauche ou de droite, en période de crise 
terroriste, l’extrême droite en revanche saisit quasi systématiquement l’opportunité 
offerte par l’acte terroriste pour critiquer le gouvernement ainsi que les partis de 
l’establishment. 
 La thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier chapitre suggère que le 
comportement des élites politiques en période de crises internationales graves (guerres et 
conflits diplomatiques) est souvent influencé par la raison d’État et non par l’intérêt 
électoral qui prédomine lors des périodes plus paisibles. Le second chapitre discute du 
phénomène terroriste et de la littérature afférente. Le troisième chapitre analyse les 
causes du phénomène d’union nationale, soumet un cadre pour l’analyse de la réaction 
des élites aux actes terroristes, et présente une série d’hypothèses. Le quatrième chapitre 
détaille la méthodologie utilisée au cours de cette recherche. Les chapitres cinq et six 
présentent respectivement les résultats des analyses quantitatives et qualitatives. Enfin, le 
chapitre sept conclut cette thèse en résumant la contribution de l’auteur et en suggérant 
des pistes de recherche. 
 
Mots-clés: Partis politiques; comportement des élites; terrorisme; union nationale; 
Allemagne; Espagne; France; États-Unis d’Amérique; Royaume-Uni. 
Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the behaviour of political elites during periods of national crisis 
and particularly on their reactions to acts of terrorism. It demonstrates that terrorist crises, 
much like military and diplomatic conflicts, represent a fertile ground for rallies around 
the flag. 
 The statistical analysis of terrorist events that occurred in five democracies 
(France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) from 
1990 to 2006 indicates that the magnitude of the attack in terms of fatalities and the 
repetition of attacks influence in large measures the reaction of the political elite. The 
higher the magnitude is, the more likely the rally. However, the repetition of attacks 
increases the likelihood of dissention between opposition and government. Moreover, the 
opposition is more likely to support the government when the attack is perpetrated by 
terrorists originating from abroad. The quantitative analysis also indicates that the 
existence of a formal antiterrorist pact between government and opposition increases the 
likelihood of a rally. Finally, the data suggest that elites are more likely to rally around 
the flag since the events of 9/11. 
 A qualitative analysis focusing solely on France and examining cases from the 
period 1980-2006 confirms the validity of the variables identified in the quantitative part 
but suggests that elites react to the total number of victims (including wounded) and that 
the repetition has less impact during waves of attacks. Furthermore, the case studies 
confirm that French political elites are particularly prone to rally when high-ranking 
representatives of the state fall victim to the terrorists. In addition, it appears that political 
rivalries and resentment (in particular following the Left’s return to power in 1981) have 
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on occasion thwarted the rallying of elites. Finally, this analysis indicates that whereas 
the far-left generally supports the government (left-wing or right-wing), the far-right uses 
almost every opportunity to criticize the government and the parties of the establishment. 
 The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one suggests that during intense 
foreign policy crises (military and diplomatic) the behaviour of the political elite is often 
influenced by the national interest, rather than the electoral interest that predominates in 
quieter periods. Chapter two discusses the terrorist phenomenon and the corresponding 
literature. Chapter three analyses the rally-around-the-flag phenomenon, lays out a 
framework for analysing the reaction of elites, and presents a series of hypotheses. 
Chapter four details the methodology used. Chapters five and six present respectively the 
results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Finally, chapter seven concludes with 
a summary of the author’s contribution and suggests avenues of research. 
 
Keywords: Political parties; elite behaviour; terrorism; rally around the flag; France; 
Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; United States of America. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
“Ce qu’on appelle union dans un corps politique, est une chose très équivoque : la vraie     
est une union d’harmonie, qui fait que toutes les parties, quelque opposées qu’elles nous 
paroissent, concourent au bien général de la société; comme des dissonances, dans la 
musique, concourent à l’accord total. Il peut y avoir de l’union dans un État où on ne 
croit voir que du trouble; c’est-à-dire, une harmonie d’où résulte le bonheur, qui seul est 
la vraie paix. Il en est comme des parties de cet univers, éternellement liées par l’action 
des unes, et la réaction des autres” (Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la 
grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence) 
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On September 12, 2001, in the midst of the worst terrorist crisis in US history dozens of 
members of Congress from both the Republican and Democratic parties stood side by 
side on the steps of the Capitol pledging their support to Georges W. Bush in a rare 
display of unity.1 In the days that followed the tragic events of 9/11, Bush’s public 
approval ratings rose from 51 percent to an unprecedented 86 percent.2 With a large 
support both in Congress and across the nation, the rally around the flag was complete 
and of a proportion unseen in the United States since the attack on Pearl Harbor some 60 
years before. Ensued a period of two weeks during which the mainstream political elite in 
Washington acquiesced to every major decision taken by the Republican administration. 
For all intents and purposes partisan politics in Congress had ceased, and in case anyone 
on Capitol Hill was tempted to publicly question the course of action adopted at 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue, Attorney General John Ashcroft reminded the legislators that “the 
American people do not have the luxury of unlimited time in erecting the necessary 
defenses to future terrorist acts”.3  
During this silent autumn, the US government was able to launch a major military 
operation abroad and severely restrict the rights of its citizens at home, all in the name of 
the ‘war on terror’, all with minimal interference by the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. Meanwhile mainstream media remained by and large uncritical of the 
Republican administration, and the general population, draped in the Star-Spangled 
Banner, entered in a frenzy of patriotism. To be fair, the rally was not complete, at least 
not in the literal sense, it never is. By September 24, 2001, the hearings on the Patriot Act 
                                                
1 The New York Times, September 12, 2001. 
2 Source: Gallup Polls, September 7-10 and 14-15, 2001. 
3 House Committee on the Judiciary, Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, 107th Congress, 
1st session, September 24, 2001, 2. 
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held by the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate provided a stage for dissent. 
Representative Robert Barr (R-GA), for instance, questioned the wisdom of rushing the 
debate on the Patriot Act and asked whether the government was seeking “to take 
advantage of what is obviously an emergency situation to obtain authorities that it has 
been unable to obtain previously (…)”.4 Yet a month later only one senator out of a 
hundred and 66 representatives out of 423 voted against the passage of the Patriot Act.5 
Only after the White House entered a diplomatic stalemate with some of its traditional 
allies abroad did major figures within the Democratic Party (senators Tom Daschle and 
John Kerry for instance) openly question the Government’s strategy in the war on terror. 
Meanwhile, the cloud of dust surrounding lower Manhattan barely dissipated, known 
‘dissidents’ and radical minds such as Gore Vidal or Noam Chomsky explained the whys 
and hows of the tragedy that had befallen the ‘land of the free’ and pointed fingers at the 
political elite in Washington DC.6 The blame game had started. Whether to unite the 
country or to criticize the government, the elites – mainstream and radical – were playing 
politics with terrorism. 
The events of 9/11 not only profoundly changed the hierarchy of issues within the 
political debate, as national security became once more the paramount issue, but also 
redefined the prevailing cleavages in US politics. This time the dividing line separated 
the hawks from the doves, the patriots from the internationalists, the strong from the 
weak, us from them. The choice was clear for those running the executive branch of the 
                                                
4 House Committee on the Judiciary, Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, 107th Congress, 
1st session, September 24, 2001, Part II, 1. 
5 Senator Feingold (D-WI) voted against whereas Senator Landrieu (D-LA) did not vote. Bill H.R. 3162, 
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress, 1st Session, October 25, 2001. In the House, out of the 66 
representatives who voted against only three were Republicans.  
6 By October 2001 Noam Chomsky had already published a pamphlet entitled 9/11. 
   
 
4 
government: “Rally around the flag!” or else be lambasted as an enemy of the state. 
Rallying became a sign of support for the president/commander-in-chief, and by 
implications an acknowledgement that the patriotic imperative required ‘good citizens’ to 
remain uncritical of his decisions. As the security of the country stood atop the agenda, 
the political elite was expected to abandon, at least temporarily, party politics for the 
good of the country. National security was all that mattered, and many perceived the 
political debate as just a hindrance, notably for the swift passage of antiterror bills. 
Bipartisanship and cooperation across the aisle were the order of the day.  
Eight years later much of the US political debate still revolves around the 
aftermath of 9/11, even though pressing concerns like the state of the economy have 
fought their way back to the top of the political agenda. Of course the issue of national 
security is again freely debated, in part because the price to pay both in human, 
diplomatic and financial terms is perceived by many as too high. Yet the rhetoric used by 
most Republicans and Democrats still revolves around the necessity to project an image 
of patriotism. Both parties’ national conventions in August and September 2008 served as 
a reminder that in the post 9/11 United States, one can never be too close to the Old 
Glory. In that respect, the effect of 9/11 promises to be long lasting. 
Of course not all terrorist events are synonymous with ‘all hell breaking loose’, 
not all of them have a profound and lasting impact both domestically and internationally. 
In fact, a high number of terrorist acts – often nothing more than blown-up mailboxes – 
do not register on the media radar or initiate any kind of reaction from the political elite 
and public opinion. The multiple attacks of 9/11 are in that respect exceptional. Yet all 
acts of terror, regardless of whether they claim any victims or destroy any property, 
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represent a direct and at times serious challenge to the political system, particularly 
within open societies. The intention of the perpetrators rather than the act itself (and its 
consequences) is what matters. To paraphrase a Corsican nationalist, terrorism is the 
military occupation of the political space.7 Indeed, what is terrorism if not an attempt to 
bypass the long and arduous process of debate and compromise by coercing through 
deeds rather than convincing through discourse, by menacing rather than appealing? As 
such, terrorism is in essence a repudiation of party politics, a denial of a key democratic 
institution. The definition of terrorism is of course a complex subject matter that will be 
covered extensively further below, but one should bear in mind that terrorism is not about 
killing or maiming, it is about political ascendancy. Terrorists seek the most effective 
strategy to gain the upper-hand in their struggle against the legitimate holders of political 
power. 
This thesis is first and foremost a study of the behaviour of political parties and 
elites in exceptional periods, that is periods when the order of the day is not business as 
usual, but periods when the national community is being threatened or attacked. Many 
scholars over the years have looked at the effects of military or diplomatic crises on elites 
as well as on media and public opinion. Most of these works, on which much more will 
be written in the coming pages, suggest that rallies around the flag following wars and 
major diplomatic crises are the rule (at least as far as the United States are concerned). 
But what about terrorism? What are its effects on party politics and the behaviour of 
political elites? Despite mounting evidence that terrorism influences the behaviour of 
political elites in government and in opposition, this question has yet to be answered in a 
systematic and comparative way. This thesis attempts to fill the gap in the literature by 
                                                
7 Libération February 7, 1998. 
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analyzing political parties’ reactions to terrorism in five countries – France, Germany, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. More precisely, my 
objective throughout this thesis is to determine whether the opposition chooses to support 
or criticize the government and why it does so. In the process, not only do I intend to 
make sense of party politics in times of terror, but I hope to contribute to a better 
understanding of how terrorism impacts Western societies. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter one begins with a discussion of both 
the evolution and the perception of political parties. I then consider the determinants of 
party behaviour during peaceful times and during critical times by notably providing 
historical examples of elite behaviour during foreign policy crises. The second chapter 
begins with a description of the evolution of terrorism through the ages and a discussion 
of recent trends in terrorist activities throughout the world. An in-depth discussion of the 
meaning of terrorism follows. Chapter two ends with a review of the literature on 
terrorism. Chapter three begins with an analysis of the rally around the flag phenomenon, 
and proceeds by presenting a theoretical framework for analyzing elite behaviour in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks. I conclude chapter three by discussing a list of variables 
likely to influence the reaction of political elites and presenting a series of hypotheses on 
the behaviour of parties. Chapter four introduces the dual quantitative and qualitative 
approach used for analyzing the reaction of parties to terrorism. Chapter five presents the 
findings of the statistical analysis, whereas the qualitative analysis, which focuses 
exclusively on France, is presented in chapter six. There I examine in details, notably 
through a series of case studies, how the French political elite has reacted to terrorism 
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since the early 1980s. Finally, a conclusion sums up the findings and suggests further 
avenues of research.
Chapter 1 
When ‘All Hell Breaks Loose!’ Party Politics in Extraordinary Times 
 
 
 
“I have confidence in Lyndon Johnson (…) We must give this man our full cooperation 
and our prayers and work with him; and let’s see the kind of president he will be (…) 
President Johnson certainly has the training; he has the instincts; he has the ability. I think 
we must now, as a nation, unite behind him and help him all we can, and go the usual 
course of helping a president, of being critical when it’s needed and helpful when that’s 
needed” (Barry Goldwater, candidate for the Republican presidential primaries, 
November 24, 1963) 
 
   
 
9 
Introduction 
 
With America’s war of independence barely over and its democratic project still in its 
infancy, a bemused Thomas Jefferson dryly remarked that if he “could not go to heaven 
but with a party” he “would not go there at all” (quoted in Katz and Crotty 2006, 9). Not 
only was this sort of unflattering view on arguably one of the bedrocks of representative 
democracy quite common among the Founding Fathers – indeed George Washington, 
John Adams and James Madison were quite vocal and literal in their criticisms too – but 
it echoed a long held belief amongst political thinkers and practitioners of all ages, not 
least those of the French Revolution, that parties would spread division and chaos to the 
nations (Sartori 1976, 9-12). The derogatory meaning of the word party was of course 
entrenched in its Latin root partire, to divide, a meaning which later on evolved into a 
more forbearing and even promising sense – i.e. partaking or the French partage (Sartori 
1976, 4). 
That parties were initially despised was due in large part to the fact that they were 
a political novelty, conceptually barely distinguishable from the older form of political 
organization known as factions. Factions were often thought to be the epitome of selfish 
interests adverse to that of the community (Sartori 1976, 12). Sartori reminds us that the 
Latin word factio came to describe originally “a political group bent on a disruptive and 
harmful facere, on ‘dire doings’. Thus the primary meaning conveyed by the Latin root is 
an idea of hubris, of excessive, ruthless, and thereby harmful behaviour” (Sartori 1976, 
4). Not until the late 18th century did this misrepresentation of parties give way to a more 
enlightened understanding. Edmund Burke was by most accounts the first one to make a 
difference between faction and party. He defined the former as an enterprise for the 
   
 
10 
advancement of the personal interests of a few and the latter as “a body of men united, for 
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle 
in which they are all agreed” (quoted by White in Katz and Crotty 2006, 6).  
Edmund Burke’s praise did little to attenuate suspicions that parties were factions 
in disguise unlikely to serve the interest of the state, particularly during critical times. 
Even a celebrated ‘democrat’ like Abraham Lincoln concluded that partisanship is 
divisive and disloyal in wartime (Smith 2006, 5).  A point of view echoed by an editorial 
in the New York Times published shortly before the start of the Civil War claiming: “The 
party has failed us. Party organization is dead” (Smith 2006, 9).  
The fortunes of parties and their role within the democratic game changed 
favourably with the re-examination of what representative democracy should be about. 
As Jacob Leib Talmon reminds us “what is today considered as an essential concomitant 
of democracy, namely, diversity of views and interests, was far from being regarded as 
essential by the eighteenth-century fathers of democracy. Their original postulates were 
unity and unanimity” (Talmon 1952, 44). Through a slow and arduous process, as the 
fear of disunity and diversity subsided, parties became accepted – and regarded as 
different from factions – and were finally understood as “parts of the whole” rather than 
“parts against the whole” (Sartori 1976, 13-14). 
Today diversity is embraced, and parties are providers of diversity, but the debate 
on the role of parties and elites in our democracies is far from over. Sartori remarks that 
“what is central to the pluralistic Weltanschauung is neither consensus nor conflict but 
dissent and praise of dissent” (Sartori 1976, 16). Indeed we have come to expect our 
parties and their elites to oppose and criticize one another. Debating over grand schemes 
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or bickering over minutiae is an essential aspect of party politics, albeit one that can be 
exasperating at times. This is the normal state of affairs, a sort of default mode for our 
elites. It is a feature of what we might call ordinary politics, a concept to which we will 
come back shortly. As a result, cooperation across the aisle, bipartisanship and any other 
forms of non-partisan approach to politics represent in most advanced democracies the 
exception rather than the rule. Yet at the same time, we expect our parties and their 
representatives to exercise restraint in their criticisms, and even temporarily end their 
rivalry when the interests of the state are at stake, when in effect parties enter the realm of 
extraordinary politics – meant here as a synonym of unusual. Pluralism then cannot be 
taken for granted. Inherent in our modern representative democracies is this tension 
between the need for diversity and the necessity under certain circumstances to unite in 
order to preserve the collective interests of the greater community – i.e. the nation-state. 
My objective throughout this study is to shed light on the behaviour of political 
parties and their elites during critical times. More precisely, my goal is to understand how 
these elites react to terrorist events. Do they choose to carry on opposing and criticizing 
one another as they do in quieter times, or do they favour cooperation instead? 
Answering this question implies that we distinguish party politics during ordinary times – 
i.e. characterized by the absence of major foreign policy or security crises – from party 
politics during extraordinary times – i.e. presence of a crisis. 
There are of course different types of crises, reflecting different levels of gravity. 
A crisis represents a “phase of disorder in the seemingly normal development of a 
system”, a transition “during which the normal ways of operating no longer work” (Boin, 
t’Hart, Stern and Sundelius 2005, 2). This aspect is crucial: “in a crisis the modus 
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operandi of a political system or community differs markedly from the functioning in 
normal time” (Boin et al. 2005, 16). Although I will focus here on man-made crises such 
as wars, diplomatic disputes and of course terrorism, crises can be caused by countless 
other disasters whether natural or induced by man (earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, 
wildfires, epidemics, economic and financial breakdowns, etc.). Not all of these crises 
affect our societies and communities as profoundly and durably as the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks or the current financial meltdown have, but all of them pose a challenge to 
political elites and particularly public office holders. In ordinary times, public office 
holders are ‘just’ overseeing business as usual, but in extraordinary periods their function 
calls for them to become crisis managers, albeit with different levels of responsibility. As 
such, these elites and the political parties they represent become accountable for their 
actions and reactions during the crisis. Some will not come out of these crises unscathed, 
as opposition elites rarely miss an opportunity to play the blame game (on postcrisis 
management see notably Boin, McConnell and t’Hart 2008; on the blame game during 
terrorist crises see Kassimeris 2008).  
The following chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the 
role of parties and their elites in representative democracy. The second section examines 
party behaviour during ordinary and extraordinary times, and provides a review of the 
relevant literature. 
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1.1. Parties and elites 
 
Parties, as we have gathered so far, have not always been seen with kindly eyes to say the 
least. What yesterday caused these misgivings – i.e. their tendency to divide rather than 
to unite – is today hailed as a hallmark of representative democracy. In fact, as early as 
1888 James Bryce remarked that “no-one has shown how representative government 
could be worked without them [parties]. They bring order out of chaos to a multitude of 
voters” (quoted by White in Katz and Crotty 2006, 7). E.E. Schattschneider (1942, 1) in 
Party Government considered “modern democracy” to be “unthinkable save in terms of 
the parties”, and more recently John Aldrich (1995, 3) deemed democracy to be 
“unworkable save in terms of parties”. Likewise Sartori (1976), Crotty (2001) and Lai 
and Melkonian-Hoover (2005) to name only a few have claimed that parties and a 
competitive party system are essential to democracy and democratization as they provide 
a crucial link between people and government. Parties are, to use Giovanni Sartori’s 
words, “the central intermediate structures between society and government”, a bond, 
unlike factions, between a people and its decision-makers (Sartori 1976, ix). 
The idea that parties fulfill an essential role in the democratic process by 
providing a linkage between society and government is generally not questioned. Yet, 
from David Broder’s The Party’s Over (1972) to Martin Wattenberg’s The Decline of 
American Political Parties (1990) and more recently Parties Without Partisans (2002) 
edited by Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, many have talked about the demise of 
parties. Of particular concern is the weakening of partisanship within the electorate 
(Aldrich and Niemi 1990; Milner 2002). Aldrich (1995, 17) notes that these days 
“elections are more candidate centered and less party centered”. Another argument points 
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to the decline of parties as mediating institutions as they are increasingly by-passed by 
technologically savvy citizens who prefer to exchange points of view via the Internet than 
in political meetings (Davis 1999; 2005). A more general argument links partisan decline 
to the increasing number of policy demands placed on democracies that far surpasses 
their capacity to address these issues (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975; 
Huntington 1981). 
Decline, resurgence or just transformation, the debate on the fate of parties is not 
over. Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg (2002) suggest that it all depends on whether 
we refer to parties in the electorate, as organizations, or in government – three analytical 
levels originally suggested by V.O. Key (1964). Their view is that parties in the 
electorate seem to be weakening, whereas parties in government have by and large kept 
their role, and parties as organizations are adapting to the new environment. 
Although the role of parties as information providers and mediating institutions 
might not be as exclusive as it once was, parties remain essential for the actual working 
of representative democracy. Aside from informing voters and shaping the political 
debate, parties fulfill the basic electoral role of presenting candidates for public offices. 
They then perform the equally important task of organizing the government and 
providing the state apparatus with an elite of political practitioners. A party is thus a 
multipurpose organization. It is to use Robert Huckshorn’s concise definition:  
“An autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making 
nominations and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over 
governmental power through the capture of public offices and the 
organization of the government” (Huckshorn 1984, 10). 
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Implicit in this definition is the role of the opposition party whose task it is to dissent and 
“present a political alternative that acts to limit the present government and offers a 
potential for change at the next election” (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, 8-10). 
More importantly a party is a “social organism” (Eldersveld in Crotty, Freeman 
and Gatlin 1966, 42). It is, as Aldrich noted, “the creature of the politicians, the ambitious 
office seeker and officeholder” (1995, 4). “Their [the parties’] basis” he adds “lies in the 
actions of ambitious politicians that created and maintain them” (1995, 19). As such, 
parties represent institutional conduits through which power, this quintessential political 
goal, is harnessed by the elite (see notably Schlesinger 1991). 
Politics is often about hard choices made by politicians and party leaders who 
need to balance a host of often diverging interests (Strøm and Müller 1999, 1). In view of 
the subject matter of this thesis, this raises two important questions: what drives the 
political elite? And is the behaviour of political elites context sensitive? The next section 
examines the determinants of political behaviour under two different sets of conditions: 
ordinary and extraordinary. 
 
1.2. Politics in ordinary and extraordinary times 
 
Under the influence of the school of rational choice, the majority of scholarly works 
published on party politics implicitly posits a world where the order of the day is business 
as usual, which by and large means winning or at least performing well at the next 
election in order to either maximize the number of votes, of governmental portfolios, or 
of influence on policy-making. The assumption is that political parties and elites, just like 
voters or any other actors in domestic politics, function and behave in a largely pacified 
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environment, free of major military conflicts, diplomatic crises or other security related 
issues. In essence then, what is being studied is politics during ordinary times as opposed 
to politics during extraordinary or unsettled times. This is hardly surprising since most 
studies concerned with political behaviour have been conducted in the post World War II 
era in countries and regions – essentially in the ‘western hemisphere’ – finally free from 
the tragedy of war, which until then had featured so prominently throughout their 
histories. In comparison, the literature on political behaviour in extraordinary times – i.e. 
broadly defined here as times when the nation is under threat – is sparse. Wedged 
between two subfields of political science – electoral behaviour and international 
relations – it has never been a research priority for students of the former. Yet there is 
something intuitively wrong about studying a set of domestic political actors with no 
regard for the international context in which they evolve, unless of course the context is 
perceived as essentially stable. For their part, international relations scholars have been 
far less hesitant to look into the interplay between international affairs and domestic 
politics (see notably Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993; Keohane and Milner 1996; Gaubatz 
1999). Although the realist and neo-realist schools of thought have traditionally 
downplayed the importance of this interplay, essentially leaving the intricacies of party 
politics in a convenient black box – the theoretical equivalent of an oubliette – and 
treating the state as a unitary actor, many in the past 40 years have pursued a different 
approach and have decided to open the proverbial black box.8 For example, Graham 
Allison (1969) in his groundbreaking article ‘Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis’ introduced his Bureaucratic Politics Model whereby he developed a theory on the 
                                                
8 The ongoing debate in international relations and foreign policy analysis opposes proponents of a liberal 
approach (constructivists and others) arguing for what some have termed Primat der Innenpolitik against 
proponents of a neorealist approach defending a Primat der Au!enpolitik. 
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impact of bureaucracy on foreign policy decision making, arguing that government 
behaviour is the result of bargaining games.9 Later on Peter Gourevitch (1978) coined the 
expression ‘second image reversed’ – in reference to Kenneth Waltz’ notion (1959) – to 
describe how pressures on the international stage influence domestic politics and how in 
turn domestic factors influence international relations. More recently, Robert Putnam 
(1988) in ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’ demonstrated 
rather convincingly how governments engaged in international negotiations must play 
simultaneous games at the domestic level and international level.10 Examples of studies 
on the interplay between domestic politics, or one set of domestic factors, and 
international affairs abound particularly in works on international political economy. 
Many have also written on the behaviour of democracies on the international scene, with 
some stressing that they are inherently pacific and others demonstrating that they are as 
likely to go to war as autocracies, if not more (see notably Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller 
1996 on the democratic peace; Gaubatz 1999 on the impact of elections; Reiter and Stam 
2002 on why democracies win war). I will not exhaust the readers’ patience with 
countless other relevant examples, but rather point out the need for ever more studies 
such as Allison’s and Putnam’s that incorporate sub-national actors or institutions into the 
study of issues such as foreign policy or security crises. This approach can obviously 
shed light as much on international affairs as on domestic politics.11 
                                                
9 See also Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow 
originally published in 1971 and reedited in 1999. 
10 Putnam’s article spurred a larger study involving contributions by several scholars that led to the 
publication of Double-Edged Diplomacy (1993). 
11 For a review of the literature on the interaction between the domestic and international levels see in 
particular Peter Gourevitch’s “Domestic Politics and International Relations” in Handbook of International 
Relations edited by Walter Carlsnaes (2002). 
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 This section is divided into two subsections. In the first one, I will define what is 
understood by ordinary politics and review the literature on the behaviour of political 
parties and elites during ordinary times. The second subsection will review the literature 
on party and elite behaviour during extraordinary times. My aim throughout this section 
will be to determine the objectives of parties and elites, and see to what extent they 
modify their behaviour when confronting extraordinary foreign policy or national 
security related events. 
 
1.2.1. In front of Janus’ Temple closed doors: party politics in peace time 
conditions 
 
The closing of the doors to the Temple of Janus meant that the Roman Republic was at 
peace, which by all accounts was seldom the case. Even then, the ending of military 
activities and the return of the legions rarely meant the ending of political violence. Party 
strife was often settled through violent means and the use of armed force became at times 
the modus operandi of many prominent politicians – Pompey and Caesar among others 
(Taylor 1949, 21). In effect then, the Roman political elite behaved during peaceful and 
ordinary times much like they did during extraordinary and unsettled times. They fought 
each other – sometimes literally to the death – and remained often unable to unite for the 
greater good of the city. In other words, the context did not seem to affect their behaviour 
all that much. Alternatively one could also argue that the context did not change much – 
i.e. wars and military interventions were more or less a constant feature for Rome’s 
overstretched Empire – and thus did not warrant a change of behaviour. 
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Leaving aside the atypical case of antique Rome let us turn our attention to 
contemporary politics and ask ourselves: have the doors to Janus’ Temple ever really 
been closed in the recent past? Doubtful would be the initial response. The world might 
not be at war now but war is still very much part of this world. In fact, it would be 
difficult to pinpoint in the post World War II era a period during which Western 
democracies were not embroiled in some international military or diplomatic crisis. In the 
period 1946-2001, there were 225 armed conflicts of which 34 were still active in 28 
countries at the beginning of 2001 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and 
Strand 2002). The Cold War and the diplomatic crises and regional military conflicts it 
generated throughout the world and particularly in Latin America, South-East Asia, 
Africa and continental Europe have been a permanent feature of international affairs from 
the late 1940s to the early 1990s. At roughly the same time and often in conjunction with 
the Cold War, the disentanglement of European powers from their overseas possessions 
was anything but peaceful. These events influenced, sometimes heavily, the domestic 
politics of countless Western democracies. They shaped the nature of the political debate 
as with McCarthyism or the Vietnam War in the United States. They altered the political 
landscape and constitutional structure as in France with the decolonization process – 
particularly in Indochina and Algeria – and the polarization of French politics between 
pro-Soviets and anti-Soviets that brought about the demise of the Fourth Republic and the 
advent of the Fifth Republic. The post-Cold War era has been as war torn with 115 armed 
conflicts between 1989 and 2001 (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 616), not to mention countless 
other foreign or security policy related events.  
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The second part of the twentieth century has been by all accounts crisis-ridden 
and one could conclude that this is the standard situation, that this is in essence the 
context of ordinary politics. Extraordinary politics would then come to characterize 
periods of peaceful conditions. While maybe true for some countries, this view does not 
hold for most advanced democracies. First of all, the turmoil that has come to 
characterize much of the international affairs over the past 60 years is not constant. 
Brinkmanship is followed by détente and major military crises are a seldom occurrence. 
In fact, the number of military conflicts has started to decrease since the end of the Cold 
War (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 616). Second of all, and closely related to the first point, not 
all foreign policy or national security related crises are of the same magnitude. It is 
particularly worth noting that Western democracies have seldom been engaged in inter-
state wars – defined commonly as armed conflicts causing at least 1,000 battle-deaths.12 
Over the course of the last 60 years, Western powers have been engaged in three such 
military conflicts.13 As for diplomatic crises, they have not all had the implications of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and have generally been limited in time. Finally, none of 
the wars in which Western powers were involved took place on their national territory. In 
fact most conflicts have taken place in Africa and Asia (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 616). Thus 
                                                
12 According to the Correlates of War project. Other datasets have a different threshold. For instance, the 
Uppsala dataset on armed conflict has a much lower threshold. 
13 The three conflicts are: Korea (1950-1953), Vietnam (1965-1975), and the First Gulf War (1991). This 
account is based on the list of inter-state wars (i.e. serious military conflicts between states) published by 
the Correlates of War project. This list does not include the ongoing Second Gulf War  (2003-present), 
which so far has caused far more than 1,000 battle-deaths, nor does it include the current military operation 
in Afghanistan. As of May 1, 2009, 1,141 coalition soldiers have died in Afghanistan according to 
iCasualties.org (http://www.icasualties.org/oef/). The Falkland War (1982) caused 910 battle-deaths and is 
therefore not included. The Indochina War (1945-1954) and the Algerian War (1954-1962), which both 
caused tens of thousands of battle-deaths, are considered by the Correlates of War project as extra-state 
wars. 
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save perhaps for the all-encompassing Cold War only a few Western countries have 
actually been directly involved in these crises.14 
My aim is not to belittle the military conflicts and diplomatic crises that have 
troubled our world in the recent past but rather to underline the fact that their impact was 
limited and that Western democratic states, on which the present study focuses, have 
been relatively spared. For these particular countries, foreign policy and national security 
policy crises are rare and exceptional. They are in a word extraordinary occurrences. 
This being said, there is a rather large grey area especially for diplomatic crises. How 
then do we distinguish an ordinary context from an extraordinary one? More importantly 
how do we define ordinary and extraordinary? A crucial measure of whether a context is 
extraordinary is whether the crisis at hand threatens, or is perceived as threatening, the 
interest of a country, its people, its territory or indeed its very survival.15 An ordinary 
context, for the purpose of this work, describes a situation where the political elite does 
not feel sufficiently threatened by foreign or security policy events to alter its day-to-day 
political behaviour. Obviously, in many instances the elites will disagree as to whether a 
situation is threatening but there are times when the danger to the nation is unmistakably 
clear and present. Rosenthal, Charles and t’Hart consider that we speak of a crisis when 
policy makers experience “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental 
values and norms of a social system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain 
circumstances necessitates making critical decisions” (1989, 10). 
                                                
14 Michael Brecher (2008) in his study on 391 international crises (non-intrawar crises) from the end of 
World War I to the end of 2002 classified 7.7 percent of these crises as high severity crises (among them 
the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 and the Cuban Missiles crisis of 1962), 35.8 percent as medium severity 
crises (e.g. the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94), and 56.5 percent as low severity crises (e.g. the 
1991 Ecuador-Peru border dispute). 
15 The national interest is discussed in chapter three. 
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What then is ordinary political behaviour in a representative democracy? How do 
politics and particularly party politics operate during ordinary times? An essential aspect 
of politics during ordinary times is its predictability, particularly in terms of the electoral 
process. Although elections might not always be held on fixed dates, electoral laws 
ensure their frequency, typically every four to five years for parliamentary elections. The 
political activity of parties and elites, particularly those of the mainstream, rests on this 
predictability.  
Anthony Downs in his groundbreaking An Economic Theory of Democracy 
(1957) suggested that parties are first and foremost interested in winning elections, that 
this is in essence their raison d’être. This assumption and its implications sparked an 
entire literature devoted to determining the objectives of political parties and their elites 
within. Paramount in this literature is the view that parties are rational and predictable 
actors. It posits a world where humans make rational choices to maximize utility. Over 
the past 50 years three models of competitive political party behaviour have tried to 
establish this assertion: the vote-seeking model, the office-seeking model, and the policy-
seeking model. 
 The vote-seeking approach put forth by Downs (1957) argues that parties want to 
maximize the number of votes. Although it might capture the main purpose of 
mainstream political parties, critics have pointed out that it falls short of describing the 
intention of smaller parties or fringe parties that are more likely to be trying to appeal to 
particular groups of voters than to try to maximize their number of votes (Riker 1962; 
Robertson 1976). The office-seeking model developed by Riker (1962) addresses some of 
these concerns and suggests that parties are in fact seeking to maximize their control of 
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political offices and government portfolios. Yet, offices can be prized for their intrinsic 
value but also for their instrumental, electoral, or policy value (Strøm and Müller 1999, 
6). Moreover, the office-seeking model fails to take into account parties that either refuse 
to enter into coalition governments and thus obtain portfolios or those who enter 
coalitions but eventually resign and relinquish the portfolios they were seeking in the first 
place (Strøm 1990). The policy-seeking model provides a partial solution by claiming 
that the objective of parties is to have maximum control over public policy. However, 
parties are likely to pursue as much office as policy, the former being a precondition for 
the latter (Axelrod 1970; Lijphart 1984; Budge and Laver 1986). In the end, it remains 
difficult to disentangle these various electoral objectives and one is left to conclude, as 
Strøm and Müller do, that “pure vote seekers, office seekers, or policy seekers are 
unlikely to exist” (1999, 12). 
The three models outlined above assume an electoral rationale. They are, as Kaare 
Strøm reminds us, “less models of party behaviour than of electoral competition and 
coalition formation” (1990, 570). This, in itself, is not necessarily problematic since 
ordinary politics is centered on elections. What is more troubling is that these models 
tend to look at parties as unitary actors insulated from both the institutional and the 
international context. Yet the behaviour of parties is to a large extent dependent on the 
institutional features and notably the electoral system. If coalition formation is expected 
then the number of seats will be crucial as it will determine the leverage and bargaining 
power the party has. In addition, rational choice models often tend to forget that parties 
are complex entities and that the influence of adherents and partisans cannot be 
discounted altogether. In other words, the unconstrained and ‘dictatorial’ leader does not 
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exist (Strøm 1990, 574). In particular, party leaders are expected to remain fairly 
consistent in their policy choices (Downs 1957, 103-109) and party activists and party 
members are likely to limit their leaders’ choice by reminding him or her of the party 
line, especially in the case of labour intensive party organizations (Strøm 1990, 578).  
Institutional variables have started to be factored into models of rational 
behaviour towards the end of the 1970s (Hall and Taylor 1996).16 Rational choice 
institutionalism, much like historical institutionalism, contends that institutions structure 
political behaviour (see notably Weingast 2002). Yet whereas historical institutionalists 
are first and foremost interested in understanding the context of politics through an 
inductive approach, rational choice institutionalists aim at deductively uncovering “the 
Laws of political behaviour and action” (Steinmo 2001). As Fiorina eloquently puts it 
“for most PTI scholars [Positive Theory of Institutions, i.e. rational choice] breadth 
trumps depth; understanding 90 percent of the variance in one case is not as significant an 
achievement as understanding 10 percent of each of nine cases” (Fiorina 1995, 110-111). 
In addition, rational choice institutionalists view institutions as essentially stable 
throughout time and very unlikely to be modified consciously by the rational actors 
(Steinmo 2001). In other words, rational choice institutionalists are unable to explain 
changes in the set of institutional rules, such as the ones provoked by political transitions. 
As Steinmo remarked, “this is unfortunate, because we know that human history is 
replete with change. A theory whose goal is to predict, but which cannot explain change 
                                                
16 Initially institutions were brought into the equation to explain the behavior of legislators within the US 
Congress. 
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has some difficulties” (2001, 573).17 The rational choice institutionalists’ most important 
contribution is best summarized by Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor: 
“They [rational choice institutionalists] postulate, first, that an actor’s 
behaviour is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by 
a strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be deeply affected 
by the actor’s expectations about how others are likely to behave as well. 
Institutions structure such interactions, by affecting the range and 
sequence of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by providing information 
and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the 
corresponding behaviour of others (…)” (1996, 945). 
 
However despite this effort to bring the institutional variable into the equation, contextual 
matters, particularly those pertaining to the international situation, are not taken enough 
into considerations by scholars working on the determinants of elite behaviour, although 
a number of very useful studies have been undertaken over the years (Evans, Jacobson 
and Putnam 1993 being one of them). This gap in the literature is particularly manifest in 
the case of terrorism. As mentioned previously, the failure to assess the impact of 
terrorism on party behaviour is particularly troubling when one bears in mind that 
terrorism is essentially a negation of party politics. 
 Ordinary politics applies to a peaceful context, that is a situation when the country 
is not under threat and political elites seek to maximize their gains at the next election 
whether in terms of votes, portfolios or policy influence. However, what happens when 
the context changes due to foreign policy or national security related issues? Can the 
political earthquakes shake the foundations on which party politics stands?18 One would 
expect a certain behavioural flexibility. Dramatic contextual changes such as a 
declaration of war should lead political elites to reassess their priorities and focus more 
on the national interest than on partisan interests. 
                                                
17 Rational choice theorists contend that on occasions the rules are altered by external shocks. 
18 The expression ‘political earthquakes’ was originally coined by Michael Brecher (2008). 
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1.2.2. When the doors to Janus’ Temple open: party politics in unsettled times 
 
Strøm and Müller (1999, 5) remark that “the scholarly literature that examines political 
parties is enormous, and yet our systematic knowledge of party objectives and behaviour 
is still quite modest”. They themselves point out in passing that the domestic and 
international context may affect party behaviour through what they call exogenous 
situational factors, which basically include scandals, death of political figures, and social 
or economic events – i.e. riots, economic recessions, events associated with powerful 
collective memories (Strøm and Müller 1999, 25-26). Alas, they choose not to elaborate. 
Richard Katz and William Crotty, in the aptly entitled Handbook of Party Politics (2006), 
which invites contributions from leading experts in the field of political parties, do not 
even allocate a paragraph to party behaviour in times of foreign policy or national 
security crises, although they do mention that parties have had to adapt to changes 
brought about by the globalization of trade, finance and markets, the creation of regional 
political alignments such as the European Union, the electronic media, etc. (2006, 1). 
Incomprehensibly, international crises are not mentioned as events worthy of attention. 
The only international development that seems relevant to them, though not specifically 
for the behaviour of parties, is the so-called ‘third wave’ of democratization, which 
increased the number of parties and party systems over the last 15 years (Katz and Crotty 
2006, 2). Perhaps extraordinary times are assumed to ‘suspend’ politics in which case one 
is left to wonder where these authors draw the line between extraordinary and ordinary 
times.  
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The overall impression left by a survey of the literature on party politics is that 
foreign policy and national security contexts are not sufficiently taken into consideration. 
The assumption then must be that traditional models of party behaviour are sufficient to 
account for the actions of parties during extraordinary times. Since these models are 
models of electoral behaviour one must conclude that maximizing votes, offices or policy 
influence is the prime objective no matter what, even when ‘all hell breaks loose’ on the 
international or national scene. A troubling assumption to say the least.19 
To be sure, a number of important studies have dealt with party and electoral 
behaviour during foreign policy and military crises. For instance, Kurt Gaubatz in 
Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace 
(1999) and Kristopher Ramsay in ‘Politics at the Water’s Edge: Crisis Bargaining and 
Electoral Competition’ (2004) consider the impact of diplomatic crises and war on the 
electoral strategy of parties. Both authors point to the crucial role played by the 
opposition, which must balance at once its electoral strategy with the national interest. 
Kenneth Schultz’ ‘Domestic Opposition and Signalling in International Crises’ (1998) 
points to exactly the same dilemma. Schultz observes that opposition parties can 
reinforce the credibility of the government by siding with it against an external foe, but at 
the same time force the government to be irreproachable on the international scene, and 
in particular avoid using foreign policy crisis for partisan reasons in what is commonly 
referred to as ‘waging the dog’. Yet at the same time one could argue that during 
exceptional times the opposition has less room for manoeuvre than the government. 
Opposing the government during a severe crisis or accusing it of playing politics with the 
                                                
19 The review of literature presented in chapter 2 introduces several recent studies on party politics during 
terrorist crises, however none of them explicitly reappraise the prevalent models of electoral behavior. 
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crisis at hand can lead to counter accusations of disloyalty. Siding with the government 
and recognizing the primacy of the national interest over the partisan or electoral interest 
might thus be the safest course of action for the opposition. 
Of course elections are always part of the equation and to some extent the 
behaviour of political elites remains influenced by the electoral timetable, even in the 
worst of times. The Second World War certainly did not prevent most free and 
democratic belligerents – the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – from organizing 
‘khaki elections’, although Great Britain represents an interesting exception.20 Up to a 
certain point, foreign policy crises can be construed as just one more set of issues that 
parties can choose to bring into the political debate, much like they decide to debate 
about the unemployment rate or tax reform. The assumption, however, is that the gravity 
of the context brought about by the crisis will dictate what kind of behaviour is 
preferable. 
In order to illustrate this assumption and shed light on the behaviour of elites 
during extraordinary times, I look at three historical cases during which the US political 
elite had to deal both with a looming election and a severe foreign policy crisis: the 1940 
US presidential campaign, which unfolded during the initial stages of the Second World 
War; the 1948 US presidential campaign, which coincided with the first major crisis of 
the Cold War; and the 1962 campaign for the midterm congressional elections, which 
overlapped towards the end with the Cuban Missile Crisis. These cases were selected 
because each represents a turning point for the United States of America (and for much of 
the world). The stakes were high and these crises had immediate implications for the US 
                                                
20 General elections in Great Britain were suspended during the Second World War. There were in fact no 
such elections between 1935 and 1945. 
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and its political elite. More importantly, these crises unfolded during election campaigns, 
which means that the opposition parties faced the dilemma described previously, namely 
to choose between their narrow electoral interest and the broader national interest. 
Because of the severity of the selected crises, these are cases where the foreign policy 
crisis at hand was most likely to have an impact on the behaviour of the political elite.  
One of the most noticeable differences between these crises concerns the 
chronology of events and the point during the electoral campaign at which each crisis 
peaked. In the case of the 1940 election, the world, or at least the better part of the 
northern hemisphere, might have been at war but the US was still not a belligerent 
although its stakes in the conflict were anything but trivial. The peak of the crisis – i.e. 
the Japanese attack of Pear Harbor – took place more than a year after the presidential 
election, and the US until then had been relatively shielded from the events unfolding in 
Europe. In the case of the 1948 election, the climax of the crisis – i.e. the Berlin Blockade 
– took place during one of the most crucial moment of the campaign, namely the 
Republican convention. Finally, in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the ‘Thirteen 
Days’ crisis unfolded late in the campaign and ended a mere nine days before election 
day. 
 
1.2.2.1. Roosevelt and the isolationists 
 
By the time the campaign for the 1940 presidential election got underway, most of the 
Western world was already at war. Even though the United States tried to remain neutral, 
the Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt who was seeking an unprecedented third mandate 
told the Congress in January 1940 that “the time is long past when any political party or 
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any particular group can curry or capture public favor by labeling itself the peace party” 
(Divine 1974, 5). More than anyone, Roosevelt understood that the events unfolding in 
Europe would determine the outcome of the election (Divine 1974, 5). As Robert Divine 
remarks “any dramatic turn in the conflict was likely to rally the nation behind his 
leadership, while a continued stalemate would help the Republicans, who focused on 
domestic discontent” (Divine 1974, 5).  
Throughout 1940 Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie, the main contender for the 
Republican nomination, were openly debating whether or not the US should enter the 
conflict. Roosevelt was favouring a more interventionist role despite the fact that public 
opinion was clearly leaning towards the isolationists of whom Willkie was one of the 
leading, albeit unlikely, figures (Gaubatz 1999, 70-78).21 Willkie, unlike other 
Republicans such as Thomas Dewey, believed it was imperative that the United States 
did not directly or indirectly become involve in the war, yet he did not go as far as 
presidential hopeful Robert Taft who considered that US involvement would be more 
dangerous for democracy at home than a Nazi victory in Europe (Divine 1974, 15-16). In 
other words, Willkie was an isolationist but not an insulationist. After the start of the 
German blitzkrieg in May 1940, he called for “anything short of war” to help France and 
England, and later on declared that these two countries were “our first line of defense 
against Hitler” (Divine 1974, 19). Willkie’s rhetoric struck a chord with an American 
public opinion reluctant to get involved militarily in Europe but still keen on providing 
assistance to the beleaguered nations of France and Great Britain. His standing in the 
polls made him a clear favourite for the Republican nomination. Yet in order to clinch it, 
                                                
21 The isolationists were not the only ones to oppose US meddling into European affairs. 
Noninterventionists and pacifists had also joined the opposition although not for the exact same reasons. 
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Willkie had to appear less ‘interventionist’ than Roosevelt and reassure the isolationists 
in his party. He did just that in the week before the convention, reminding his audiences 
throughout the country that he would not send soldiers to Europe (Divine 1974, 20). 
From then on, although sharing many of Roosevelt’s interventionist ideas, Willkie would 
present himself as the isolationist candidate. 
If anything the movement against intervention was growing. The percentage of 
people opposed to a war against Germany grew from 83 percent before the invasion of 
Poland in September 1939 to 94 percent after (Gaubatz 1999, 72). In addition, the 
interventionist vs. antiwar divide cut across the partisan cleavage. Roosevelt’s resolve 
was particularly tested by West and Midwest isolationists, many of which were 
Republicans ready to vote in favour of the Democratic incumbent and his New Deal 
program provided he backtracked on his decision to intervene on the international scene 
(Gaubatz 1999, 70).  
The political elite was not warming to Roosevelt’s interventionist plan either. 
Already in 1935, the Senate passed the first of the Neutrality Acts by 79 votes in favour 
and 2 against (Gaubatz 1999, 71). Eventually both the Congress and the public became 
less isolationist – for instance the prohibition on arms sale was lifted – but a clear 
majority remained opposed to sending the army and the navy anywhere close to the 
frontline.22 In fact, Burton Wheeler and other Democratic isolationists threatened to 
create a third party unless Roosevelt declared himself opposed to intervention (Gaubatz 
1999, 73). Even after the May 1940 blitzkrieg during which the Nazi war machine 
overpowered its European adversaries like mere lead soldiers in a child’s playground, 
                                                
22 According to a Gallup poll taken in May 1940, two-thirds of interviewees preferred a candidate willing to 
assist England and France in anyway possible as long as the army and navy would not be sent into battle 
(Divine 1974, 8). 
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Roosevelt was still unable to push forward his plans for intervention. Instead, FDR had to 
content himself with a plan to beef up the national defence (one billion dollars in 
emergency defence appropriations), a move which drew massive support from both 
interventionists and isolationists in Congress (Divine 1974, 9).  
Although Roosevelt was unable to push forth his interventionist plan, the German 
invasion of Europe played to its advantage in the electoral race. Time magazine even 
boldly declared that “the Republican Party was the first US casualty in World War II” 
(Divine 1974, 10).  Polls were indicating that a clear majority would vote for Roosevelt 
but that an even larger majority was opposed to intervention unless the country was 
attacked (Divine 1974, 11). Eventually, unable to secure the backing of the elite and of 
public opinion, and unwilling to risk breaking up his New Deal coalition, Roosevelt 
decided to adopt the isolationist position of Willkie so as not to hurt his chances of 
winning the November election. Gaubatz (1999, 74) remarks that “as the election drew 
nearer through October 1940, there were escalations in antiwar rhetoric by both 
candidates” with Roosevelt declaring during a public speech: “I have said this before, but 
I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any 
foreign wars”. Electoral considerations had finally convinced Roosevelt to publicly turn 
around. 
Despite the growing tension in Europe, the US was not under threat. The context 
was still peaceful. With no clear and present danger, foreign policy could be debated just 
like any other issue. Willkie projected himself as more isolationist than he really was 
thereby forcing Roosevelt to put on hold his interventionist agenda until after the 
election. Clearly Willkie and the Republicans did not feel the urge to rally around their 
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president and allow him to choose his preferred course of action. However, had 
Roosevelt and Willkie been on the campaign trail in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor a year later, the question of America’s entry into war would likely not have been 
disputed. By December 7, 1941, this ‘day of infamy’, the Washington political elite 
rallied around its President like an army behind its commander-in-chief. 
 
1.2.2.2. Dewey and the Berlin Crisis 
 
For the Republicans, the US presidential campaign of 1948 was the first since Herbert 
Hoover’s in 1928 for which their candidate – in this case Thomas Dewey – was the clear 
favourite to win the election. Having won the 1946 midterm elections, members of the 
Grand Old Party were convinced that the White House was within their grasp. For his 
part Harry Truman, the incumbent, still had to convince the Democrats that he rather than 
Ike Eisenhower should be their candidate. To make matters worse, in the spring of 1948 
his approval rating in the Gallup poll reached an all-time low with 32 percent (Divine 
1974, 188). 
The campaign was fought primarily over foreign policy, which according to polls 
was the number one problem facing the country (Ramsay 2004, 19). A slight majority of 
Americans also believed that the Republicans were the best choice to conduct their 
foreign policy (Ramsay 2004, 19). As a consequence, Dewey repeatedly attacked 
Truman’s record on the international front, notably regarding the fate of Eastern Europe 
(Ramsay 2004, 18). Dewey notably lambasted the Truman administration for having 
“delivered” 200 million Europeans into Stalin’s hands (Divine 1974, 189). Polls also 
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indicated that almost three-quarters of respondents felt that the United States was “too 
soft” with the Soviets (Divine 1974, 200).  
On June 23, 1948, the day Dewey received the Republican nomination, the Soviet 
Union closed the corridor linking West Germany and Berlin, creating the first great crisis 
of the Cold War and what at the time Newsweek called “the greatest diplomatic crisis in 
American history” (Lemelin 2001, 51). The Soviets’ bold move was a reaction to western 
plans of creating an independent West German entity. At the Potsdam Conference in 
1945, the Soviet Union and the Western powers agreed on the division of Germany and 
Berlin into four zones of occupation, which would remain part of the same political 
entity. When the US and its Western allies realized that the deal reached with the Soviets 
was unworkable, they decided to merge their zones and create a West German entity. The 
Berlin blockade was an attempt by the Soviets to prevent their former allies to proceed 
with their plan (Lodge and Shlaim 1979, 52).  
Despite leading in the polls, Dewey faced a difficult choice: carry on the attacks 
against Truman’s perceived mismanagement of foreign policy issues, or rally around 
Truman ‘the president’ during a severe crisis.23 For his part Truman declared that 
“foreign policy should be the policy of the whole Nation and not the policy of one party 
or the other (…). Partisanship should stop as the water’s edge” (Divine 1974, 219). 
Congress lost little time in giving Truman the support he needed as both Democrats and 
Republicans approved the airlift announced on June 30 (Lodge and Shlaim 1979, 75). 
Charles Eaton, the Republican chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
underlined the necessity for the US to remain in Berlin: 
                                                
23 The Democrats were blamed for their failure to obtain secure access rights to Berlin at the Potsdam 
conference (Divine 1974, 224). 
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“If the United States should withdraw, it would remove any confidence in 
us as world leaders. It would be more of a fateful calamity to mankind 
than Munich was. It would be a signal to the world that we intend to turn 
over everything to the dictatorship of Russia” (Lodge and Shlaim 1979, 
75). 
 
In the end Dewey decided that recognizing the legal ambiguity of Berlin’s status 
brought about by the mismanagement of the White House would only play in the hands 
of Stalin and legitimize his claims, and instead decided that the Berlin Blockade would 
not be made into an electoral issue (Ramsay 2004, 19). With the fate of his country’s 
foreign policy in the balance, Dewey declared:  
“The present duty of Americans is not to be divided by past lapses but to 
unite to surmount present danger (…). We shall not allow domestic 
partisan irritations to divert us from indispensable unity” (Divine 1974, 
225).  
 
Truman went on to win the election. Dewey for the sake of his country had indeed 
“snatched defeat from the jaws of victory” (Ramsay 2004, 21). Despite an electoral 
victory in sight, the national interest of the US proved in the end too much to brush aside. 
“The fear of war” as noted by Robert Divine “rallied the people around Truman’s 
leadership” (1974, 226).24 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 To be sure other factors played a role in Truman’s victory. Harold Gullan (1998) suggests that internal 
conflicts within the Republican Party as well as Dewey’s excessive cautiousness worked in Truman’s 
favor. Gullan also points out that the Democrats outspent the Republicans throughout the campaign. Yet the 
Democratic Party was itself divided (Lemelin 2001). Henry Wallace who had been FDR’s vice-president 
for four years and later on Secretary of Commerce under Truman decided to run for president on a third-
party ticket. In addition, 35 Democratic delegates from Mississippi and Alabama left the party to support 
Strom Thurmond’s presidential bid. 
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1.2.2.3. JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
 
Perhaps more than the two crises described above, the events of October 1962 were seen 
as severely jeopardizing the national interest of the US (and potentially countless other 
countries) and threatening the survival of millions in what Timothy McKeown describes 
as “our closest brush with thermonuclear war” (2000, 70). Graham Allison sombrely 
remarks: 
“For thirteen days of October 1962, there was a higher probability that 
more human lives would end suddenly than ever before in history. Had the 
worst occurred, the death of 100 million Americans, over 100 million 
Russians, and millions of Europeans as well would make previous natural 
calamities and inhumanities appear insignificant. Given the probability of 
disaster – which President Kennedy estimated as ‘between 1 out of 3 and 
even’ – our escape seems awesome.” (1969, 689) 
 
Ever since Fidel Castro had seized power in January 1959 Cuba was a pressing 
concern for the US administration and a sore point for Kennedy who had greenlighted the 
fiasco that would be the CIA operation at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Yet during the 
fall of 1962 Kennedy had other things on his mind. Congressional elections were looming 
and although the Democrats controlled both the Senate (65-35) and the House of 
Representatives (263-174), a working majority was often missing notably because House 
committees were in the hand of conservatives from the South, and in the Senate southern 
Democrats often opposed Kennedy (Paterson and Brophy 1986). As pointed out by 
Paterson and Brophy “the president and his aides eagerly looked to the forthcoming 
elections to produce a more sympathetic Congress” (1986, 88). Yet midterm elections up 
to that point had almost always been unfavourable to the incumbent’s party. Republicans 
were thus expecting to gain seats in both assemblies and perhaps even become the 
majority party in the House (Paterson and Brophy 1986, 91). However, throughout the 
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first ten months of 1962 the Democratic Party retained a lead in the Gallup polls on 
voters’ preferences – i.e. the Democrats enjoyed a 20 points margin on the Republicans in 
January 1962 but only an 11 points margin in early November (Paterson and Brophy 
1986, 92). Democrats were also perceived as more capable than Republicans to handle 
national problems (Paterson and Brophy 1986, 93). Yet Kennedy’s record with regards to 
Cuba remained problematic with a Louis Harris poll showing a majority of interviewees 
disapproving the President’s actions (Paterson and Brophy 1986, 93). Not surprisingly 
the Republicans tried to make Cuba the main issue of the congressional campaign, 
whereas the Democrats were trying to focus the debate on Medicare (Paterson and 
Brophy 1986, 94). The Republican opposition, it should be pointed out, was critical of the 
Kennedy administration’s handling of Cuba even before the October Crisis. Essentially, 
Republicans were arguing that the missiles installed by the Soviets on the island had an 
offensive purpose, whereas Kennedy described them as defensive or short-range and thus 
unable to reach the US (Paterson and Brophy 1986, 95). In any event, the Republican 
opposition in Congress argued that the US could not stay inactive and had to resort to 
either a blockade or an invasion of Cuba (Paterson and Brophy 1986, 95). In an attempt 
to appease the hawks, Kennedy declared at a press conference held on September 13 that 
he would do whatever needed to be done to protect the security of the country (Paterson 
and Brophy 1986, 96). Even though the president did not adopt their strategy, the 
Republicans had succeeded in promoting Cuba as one of the top issues of the campaign. 
The crisis reached a climax on October 16 when the president was informed that 
photographs taken by a US spy plane two days before revealed the presence of surface-
to-surface missiles – i.e. for offensive purpose – on the Caribbean island. With elections a 
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mere three weeks away, President Kennedy had to take into account the forceful 
alternatives put forth by the hawkish Republicans and the preferences of public opinion, 
which according to polls favoured doing something while avoiding the use of force 
(McKeown 2000, 72). The week that followed can best be described as a long 
brainstorming session involving members of the Executive Committee of the National 
Security Council (better known as ExCom). In light of the massive amount of material 
(notably primary documents) available, Paterson and Brophy conclude that “politics was 
very seldom discussed and did not determine the choice of the naval blockade” (1986, 
100).25 The most ardent critic of Kennedy on Cuba, Senator Kenneth Keating, was not 
invited to offer his ideas. During that fateful week Kennedy carried on campaigning 
across the country, revealing nothing about the extent of the crisis to the public, proof 
enough for Paterson and Brophy that Kennedy did not play politics with Cuba. Most of 
the political elite was not aware of the reconnaissance photographs and of the extent of 
the crisis. As a result criticism, notably from Republican politicians, continued.  
The situation changed dramatically after the full extent of the crisis was revealed 
to the world on October 22 during a television address. Kennedy announced a “strict 
quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba” and gave 
Khrushchev an ultimatum, asking the Soviet leader to “halt and eliminate this 
clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace” (Allison 1969, 704). 
Republicans by and large sided with Kennedy, and Keating himself declared that the 
President had “taken Cuba out of politics” (Paterson and Brophy 1986, 106). Throughout 
                                                
25 Was Kennedy influenced by domestic politics? Clearly the subject was mentioned during meetings and 
Kennedy was keeping a close watch on the opinion polls (Paterson and Brophy 1986, McKeown 2000). 
McGeorge Bundy later acknowledged that congressional pressure did influence the President (McKeown 
2000, 79). 
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the remainder of the crisis the Kennedy administration worked at creating a bipartisan 
consensus by notably bringing top Republicans in foreign-policy meetings (Paterson and 
Brophy 1986, 106). As pointed out by McKeown, “given the pronounced public support 
for the blockade compared to more violent options, the blockade was the ideal response 
in terms of gratifying public opinion” (2000, 74). At the same time, this option was 
strong enough to appease the hawks and other warmongers roaming on Capitol Hill. Even 
the media rallied around the flag following the announcement of the embargo (Kern, 
Levering and Levering 1983). 
By October 29, the White House had reached an agreement with the Soviets, 
essentially putting an end to the crisis. With a week left before the election, the 
Republicans went again on the offensive and renewed their attacks against the incumbent 
arguing that Kennedy’s policy left a communist country and a military ally of the Soviet 
Union in the United States’ back garden. Even worse, by promising Nikita Khrutshev not 
to invade Cuba, Kennedy had in the eyes of the Republican Party essentially renounced 
the Monroe Doctrine (Paterson and Brophy 1986, 107).26 
The November 6 election did not significantly modify the Congress. The 
Republicans gained two seats in the House, where the Democrats retained the majority, 
and lost four seats in the Senate. Paterson and Brophy conclude that the Missile Crisis did 
not change the course of the election: 
“The crisis helped some Democrats and hurt some Democrats; it buoyed 
some Republicans and weakened some Republicans. In many instances 
Cuba was not even a conspicuous campaign issue. The historian cannot 
identify one election in 1962 decided by voter reaction to the missile crisis 
– not a single outcome where the Cuban issue made the difference 
                                                
26 The Monroe Doctrine issued on December 2, 1823, stated that European powers were no longer allowed 
to meddle in the affairs of American countries, thereby making Latin America Washington’s exclusive 
sphere of influence. 
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between victory and defeat. The results of the House and the Senate races, 
in other words, are best explained by the mix of other factors (…): 
personalities and their public images; local politics; domestic issues; 
reapportionment and gerrymandering; superior Democratic Party 
registration; and the nature of the 1960 election.” (1986, 118). 
 
Yet for a week (between October 22 and October 29) the Republicans by and large 
ceased their attacks against Kennedy. It was neither the most heartfelt nor the longest 
rally around the flag but it did halt the Republican momentum. More importantly, it gave 
Kennedy an opportunity to demonstrate his leadership in the worst of times. Although he 
did not choose the hawks’ preferred course of action (a more forceful response), 
Republican critics were silenced two weeks before voters were called to the polls. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Party politics does not always revolve around electoral objectives. In fact, one would be 
tempted to share Juliet Lodge and Avi Shlaim’s remark that “the greater the perceived 
probability of war, the greater is the freedom of key decision-makers from domestic 
constraints” (1979, 74). Of course the value of the above set of historical examples is 
limited in several ways: only one country (and one political system) is taken into account 
and the timeframe is relatively narrow. More importantly the selected events, because of 
their implications, represent cases where foreign policy events are most likely to 
influence the parties. It goes without saying that party behaviour during less intense crises 
must be less influenced by events outside the borders. In many ways this is what the first 
case study points out. In 1940 the United States are just a ‘neutral’ bystander in the 
European military conflict, and political elites can look upon foreign policy as just 
another issue, albeit the most important one, in the presidential campaign. In 1956 a 
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similar situation presented itself in the United Kingdom when Gamal Abdel Nasser 
decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. Anthony Eden, the conservative Prime Minister, 
decided to seize back the canal through a military operation involving France and Israel. 
However, Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition – i.e. the Labour Party – backed by a majority 
of the public opinion decided to oppose this intervention. The Conservative Party was 
itself split between those advocating an even tougher policy towards Egypt and those 
siding with Labour. This unequivocal position on the part of the Labour Party reinforced 
Nasser’s as well as the US government’s determination to oppose the British-led invasion 
and precipitated the failure of the operation. The crisis despite its implications (mainly 
economic) did not threaten the United Kingdom though it dismantled further an Empire 
that had become too much of a burden anyway. The loss of Suez was more a symbolic 
loss, that of a vanishing supremacy. As a result, Labour felt no qualm about opposing the 
government, particularly with public opinion very much against intervention.  
The last two cases (Berlin Blockade and Cuban Missile Crisis) reveal a very 
different logic, particularly in the case of the 1948 election. Here despite a looming 
election and an open road to victory the opposition chose the national interest over the 
electoral interest. The loss of Berlin would have dealt a severe blow to the United States 
and its allies and would have put the next president (Dewey or Truman) in a difficult 
position. The Missile Crisis of 1962 is another proof that when the going gets tough the 
tougher will rally. To be sure the rally only lasted a week but it ended a mere eight days 
before the election. Had the Republican Party only had its best electoral interest in mind 
it would simply not have stopped its attacks against Kennedy, not for a week, not even 
for an hour. 
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The idea of a shift from ordinary politics to extraordinary politics when the 
national security is threatened seems particularly relevant with regards to terrorism. The 
threat might be of a different scale but as Michel Wieviorka and David Gordon White 
point out: 
“A terrorist movement at its height operates like a magnet, drawing 
attention to itself well beyond its terrorist acts per se. Overheating in the 
media, panic in the corridors of power, empty-handedness in the police 
and intelligence services, miscarriages in the halls of justice, and the 
human drama of victims and their families all combine to reinforce the 
image of the terrorist as an all-powerful figure. Conversely, disinterest 
reigns as soon as an incident has passed, and our memories are hardly 
jogged when we see these same terrorist actors, now portrayed as 
miserable figures, at the conclusion of an escapade” (2004, xxix). 
 
If foreign policy crises can temporarily push electoral preoccupations aside and 
activate what Adam Smith (2006) calls the ‘patriotic imperative’ then presumably the 
same holds for terrorist crises. The question then is one of trade-off between partisan 
interests and the national interest, a question to which I will return later. First we turn our 
attention to terrorism, an ancient phenomenon but a relatively recent field of study. 
Chapter 2 
Politics and Terrorism 
 
 
 
“When the Patriot Act was passed, smoke was still coming out of the rubble of the 
Pentagon and the twin towers. We rushed in order to provide some comfort to the people 
of the United States. It was a huge mistake” (Buth Otter, Republican Representative from 
Idaho, August 17, 2003) 
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Introduction 
 
If as Clausewitz famously wrote war is a “continuation of politics by other means” then 
so must be terrorism, which as Bruce Hoffman puts it, is “fundamentally and inherently 
political” (Hoffman 2006, 2).27 From its onset in Mesopotamia more than 4,000 years ago 
terrorism has been used to achieve political objectives – whether those of empires, states 
or groups of individuals – affecting in the process the lives of many and in some cases 
altering the course of history. And yet, terrorism as a distinct field of study is relatively 
young. The discipline really emerged in the early 1970s. Since then the phenomenon has 
been dissected and explored through many different angles. Oddly enough its effects on 
party politics have been until very recently largely ignored. A worrying gap in the 
literature to say the least, especially when one considers that terrorism is in effect an 
attempt to alter the political decisions taken by parties and their elites, that is a negation 
of party politics. 
 The following section is divided into four parts. Section one briefly describes the 
evolution of terrorism throughout history. Section two offers an appraisal of the recent 
evolution of terrorism in the world. The third section discusses terrorism as a concept and 
identifies differences with other forms of political violence. Finally, section four offers a 
review of the literature on terrorism and on its interplay with politics. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 In fact, Weinberg and Pedhazur (2003) point out that parties, notably in Tsarist Russia, resorted to 
terrorism to bring about political changes. 
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2.1. An ancient phenomenon 
 
Human violence is ageless. It is a permanent feature of human behaviour. As novelist and 
historian Ronald Wright (2004, 31) remarked, “we [humans] are at best the heirs of many 
ruthless victories and at worst the heirs of genocide. We may well be descended from 
humans who repeatedly exterminated rival humans – culminating in the suspicious death 
of our Neanderthal cousins some 30,000 years ago”. Yet terrorism is an altogether 
different form of violence. It is different from genocide and different from the primeval 
and permanent terror that came to characterize the life of our early ancestors. It is 
different from other types of violence, notably those associated with the organized crime, 
that deliberately seek to terrorize in order to achieve their goals. Terrorism is in essence 
political; it is about power and can therefore only occur in hierarchical societies.  
Terrorism first emerged around 2,000 B.C. in the first known hierarchical 
communities: the Empire of Sargon and the Assyrian Empire. There the governing elites 
instrumentalized terror to subdue their subjects. As pointed out by Gérard Chaliand and 
Arnaud Blin in their Histoire du Terrorisme, “[La terreur devient] dans les sociétés 
despotiques qui forment la majeure partie de la trame de l’histoire, l’instrument de la 
servitude, le garant de la soumission de la multitude” (2004, 9). What Thomas Thornton 
(1964) aptly called “enforcement terrorism” was first and foremost a means of 
governance for despots and autocrats, but also at times for liberals and democrats. Indeed 
what Michael Walzer has termed “war terrorism”, that is the “effort [by democrats and 
autocrats alike] to kill civilians in such large numbers that their government is forced to 
surrender” – such as the bombings of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Coventry and Dresden during 
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the Second World War – has been the single most murderous terror campaign of the 20th 
century (2002, 5). 
Notwithstanding transnational state-sponsored terrorism, which some 
governments still rely on, enforcement terrorism has receded dramatically over the past 
50 years owing in large part to the democratization process under way in many parts of 
the world.28 However, let us remind ourselves that state terrorism has claimed over the 
course of history countless number of lives, in any case far more than non-state 
terrorism.29 The ‘Reign of Terror’ in its most brutal version has blurred the distinction 
between state terrorism and genocide.30 
Today terrorism is first and foremost associated with sub-state actors. The first 
documented acts of terrorism by non-state entities, or group terrorism as it is often 
referred to, took place in the Roman province of Palestine in the fifth century B.C.. 
However, not until the late 19th century did group terrorism really challenge the political 
establishment.  
It began with the ‘anarchist wave’, which first appeared in Tsarist Russia in the 
1880s before spreading to the rest of Europe (Rapoport 2004). Carlo Pisacane wrote at 
the time that “ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former” adding that “the 
people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are free”, hence 
the expression ‘propaganda by the deed’ first coined by Peter Kropotkin (quoted in 
                                                
28 Hrair Dekmejian distinguishes state-sponsored terrorism with domestic targets (i.e. enforcement 
terrorism) from state-sponsored terrorism with transnational targets which he defines as “the projection of 
coercive force overtly or covertly across territorial boundaries in order to annex territory, establish friendly 
regimes, subvert unfriendly regimes, assassinate or capture enemy leaders, or destroy terrorist bases and 
cells” (2007, 14). 
29 According to David Rapoport (1984), the Thuggee (in the Indian subcontinent) might have been the most 
murderous terrorist group of all time, killing about half-million people over the course of four centuries. 
30 Rudolf Rummel (1994, 15) estimates that over 169 million people have been killed by their own 
governments from 1900 to 1987. 
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Hoffman 2006, 5). The belief amongst anarchists such as Albert Parsons was that 
dynamite “made all men equal and therefore free” (quoted in Townshend 2002, 25). 
Violence was meant to draw attention to their cause and educate the people so that 
ultimately they would support the revolution. Narodnaya Volya (i.e. People’s Will), the 
best known of these Russian groups, targeted exclusively symbols of the state and 
representatives of the Tsar, and was particularly careful not to spread innocent blood. But 
as this phenomenon spread to Western Europe, the Balkans and Asia, this discriminate 
approach soon vanished. By the 1880s the Skirmishers in Ireland had already killed and 
injured innocents (Hoffman 2006). A few years later Émile Henry, one of the most 
notorious anarchists turned terrorist of his time, declared during his trial “Il n’y a pas 
d’innocents!”. Terrorism had entered a new era. 
The anarchist wave all but disappeared at the beginning of the 20th century and 
was soon replaced by an ‘anti-colonial wave’ which lasted from the 1920s to the 1960s. 
Terrorism was used by movements of national liberation as a strategy to wear down the 
colonizing forces. Throughout this period, it became an important aspect of low-intensity 
conflicts fought throughout Africa and Asia. Wars of liberation were fought primarily 
outside the urban areas, and thus guerrilla warfare was still the preferred method for these 
movements.31 Yet terrorism represented a mean to bring the conflict into the cities 
controlled by the adversary (Chaliand and Blin 2004, 236). Terrorism, as a strategy of 
liberation, was particularly successful in Palestine during the British mandate, Cyprus 
and Algeria.  
By the 1970s a social-revolutionary brand of terrorism that aimed at overturning 
the capitalist order appeared with groups such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) in 
                                                
31 The difference between guerrilla and terrorism is discussed later in this chapter. 
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Germany or Brigate Rosse (BR) in Italy. Here again as was the case with the previous 
anarchist wave, acts of violence were meant to awaken the people (Chaliand and Blin 
2004, 260). These radical activists targeted politicians and prominent businessmen, 
usually through assassination or kidnapping. The situation was particularly tense in Italy 
where literally hundreds of these radical groups wrought havoc to the country (a situation 
made even worse by the terrorist activities of right-wing groups). The ‘years of lead’ 
culminated in the kidnapping and subsequent murder of former Prime Minister Aldo 
Moro in 1978, and the killing of 84 people in an explosion at the Bologna railway station 
in 1980 (this one by right-wing terrorists).32 Meanwhile, groups such as the Rote Armee 
Fraktion (a.k.a. Baader-Meinhof gang) and Bewegung Zwei Juni (B2J) in Germany, the 
Weathermen in the US, and Action Directe (AD) in France were conducting similar 
operations although on a smaller scale than their Italian counterparts. 
Red terrorism all but died out at the end of the 1980s, but the ‘nationalist-
separatist wave’ spearheaded by groups such as al Fatah, the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA) and Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), which had emerged in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, proved far more resilient. In fact, PIRA and its splinter groups could 
trace back their ancestry to the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood active in the 1850s 
(Townshend 2002, 77). Most of these groups were able to sustain their activities thanks to 
a relatively large support within parts of the population (and even abroad with the help of 
                                                
32 The expression ‘years of lead’ refers to a German movie entitled Die Bleierne Zeit that tells the story of 
the Ensslin sisters, one of whom decided to join the Rote Armee Fraktion. The movie was directed by 
Margarethe von Trotta and came out in 1981. The expression bleierne Zeit originally came from a Friedrich 
Hölderlin poem entitled Der Gang aufs Land. Trotta used the expression as a metaphor to describe the 
circumstances in which the Ensslin sisters grew up in the 1950s, namely a defeated Germany leaving under 
a ‘lead sky’. The expression was then translated into other languages (notably anni di piombo in Italy 
where the movie was awarded the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival) and came to describe the use of 
bullets by left wing and right wing terrorists in the seventies. See notably an interview with Margarethe von 
Trotta in Der Tagesspiegel: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/art772,2246677  
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the diasporas and other sympathizers). Illustrating the notion that terrorism is a 
continuation of politics, many of these groups carried out their activities in parallel to 
those of legal political representatives of the cause. In the case of Ulster, the existence of 
a political entity (i.e. Sinn Féin), representing the more moderate advocates of the Irish 
republican cause, proved a crucial factor in ending years of terror. 
The ‘religious wave’, which many see beginning with the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran (1979), is the latest manifestation of modern terrorism. Yet in all fairness this brand 
of terrorism is older than the previous waves mentioned above. Terrorist acts perpetrated 
in the name of a religion have been recorded as far back as antiquity (e.g. the Zealots). 
None of the three monotheist religion is blameless. Today, the ‘religious wave’ refers 
primarily to jihadists or radical Islamic terrorists, yet covers other types of religious 
fundamentalism as well: Christian (particularly anti-abortionists), Jewish, Sikh, etc. 
Jerrold Post (2005, 620) remarks that unlike social-revolutionary and national-separatist 
terrorists, many fundamentalists are “not constrained by Western reaction” and are thus 
ready to cause heavy casualties. Yet religion is often just a pretext hiding a political 
objective. Terrorism, regardless of the claims issued by its perpetrators, is always about 
political power. The multiple attacks in New York, Madrid and London were not the 
result of a clash of civilization but rather an attempt by some to export the civil war 
taking place within Islam outside the confines of the Ummah. It is likely that by striking 
at the heart of America’s economic and military power, al Qaeda was trying to get rid of 
the reigning Hashemite in Saudi Arabia (David and Gagnon 2007, 14). 
The coming of age of group terrorism takes place in the early 1970s, a period 
when according to Brian Jenkins, a long-time observer of the terrorist phenomenon: 
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“jet air travel gave terrorists worldwide mobility. The development of 
radio, television, and communication satellites gave them almost 
instantaneous access to a global audience. The increasing availability of 
weapons and explosives made it easy to arm, while the vulnerabilities 
inherent in our modern-technology-dependent society, from electrical 
pylons to Boeing 747s, provided ample targets” (2001, 321). 
 
Modern terrorism remains an instrument of coercion to achieve political goals but its 
methods have evolved. The availability of more lethal weapons coupled with logic 
reminiscent of early anarchists such as Émile Louis – “There are no innocents!” – has 
increased substantially the death toll. Whereas terrorists used to rely on the attack of 
symbols to publicize their cause and rally their supporters they are now more murderous, 
even at times genocidal. Sean MacBride and Michael Collins – both historical figures of 
the IRA – took pride in preserving the lives of innocents and civilians (Leiser 1977, 39-
40). And when an explosion killed 28 people in Omagh, Ulster, in 1998, the real IRA 
issued a public apology claiming it had warned the authorities of the attack.33 Likewise, 
ETA was keen to distance itself from the March 11, 2004, attacks that claimed the lives 
of 191 people by quickly issuing a statement denying its implication in the attack.34 
Terrorism is not all blood and threat of more blood. To successfully spread their political 
message, terrorist groups need to sway part of the public opinion in their favour, and to 
do that they will often try to ‘control’ the damage caused by their attack by issuing 
warning to the authorities and informing them of their next target.35 The relative restraint 
of such groups seems lost on the al Qaedas of this world for which carnage seems to be 
                                                
33 See details on BBC News Online dated August 18, 1998: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern 
_ireland/focus/153629.stm See also, James Dingley, “The Bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: The 
Bombers, Their Tactics, Strategy, and Purpose Behind the Incident”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
24(6): 451 – 465. 
34 For details: http://www.arte-tv.com/fr/histoire-
societe/archives/Madrid_2C_20un_20an_20apr_C3_A8s/rappel_20des_20faits/805266.html 
35 In the case of the Omagh attack a warning was given to the police a few minutes before the explosion. 
The warning (intentionally or unintentionally) gave contradicting information as to exactly which part of a 
shopping street in Omagh was targeted. Tragically the police evacuated the wrong end of the street. 
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the avowed operational objective, although this is a disputed claim. Brian Jenkins offers a 
chilling perspective on terrorism at the start of the 21st century: 
“[The] new breed of terrorists [is] less constrained by the fear of alienating 
perceived constituents or angering the public. Some of the notions that I 
once offered about self-imposed constraints on terrorist behaviour appear 
to be eroding as terrorists move away from political agendas and into 
realms where they are convinced that they have the mandate of God. 
Large-scale, indiscriminate violence is the reality of today’s terrorism” 
(2001, 324). 
 
2.2. A phenomenon on the rise? 
 
Is terrorism in the world, particularly in the Western world, on the rise? Are there more 
casualties today than there were 5 or 10 years ago? In other words, how acute is the 
problem? The answer to these questions is a complex one. Statistics on terrorism have 
been in the past few years confusing and contradictory (David and Gagnon 2007, 3). 
Much like the definition of terrorism – discussed in the following section – the 
interpretation of the evolution of terrorism has become politicized, particularly in an age 
when a global ‘war on terror’ is being waged. Experts using the same datasets and 
analyzing the same figures on global terror will draw different conclusions. This 
controversy is essentially the result of a disagreement as to what should and should not be 
considered a terrorist act and thus be included in datasets recording this type of event. As 
such the definition of terrorism and the interpretation of statistics on this phenomenon are 
closely linked. 
For instance, figures released by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) of 
the US State Department indicate that the number of terrorist attacks worldwide as well 
as the number of people killed in these attacks has increased tremendously over the last 
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few years. These trends, as shown in figure 1, are confirmed by figures from two other 
well-respected data sources, namely those of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism (MIPT) and of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START). The NCTC database indicates that from 2005 to 2006 
the number of fatalities caused by terrorist attacks has increased by 41 percent (from 
14,618 fatalities in 2005 to 20,573 in 2006). For its part, the MIPT database shows an 
increase of around 450 percent from 1998 to 2006, whereas the START database reports 
an increase of 75 percent for 2004 alone.36 
 
Figure 1. Global fatalities from terrorism, 1998 – 2006 (from the Human Security 
Brief 2007) 
 
Sources: MIPT – NCTC – START 
                                                
36 All of these figures are presented in the Human Security Brief available at 
http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/hsb07_chapter1.pdf.  
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This interpretation of these figures has been contested, most notably by 
researchers at the Vancouver-based Human Security Project.37 According to them, the 
increase witnessed by others is largely attributable to the massive increase of civilian 
casualties following the US-led military invasion of Iraq in 2003. Once we exclude Iraq 
from the dataset, the worldwide trend of fatalities caused by terrorism is decreasing (see 
figure 2). The estimate from the Human Security Project, based on the three above-
mentioned datasets, is that the number of fatalities in the world caused by terrorist attacks 
has decreased by 40 percent since 2001.  
 
Figure 2. Global fatalities from terrorism 1998 – 2006, excluding Iraq (from the 
Human Security Brief 2007) 
 
Sources: MIPT – NCTC – START 
                                                
37 See http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/hsb07_chapter1.pdf 
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For 2006, NCTC puts the share of Iraq for terrorist fatalities worldwide at 64 
percent and MIPT puts it at 79 percent. Experts at Human Security Project argue that 
“describing the intentional killing of civilians in civil wars as ‘terrorism’ is both unusual 
and somewhat controversial”. In fact, in their view the majority of civilians killed in Iraq 
since 2003 are better described as victims of insurgencies and victims of the war. As 
such, they are very much comparable to other victims of civil wars in the recent past, 
whether in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia or Guatemala to name but a few. 
In those countries, as in Iraq now, the murder of these civilians was “intentional, 
politically motivated, and perpetrated by non-state groups”, yet it was rarely if ever 
described as terrorist at the time.  
The overlap between acts of terrorism and large-scale political violence such as 
civil war makes it difficult to assess the current situation and decide whether or not 
terrorism is indeed progressing as claimed by NCTC. There is certainly a case for arguing 
that figures on Iraq tend to distort the picture on global terrorism, and that if we treat the 
killings occurring in Iraq as instances of war crime or even genocide, then we might be 
able to conclude that terrorism worldwide is receding rather than increasing. Yet figures 
published by another organization, namely Europol, show that in recent years terrorism in 
the European Union has been increasing considerably.38 The figures for the nine 
                                                
38 See the 2008 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report at: 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-
SAT/TESAT2008.pdf 
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countries taking part in this yearly survey of terrorist activities indicate that from 2006 to 
2007 the total number of reported attacks has risen by 24 percent.39  
The majority of attacks occurring in the European Union were, according to 
Europol, perpetrated by separatist groups operating in Spain and France. Instances of 
Islamic terrorism were very limited. However, globally terrorism by jihadist groups has 
been on the rise. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank (2007) argue that the average yearly 
incidence of jihadist-led terrorist attacks in the world has increased by more than 600 
percent since the beginning of the US-led military intervention in Iraq.40 Even by 
removing Iraq and Afghanistan from the analysis, they still find a 35 percent increase in 
the number of jihadist attacks in the world. 
A limitation on the availability of data makes it difficult to determine trends in 
terrorist activities over longer periods of time. According to the RAND Corporation 
international terrorism grew throughout the seventies and eighties (from a hundred 
attacks in 1968 to roughly 450 twenty years later), declined during the nineties before 
rising again at the start of the new millennium (David and Gagnon, 5). The latest figures 
however would seem to indicate that international terrorism has been declining over the 
past couple of years. Likewise, the number of victims caused by international terrorism 
peaked several times during the eighties and nineties before declining. Subsequently, the 
high death toll caused by the multiple attacks of 9/11 has of course distorted the trend. 
Domestic terrorism on the other hand has been increasing sharply over the past six years, 
                                                
39 Europol compiles failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
40 Their analysis is based on the MIPT dataset. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Iraq Effect: War 
Has Increased Terrorism Sevenfold Worldwide”, Mother Jones, March 1, 2007. 
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an upsurge which coincides with the beginning of the US-led military operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (David and Gagnon 2007, 5). 
Relatively speaking terrorism remains a limited threat. John Mueller points out 
that “the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or ‘al Qaeda-like’ 
operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number of people 
who drown in bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance 
of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000 – about the 
same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor” (Mueller 2006).41  What is also clear 
is that the risk of a CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) terrorist attack 
has been blown out of proportion and is in fact very small (Mueller 2007; 2008). John 
Mueller (2008) estimates the odds of terrorists actually setting off a nuclear bomb at a 
mind-boggling one over 3.5 billion. 
Whether global terrorism is rising is still unclear and depends on how inclusive 
our definition of terrorism is. What is clear however is that the terrorist threat has not yet 
been contained let alone eliminated and still remains a thorn in the side of many 
countries, notably those studied in this thesis. 
 
2.3. A conceptual quagmire 
 
Terrorism is a common occurrence, if not in our immediate surroundings, then at least in 
our ‘imagined community’. The phenomenon is inescapable. Not one day goes by 
without news of carnage somewhere in the world. More than eight years after the tragic 
events of 9/11, the images of the two Manhattan giants crumbling down to the ground are 
                                                
41 www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat.html  
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still haunting our collective memory – although sadly for some ‘rejoicing’ might be a 
more appropriate term. They have penetrated our consciousness, reminding us of our 
mortality and of the vulnerability of our open societies. Who has not once felt unease 
while boarding a commercial airplane? And yet we find it hard to describe this 
phenomenon, let alone define it. Despite massive media coverage and countless books on 
the topic we are still not closer to agreeing on what terrorism is. Experts and academic 
scholars within the field have yet to find a consensus. 
 Finding a definition of terrorism is crucial for this study, for until I do, I cannot 
select terrorist incidents and thus carry out a quantitative and qualitative analysis on the 
political parties’ reaction to this phenomenon. Finding a universally acceptable definition 
is however not my objective. What is of interest for this particular project is how Western 
politicians are likely to perceive terrorism, which may or may not be how others across 
the world perceive this same phenomenon. Equally important is the necessity to 
distinguish terrorism from other types of violence, which sometimes are construed as 
terrorist in nature. After all the aim of this project is to study the reaction of elites to 
terrorism, not to guerrilla, insurgency or any other manifestations of violence. 
 
2.3.1. A blurred meaning 
 
As Jonathan Barker remarks “the walk on the ugly side [of politics] is fraught with 
emotion” (2002, 9). To some extent our failure to agree on a set of words to describe a 
phenomenon as common as terrorism is attributable to emotions. The debate has certainly 
generated over the years more heat than light. What is required then is a dispassionate 
analysis. Unfortunately more often than not, pundits, journalists, politicians and even 
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sometimes scholars seem unable or unwilling to think about terrorism in a clearheaded 
and genuinely impartial way. Yet emotions are just part of the story. Ultimately, our 
failure to agree on a common ground lies in the fact that terrorism is time and culture 
bound, and more importantly political. 
Terrorism is a subjective concept like many others in social sciences. Its meaning 
changes across time, across land and across cultures. As the old adage goes: “one 
person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”.42 One could add, with the 
necessary precautions, that some of today’s terrorists are the heirs to yesterdays’ freedom 
fighters. There are certainly a number of troubling similarities between certain existing 
groups of terrorists and activists of yesteryears, which history books reverently and 
deservedly describe as resistant. The vantage point is here crucial. Mine is that of 
Western mainstream political elites. 
Everything about terrorism is political, even its very definition. It is a pejorative 
term easily manipulated to discredit a political opponent. The problem is as much 
defining terrorism as agreeing on who fits the description of a terrorist. The first modern 
terrorists (i.e. Narodnaya Volya in Russia) accepted to be labelled as terrorists. The term 
carried with it a certain prestige, that of selfless have-nots fighting the ‘good’ fight 
against the haves. Nowadays few would readily accept this damning label and would 
rather be called insurgents or rebels.43 The T-word, as Brigitte Nacos (2007) calls it, is a 
loaded term. Richard Rubenstein (1987, 17-18) pointedly remarks that to “call an act of 
political violence terrorist is not merely to describe it but to judge it (…) nobody wants to 
                                                
42 An axiom which has not been lost on certain international media outlets. The BBC World Service, for 
example, never uses the word terrorist for any group or individual. 
43 Exceptions exists, in 2002 the al Aqsa brigades declared that being called a terrorist group by the US 
government was actually an honor. 
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be called a terrorist; terrorism is what the other side is up to”. As a result perpetrators of 
violence have had to look for more appropriate synonyms. The Ku Klux Klan, for 
instance, described its actions as “resistance to Reconstruction” or “vigilantism” 
(Kronenwetter 2004, vii). 
Recent developments have rendered the task of defining terrorism even more 
difficult. Bruce Hoffman (2006, 1) points out that “virtually any especially abhorrent act 
of violence perceived as directed against society – whether it involves the activities of 
antigovernment dissidents or governments themselves, organized crime syndicates, 
common criminals, rioting mobs, people engaged in militant protest, individual 
psychotics, or lone extortionists – is often labeled terrorism”. This confusion has been 
fuelled, particularly in the post 9/11 period, by a Manichean rhetoric of victims versus 
terrorists. In this battle for the moral high ground the other one, belligerent or mere 
ideological opponent, is often labelled terrorist. In the process, the distinction between 
militant, combatant, activist, resistant or insurgent has been lost. It does not come as a 
surprise then when Walter Laqueur (2004, 232), one of the foremost experts in the study 
of terrorism, remarks that “after thirty years of hard labor there is still no generally agreed 
definition of terrorism”.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
44 Some 20 years before, Laqueur had even abandoned the idea of defining terrorism (Laqueur 1977). 
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2.3.2. A plethora of definitions 
 
Depending on the context and on the framework of analysis different aspects of terrorism 
can come to the forefront (see Schmid 2004). Terrorism is an instrument of political 
strategy, but terrorism can also be seen as a crime, a perspective used for instance by the 
UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism. Its Convention states:  
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention 
[i.e. terrorist offence] if that person, by any means, unlawfully and 
intentionally causes: death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
serious damage to public or private property (…) (quoted in Schmid 2004, 
199).  
 
In fact, Schmid points out that most countries consider acts of terrorism first and 
foremost as criminal offences (2004, 198). 
A plethora of definitions have emerged over the years, all stressing different 
aspects. This is particularly the case in the US where different branches and agencies of 
the same government use different definitions to suit their particular needs and priorities. 
Thus, the State Department defines terrorism as:  
Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience (quoted in Dekmejian 2007, 
17).45  
 
Note that the State Department emphasizes ‘noncombatant targets’ (which includes 
civilians and off-duty military personnel) as a way of protecting US nationals abroad. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for its part, defines terrorism as: 
The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (quoted in 
Dekmekian 2007, 17). 
 
                                                
45 Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). 
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Here the emphasis is on the unlawful nature of terrorism – a characteristic particularly 
suited to a crime-solving agency such as the FBI. A similar definition is used by the 
Department of Defense, which in addition underlines the religious or ideological 
objectives of the terrorists. Finally, the Department of Homeland Security defines 
terrorism as: 
Any activity that involves an act that: 
is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure 
or key resources; and (…) must also appear to be intended 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping (Hoffman 2006, 31). 
 
The focus is here on acts that can cripple the country’s infrastructures. 
 The European Union for its part considers that terrorist acts are offences 
committed with the aim of: 
(i) seriously intimidating a population, or 
(ii) unduly compelling a Government or international organization to 
perform or abstain from performing an act, or 
(iii) seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an 
international organization.46 
 
 This sample of definitions demonstrates that terrorism is more than just an act of 
political violence; it is a tool for policymakers. 
In its simplest expression “terrorism is a form of violent strategy used to alter the 
freedom of choice of others” (Paust 1977, 79). Michael Walzer sees in these acts the 
“deliberate killing of innocent people, at random, in order to spread fear through a whole 
population and force the hand of its political leaders” (2002, 79). Likewise, Raymond 
                                                
46 Council Common Position of December 27, 2001, on the application of specific measures to combat 
terrorism, Official Journal of the European Communities. 
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Aron underlines the psychological dimension of terrorism, which he defines as an 
instrument of pressure designed to bend the will of an adversary by inflicting 
psychological damages that far surpass its purely physical results (quoted in Chaliand and 
Blin 2004, 17). These are just a few examples in an ever increasing list of definitions.  
From this intellectual maelstrom, two definitions stand out, both the result of 
compilations of existing definitions. The first one, put forth by Alex Schmid and Albert 
Jongman (1988), is the outcome of a questionnaire filled by more than 100 scholars and 
in which respondents were asked to define what they understand by terrorism. Out of the 
20 conceptual elements identified throughout these definitions, the authors chose the 16 
that came up most frequently in the answers. The condensed definition that they obtained 
is the following: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to 
assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) 
from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat – and 
violence – based communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperilled) victims, and main target (audiences), turning it into a target of 
terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid and 
Jongman 1988, 28) 
 
This conceptual mosaic is not flawless. For instance, why should terrorism be 
characterized by “repeated violent action”? What about isolated acts of violence? Are 
they any less terrorist? Moreover, are we to understand that assassination is never a 
terrorist act? 
The second definition is also the result of a compilation. The logic used is similar to 
the one used by Schmid and Jongman but rather than analyzing answers to a 
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questionnaire, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedhazur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler (2004) 
examine 73 definitions of terrorism found in 55 articles published by three academic 
journals – Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism -  and produce a definition based on the elements of convergence between their 
text analysis on the one hand, and the analysis of the Schmid-Jongman questionnaire on 
the other. The result is far more concise: 
Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of 
force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role. 
(Weinberg, Pedhazur and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004, 782) 
 
This consensual definition leaves aside any reference to the psychological aspect of 
terrorism as well as the difference between combatants and non-combatants. To be fair, 
the authors themselves acknowledge the limits of such a definition and use the exercise 
primarily as a way of underlining the risks inherent in seeking too large a consensus.47 
Other scholars argue that what makes an act of political violence terrorist are its 
targets. Traditionally terrorists have targeted symbols of the state (including its ‘flesh and 
bone’ representatives), of the economic system, or of religious and ethnical groups. Yet, 
since the end of the 19th century the gun sight has been directed more and more on 
civilians and innocent bystanders. Boaz Ganor (1998), for example, defines terrorism as 
“the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian 
targets, in order to attain political aims”.  
Lately many definitions have referred to non-combatants rather than just civilians, 
the idea being to include militaries as potential victims. Michael Walzer (2006) suggests 
                                                
47
 Rather than agreeing on what should be included in a definition, Jean-Marc Sorel suggests to focus on 
what is not worth incorporating in a definition. In his view “it does not seem useful to specify the type of 
political aim, the means used or to qualify the nature of the perpetrators (by country, group, individual); 
they are already qualified by their objective, which is to spread terror” (Sorel 2003: 371). 
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that only acts intentionally directed against non-combatants are terrorist. However, 
soldiers but also representatives of the government are according to Walzer combatants. 
Following this line of reasoning, Walzer (2006) is telling us that had it not been for the 
presence of non-combatants aboard the plane that crashed into the Pentagon on 9/11 this 
attack – but obviously not the other ones that happened on that day – would not have 
been terrorist. The question concerning the status of soldiers or civil servants, although 
legitimate, creates more problems. Indeed, should one consider the assassination by ETA 
of a municipal councillor in a small Spanish town as a terrorist act or as an act of war 
against the Spanish government? What of the assassination of a retired soldier or of a 
soldier on leave? And what of an explosion in a public place that indiscriminately kills 
passersby? Such an attack could be or could not be terrorist depending on who happens to 
be there at the time of the blast. 
In fact, what really matters to terrorists is often not the direct target but the target 
audience. In his anarchist newspaper Freiheit Johann Most, a late 19th century anarchist, 
reveals a logic that has not aged since. The terrorist, he argues, must capture the public’s 
imagination through the use of outrageous violence (see Garrison 2004). “Target a few in 
a way that claims the attention of many” is the terrorist motto (Crenshaw 1995, 4). The 
role of the media is here crucial and some scholars have underlined the symbiotic 
relationship between terrorism and media. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, 4) for instance 
suggest that “an act of terrorism is in reality an act of communication”. Put differently, 
terrorism relies on the spreading of fear, and the media are incremental in that process, 
their role very much that of merchants of fear. In a fiercely competitive news market, 
blood and drama will attract attention (Nacos 2007, 38). Media allow terrorism “to be 
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everywhere but physically nowhere” remarks Ranstorp (2007, 2). As Nacos (2000, 175) 
points out “without massive news coverage the terrorist act would resemble the 
proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learned of an incident, it would be as if it 
had not occurred”. Wilkinson (2001, 177) shares a similar view and points out that 
“terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which depends upon 
communicating a threat to a wider society”. An unreported terrorist act is still terrorist in 
so far as it kills or injures in an attempt to coerce but it will not affect people’s life, just 
the immediate victims and witnesses. If the news does not spread then there is no fear and 
no coercion is possible. Put somewhat differently, the primary objective of a terrorist is 
not to kill but to get his or her message through. If the message does not get through then 
the act loses its purpose.48  
The argument that terrorism is a media construct gains currency when one sees to 
what extent more blood and more threat is rewarded by more attention. For instance, 
Nacos (2007, 189) observed that in the US increases in terror alerts were reported in lead 
stories, unlike rollbacks which more often than not were ignored. Nacos (2007, 190) also 
observes that following terrorist threats or threat assessments by decision makers, news 
media and particularly television networks tend to magnify threats thereby increasing the 
concerns and fears of the public and elevating the approval ratings of the president. As 
Sloan reminds us, the old adage “if it bleeds, it leads” applies more than ever in the 
electronic age (Sloan 2005, 141). Television has allowed terrorists to go much further 
than Sun Tzu’s motto “Kill one person and frighten a thousand” by literally killing 
thousands and frightening millions. 
                                                
48 See in particular the account by Michael J. Kelly of the hostage crisis at the Turkish embassy in Ottawa 
in 1985 (in Rosenthal et al. 1989). 
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Media outlets it seems act very much as a “force multiplier” (Sloan 2005, 136). 
Ultimately, the media decides whether or not an incident or an act of violence deserves to 
be labelled as terrorist or even reported. In effect then as Philip Jenkins (2003, ix) 
remarks terrorism is “socially constructed (…) the concept is shaped by social and 
political processes, by bureaucratic needs and media structures”.  
These days many incidents pass as terrorist, yet we can only speak of terrorism 
when a specific political intent is involved. This is never clear. Jenkins (2003, 6-7) gives 
the example of Egypt Air flight 990 which crashed near Nantucket, Massachusetts, in 
1999 killing all 217 passengers and crew onboard. Shortly before the crash as the plane 
was diving the co-pilot Gameel al-Batouti repeated in Arabic “I put my trust in God”. 
Was he simply repeating this phrase in a moment of extreme stress as he was trying to 
solve the technical problem at hand? In which case the crash was accidental. Was he 
committing suicide as a result of depression? In which case the crash was criminal. Or 
was he, as some people have argued, carrying out a plan to intentionally crash the plane 
for political reasons (some high-level Egyptian officials were onboard)? In which case 
the incident was terrorist in nature.49 The media covered all three possibilities over the 
course of the investigation. In the end the accidental thesis was confirmed. Yet the 
terrorist thesis lingered on for some time after. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 The Guardian reported that more than 30 Egyptian military officers were onboard including two 
brigadier-generals. The Guardian November 2, 1999. 
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2.3.3. The vantage point 
 
Wanton act for some, act of heroic resistance for others, the perception of terrorism varies 
inevitably from one social and historical context to another. Its semantic ambiguity is 
thus inescapable. Its perpetrator is at the same time martyr and criminal, saviour and 
murderer. The quest for a widely accepted definition is near impossible. 
The vantage point is crucial. The semantic ambiguity of the word terrorism does 
not affect this project too much because what is of interest here is the reaction of western 
mainstream parties and elites to acts of political violence that they themselves perceive as 
unequivocally terrorist.50 Most of the above-mentioned definitions share this western 
vantage point. By and large they define terrorism as a politically motivated criminal 
strategy used by sub-national groups to intimidate governments and populations, and 
limit their freedom of choice by physically striking a few in order to scare many. The 
existing differences are often subtle ones, such as the one that distinguishes non-
combatants from civilians, yet the search for a universal and timeless definition is futile. 
More importantly, even if one were to stumble on a universal definition, there would still 
be disagreement as to whom or which group should be labelled terrorist. After all much 
of the debate hinges on what we view as a legitimate recourse to violence, the tendency 
being to view illegitimate use of violence as terrorist. 
In the end, the choice of a definition for this study is linked to the choice of a 
database for the analysis. Thus inevitably conceptual considerations must accommodate 
operational considerations. The definition chosen for this project is the one used by the 
                                                
50 This being said, more radical elites just like their constituencies might have a different view. They might 
have a different understanding of terrorism and consider it as a legitimate act of political defiance. 
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Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) – the dataset used to create the database introduced in 
chapter 4: 
Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an 
atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others 
into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions 
they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be 
violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or 
threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The 
motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally 
carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other 
criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist 
acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical 
damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a 
particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended 
to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the 
importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to 
discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce 
compliance with their demands. 
 
Yes, this definition is imposed, and it is for a lack of a better word part of the package. 
But for reasons that will become clearer in chapter four, the database to which this 
definition is attached is by far the best option on the market for this study. Yet beyond 
operational considerations, the TKB definition is suitable from a conceptual point of 
view. It incorporates most of the characteristics of terrorism discussed previously: it is a 
political act which aims at coercing and spreading fear by achieving maximum publicity. 
Interestingly, and unlike many other definitions seen previously, this one underlines the 
fact that terrorism might provoke “governmental overreaction” and “discourage dissent”. 
In all fairness, this definition might be slightly too inclusive and too imprecise in some 
instances. For example, the use of the suffixes ‘many’, ‘generally’ and ‘may’ 
demonstrates a certain ambiguity. Yet compared to most definitions used to create other 
databases, this one although not particularly concise is in fact less inclusive. The TKB 
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definition is for instance more discriminate than the one used by the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD – formerly known as the Pinkerton database) which defines terrorism as: 
The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state 
actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, 
coercion or intimidation. 
 
The TKB definition is also less confusing than the one used by ‘Terrorism in 
Western Europe: Events Data’ (TWEED) which defines terrorism in the following way: 
As an act of terrorism is counted an act that has inflicted personal injury, 
or attacks against material targets (property) if the act is of a nature that 
could have led to personal injury or in another way would have a 
noticeable impact on an audience, while at the same time the act was 
committed to direct demands of or raise attention from others than those 
immediately inflicted with personal or material injury. 
 
Finally the TKB stands on its own unlike the one used by WITS which explicitly 
relies on the definitions of other types of political violence to delineate the conceptual 
boundaries of terrorism: 
Terrorism occurs when groups or individuals acting on political 
motivation deliberately or recklessly attack civilians/non-combatants or 
their property and the attack does not fall into another special category of 
political violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence. 
 
Crucially the TKB definition leaves place for interpretation. In many instances, acts 
of political violence are not necessarily as clear-cut as one would hope for. The TKB 
definition allows for borderline cases, such as those taking place during a war, to be 
reviewed separately. In fact, a committee of experts (including renowned specialists such 
as Bruce Hoffman) is in charge of deciding whether borderline and ambiguous cases 
should be included in the TKB database. If anything, such a definition ensures a better 
data gathering process. Thus this definition meets both the need for conceptual rigor and 
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operational flexibility and is therefore well suited for this study. 51  
  
2.3.4. How terrorism differs from other forms of political violence 
 
The discussion of terrorism would not be complete without an effort at distinguishing it 
from other forms of political violence. Indeed, if anything the concept of terrorism has 
become too inclusive. It has become an umbrella definition for all sorts of violent 
behaviours and actions, sometimes only remotely related to any kind of political struggle. 
Terrorism is distinct from other types of violence such as criminal violence 
although both do on occasions overlap as in the case of narcoterrorism. Criminals might 
be using violence as a means to an end, and in the process use similar methods, but their 
purpose is different. Criminals look for personal gains and could not care less about 
changing the political system (Hoffman 2006, 37).  
Terrorism is also different from genocide. It is different in magnitude but more 
importantly in intent. If terrorism aims at coercing a group of people, genocide simply 
aims at wiping out a people whether they represent a class, an ethnic group or a religious 
community. Perpetrators of genocide do not give an option or a choice to their victims, 
nor do they try to intimidate people into submission. Unlike terrorists they do not strike 
people at random. The carnage has no message attached to it for the aim is to leave no 
survivors. To be sure not all mass murders are genocidal. The ‘Reign of Terror’ imposed 
on France by the Jacobins revolutionaries claimed approximately 17,000 victims but the 
                                                
51 In addition to this definition, the Terrorism Knowledge Base offers a list of potential targets: 
Abortion Related, Airports & Airlines, Business, Diplomatic, Educational Institutions, Food 
or Water Supply, Government, Journalists & Media, Maritime, Military, NGO, Other, Police, 
Private Citizens & Property, Religious Figures/Institutions, Telecommunication, Terrorists, 
Tourists, Transportation, Unknown, Utilities. 
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aim was not to wipe out a group of people, though aristocrats were particularly targeted, 
it was to impose a new political system. La grande terreur was meant to force people into 
submitting to the newly created republic. In theory, everyone who embraced the idea of 
the Revolution was safe. No matter the scale of atrocities, the Revolution “retained a 
distinct and perilous political logic: the notion that violence could change political 
attitudes” (Townshend 2002, 41). Nazism on the other hand ruled out any possibility for 
their victims to change their attitude. Townshend remarks that “Nazism required not 
political, religious, or ideological, but biological uniformity – and this lay outside the 
realm of political adaptation” (2002, 44). Unlike the Jacobins, the Nazi were aiming at a 
different purification process, “the purity pursued here was not of virtue but of blood” 
(Townshend 2002, 44). 
Terrorism is also a tactic. As such it is different from other tactics and methods 
such as guerrilla, which involves larger groups of individuals operating as military units 
that can take on regular military forces, seize territories and exercise limited sovereignty 
over an area and its population (Hoffman 2006, 35). Likewise, insurgency has its own 
particularities. As well as conducting irregular military operations like guerrillas, 
insurgents try to gain popular support notably through the use of propaganda (Hoffman 
2006, 35). Terrorists, for their part, “do not function in the open as armed units, generally 
do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military 
forces in combat, are constrained both numerically and logistically from undertaking 
concerted mass political mobilization efforts, and exercise no direct control or 
governance over a populace at either the local or the national level” (Hoffman 2006, 35). 
To be fair, the difference between terrorism and guerrilla is not always clear especially 
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when the two overlap as when a terrorist group evolves into a guerrilla organization like 
the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka did (Dekmejian 2007, 16). In this case, terrorism and 
guerrilla represent two methods of struggle that can be used simultaneously in different 
settings. 
Finally, terrorism is also different from conventional warfare although both might 
occur at the same time. Terrorism and war might be politics by other means, but terrorism 
is not war by other means. Clausewitz argued that war requires “the collision of two 
living forces” (quoted in Townshend 2002, 7), which is not the case with terrorism. 
Townshend points to a difference in their operational logic: “War is ultimately coercive, 
terrorism is impressive. War is physical, terrorism is mental” (Townshend 2002, 15).  
 Terrorism, as Charles Tilly (2004, 12) remarked, might not be “a single causally 
coherent phenomenon” but it has distinctive features. Terrorism is both a type of violence 
and a tactic of combat. Terrorism is not gratuitous and aimless violence, but violence 
with a political purpose albeit not always a clear one. It is, as Michael Walzer noted, “a 
political strategy selected from among a range of options” (2002, 5). 
 
2.4. A recent field of study 
 
Despite being an ancient phenomenon, the study of terrorism is recent. It emerged as a 
subfield of conflict studies in the early 1970s with works by J. Bowyer Bell (1970; 1975; 
1978), David Rapoport (1971; 1984), Paul Wilkinson (1974; 1977), Brian Jenkins (1975), 
Walter Laqueur (1977), Martha Crenshaw (1978; 1981), Leonard Weinberg (1979; 1986) 
and later on Alex Schmid (1982; 1988), Jerrold Post (1984), Bruce Hoffman (1984) and 
Walter Reich (1990) to name some of the most prominent specialists. Most of these 
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pioneers came from other areas of social sciences and sometimes from entirely different 
disciplines or professions: Crenshaw, Bell and Laqueur had worked previously on 
conflict studies, but Jenkins had been a military and Post and Reich psychiatrists. The 
first forays into terrorism as a field of study have been a reflection of this wide array of 
expertise. Yet ever since these early years, “the science of terror”, as Andrew Silke puts 
it, “has been conducted in the cracks and crevices which lie between the large academic 
disciplines” (2004, 1). Neither solely a subfield of political science nor one of 
criminology, terrorism studies still struggle to establish themselves as a distinct 
discipline. However, the development of journals and research centers dedicated to the 
study of terrorism has helped consolidate a niche between more established fields and 
subfields of social sciences.52 
 Many aspects of terrorism remain understudied, sometimes even altogether 
ignored. Silke laments that much of the scholarly output on the subject of terrorism is 
“dross, repetitive and ill-informed”, an echo to Brian Jenkins’ comments in the aftermath 
of 9/11 that “we are deluged with material but still know too little” (Silke 2004, 2). To 
my knowledge, this is particularly the case with the impact of terrorism on political 
parties and elites. This is not to say there have not been some brave efforts produced over 
the years, but none of them have set out to study the behaviour of political parties during 
terrorist crises in a systematic and comparative way. I will come back to this shortly after 
first reviewing some of the more important works on terrorism. 
 
                                                
52 To date there are three peer-reviewed journals publishing articles on terrorism: Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Critical Studies on Terrorism. Published in French 
Cultures et Conflits includes from time to time articles on terrorism. The Centre for the Study of Terrorism 
and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews, one of the oldest research center 
dedicated to the study of terrorism, was established in 1994. 
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2.4.1. The state of the discipline 
 
Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman’s imposing Political Terrorism (1988) represents a 
stepping-stone in the study of terrorism.53 Written before terrorism became fancy beyond 
certain academic circles, it presents the state of research as of the late 1980s, a feat which 
given the exponential multiplication of monographs and articles on the topic since then 
would be near impossible to reproduce today.54 By the end of the 1980s Schmid and 
Jongman had identified only 32 experts on terrorism. As Edna Reid (1997) later 
remarked, this “indicates a static environment; the same hypotheses, definitions and 
theories continued to be analyzed, assimilated, published, cited, and eventually 
retrieved”.55 Of course since then the pool of researchers has increased considerably and 
the scope and methods of research have expanded somewhat. 
Schmid and Jongman’s typology of terrorism research separates the field into 
macro-studies that look at the historical dimension of the phenomenon and in particular 
its origins and its sociological/political causes, and micro-studies that focus on 
psychological aspects, prevention, terrorist strategies and countermeasures. The latter 
category includes studies on governmental responses to terrorism and in particular crisis 
management. However, nothing specific on parties and elite behaviour appears in Schmid 
and Jongman’s opus. In fact, not until later in the 1990s did research on the effects of 
terrorism on institutions, and vice versa, take off. The relationship between democracy 
                                                
53 Originally published in 1984. 
54 And yet Alex Schmid, Albert Jongman and Eric Price are currently working on an updated version of 
Political Terrorism, a tour de force that should become a de-facto reference for terrorism studies 
(Handbook of Terrorism Research, forthcoming in 2009). 
55 Reid herself had identified only 24 scholars whom she qualified as high or moderate producers of articles 
or books on the subject of terrorism. Most other authors were just passing through this field of research, 
which is not to say that their production was any less valuable than scholars who have a long-term 
commitment to the discipline. 
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and terrorism in particular spurred an entire literature with many arguing that 
democracies represent a fertile ground for terrorism (Stohl 1988; Eubank and Weinberg 
1994; 2001; Weinberg and Eubank 1998; Wilkinson 2001; Li 2005; Chaliand and Blin 
2004) and some stressing the resilience of democratic structures (Wardlaw 1994; 
Eyerman 1998). 
The need to understand the roots of terrorism features prominently in the literature 
(Crenshaw 1981; Reich 1990; Howard 1992; Wieviorka 2004; Bjorgo 2005; Abadie 
2006), the received wisdom being for a long time that poverty, oppression and low 
education cause terrorism (see Krueger and Maleckova 2003, Berrebi 2007 and Krueger 
2007 for a rebuttal of this argument). Others researched the psychological dynamics of 
terrorism and often underlined the ordinary nature of terrorists (Ferracuti 1983; Post 
1984; 1987; 2005; 2007; McCauley and Segal 1987; Reich 1990; Silke 2003; Pape 2003; 
2005). 
From the onset scholars have been keen to shed light on particular terrorist 
movements whether nationalist/separatist, revolutionary, neo-fascist, religious or 
international/transnational. Much has been written over the years on the IRA and 
terrorism in Northern Ireland (Bell 1970; 1993; Bishop and Mallie 1987; Cunningham 
1991; Smith 1995; Taylor 1997) and on ETA and Basque separatism (Clark 1984; 
Sullivan 1988; Moruzzi and Boulaert 1988; Douglass and Zulaika 1990; obviously 
numerous books and articles in Spanish have also been published).56 The terrorist 
activities of left-wing and right-wing groups particularly during the 1970s and 1980s 
have spurred an impressive literature (Weinberg and Eubank 1987; Meade 1990; Drake 
                                                
56 Many other similar movements have been adequately covered, for instance the Front de Libération du 
Québec (Fournier 1998; Leroux 2002; Tetley 2007 to name a few) or Zionist groups such as the Stern Gang 
(Heller 1995) or the Irgun (Clarke 1981).  
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1995; Sommier 2000; Giovagnoli 2005 on Italy; Hess et al. 1988; Rabert 1995; Aust 
1998; Kraushaar 2006 on Germany; Della Porta and Rucht 1995 on Italy and Germany; 
Hamon and Marchand 1986; Dartnell 1995 on France; Bjorgo 1995 on the far right).57 
More exotic forms of terrorism such as ecoterrorism (Lee 1995 on the group Earth First; 
Arnold 1997) and animals’ rights activists (Jasper and Nelkin 1992) have also received 
some scholarly attention. 
The interplay between religion and terrorism represents one of the main avenues 
of research. Obviously the events of 9/11 have been incremental in filling up library 
shelves with monographs and articles dealing with Islamic fundamentalism in general 
and al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah or Hamas in particular (see notably Gunaratna 
2002; Esposito 2002; Burke 2003; Guidère and Morgan 2007; Zaki 2007; Samaan 2007). 
Here the objective is as much understanding the roots of Jihad, notably sociological and 
psychological, as analyzing the organizational and operational structures of these groups 
and networks (Sageman 2004; 2008; Vidino and Emerson 2005; Nesser 2006). Yet the 
literature on religious terrorism is neither new nor limited to jihadist movements. David 
Rapoport’s seminal article ‘Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions’ 
was published in 1984 and Mark Juergensmeyer’s Violence and the Sacred in the Modern 
World in 1992 (see also Marty and Appleby 1995 on fundamentalism across religions; 
Baird-Windle and Bader 2001 on Christian anti-abortion terrorism; Lifton 2000 on the 
Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo; Sprinzak 1998 on Jewish terrorism; Karpin and Friedman 
1998 on the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin). Years before al Qaeda’s fait d’arme 
scholars were publishing on Islamic fundamentalism (Taheri 1987; Kramer 1990 on 
                                                
57 Michel Wieviorka’s Société et terrorisme (1988, also published in English as The Making of Terrorism 
2004) is particularly interesting as it covers various European, Middle Eastern and international groups. 
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Hezbollah; Khelladi 1992 on Algeria; Kepel 1993 on Egypt) and international terrorism 
(Oots 1986; Kegley 1990). 
The turn of the century brought to the forefront new dimensions and new threats – 
notably Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – for which the expression “new 
terrorism” was soon coined (Laqueur 1999). Yet much like intelligence agencies, most 
scholars failed to anticipate the events of 9/11. In retrospect, a number of events 
occurring in the 1990s from the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 to the 
targeting of US embassies in Africa in 1998 hinted as to where the attention should be 
focused. But in the end, much more was said and written about millenarian groups and 
the fear of major actions surrounding Y2K than about al Qaeda and Bin Laden. As Bruce 
Hoffman points out:  
“Until 9/11 (…) the conventional wisdom was that terrorists would abjure 
from carrying out mass casualty attacks using conventional weapons and 
would shun CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear) weapons 
simply because there was little reason for them to kill en masse when the 
death of a handful of persons often sufficed” (Hoffman in Silke 2004, 
xvii). 
 
As a result of the events of 9/11 the publication of books and peer-reviewed 
articles on terrorism is booming. Recently The Guardian reported that every six hours a 
new book on terrorism is published – and this is just for titles in English.58 In fact, the 
great majority of all books ever written on terrorism – perhaps as much as 90 percent – 
have been written after 9/11.59 As for articles, the social science citation index indicates 
that there were a little over 100 articles related to terrorism published in 2001. By 2002 
this figure was multiplied by three, and in 2007 about 2,300 citations were recorded.60 
                                                
58 Source: The Guardian on July 3, 2007. 
59 Source: The Guardian on July 3, 2007. 
60 Source: The Guardian on May 13, 2008. 
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The task of reviewing such a literature much like Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman did 
in the mid-eighties appears daunting.61  
The post 9/11 period has witnessed a renewed interest for suicide terrorism, even 
though this tactic is relatively ancient, and has spurred a debate on the extent of the role 
played by religion (Merari 1990; Bloom 2005; Pape 2005; Gambetta 2006; Pedazhur 
2006). There is also a renewed and at times exaggerated interest for dubious catastrophic 
scenarios including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), notably nuclear devices, 
falling in the wrong hands. The perceived threat of WMD was already tackled by B.J. 
Berkowitz et al. in Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons (1972), 
and in 1976 Brian Jenkins asked ‘Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?’ (more recently Roberts 
1997; Tucker 2000; Hills 2002; Allison 2004; see Mueller 2005; 2007; 2008 for a critical 
view). The post 9/11 period has also seen the publication of numerous studies on the 
economic impact of terrorism (notably Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Chen and Siems 
2004; Enders and Sandler 2006).  
Finally, counterterrorism and antiterrorism have always represented two 
particularly popular lines of research both before and after 9/11 (Hewitt 1984; Wolf 
1989; Crenshaw 1989; Schmid and Crelinsten 1993; Howard and Sawyer 2004; Crank 
and Gregor 2005). This literature also raises a series of normative questions such as 
trade-offs between civil liberties and national security (Wilkinson 2001; Parker 2007; 
Holmes 2007). The seemingly ever increasing preeminence of prescriptive works on 
counterterrorism and antiterror legislation is a reflection of a discipline that today exists 
                                                
61 Schmid and Jongman remarked then that roughly 6,000 books and peer-reviewed articles dealt with one 
or the other aspect of terrorism. 
   
 
79 
largely outside of academia, in organizations and think tanks financed by governmental 
agencies. 
 
2.4.2. Party politics and electoral behaviour in a terrorist context 
 
So far the state of research on the interplay between terrorism and party politics is 
particularly disappointing. A large and relevant body of literature simply does not exist. 
Passing and superficial remarks or assumptions are unfortunately the rule. Some works 
(e.g. Charters 1994) have looked at the institutional context of terrorism but stopped short 
of actually studying the interaction between party politics and terrorism. Adrian Guelke 
and Jim Smyth’s (1992) account of the electoral process in Northern Ireland during the 
1980s was a welcomed exception, as was Michael Cunningham’s British Government 
policy in Northern Ireland, which described the ‘spirit of accord’ that prevailed between 
the two main parties on Ulster-related terrorism. Particularly noteworthy is also David 
Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg’s The Democratic Experience and Political Violence, 
which underlines the often overlooked link between elections and violence (2001). 
Similarly, Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur’s classical Political Parties and 
Terrorist Groups (2003) reminds us that the difference between political parties and 
terrorist organizations is not as important as one would think, and that parties have been 
known to engage at times in non-electoral activities and rely on violence to reach their 
objectives.62 
Although 9/11 led to a burgeoning of publications in the field of terrorism studies, 
a research output on the implications of terrorism on domestic politics, let alone on party 
                                                
62 This remark applies particularly to autocratic regimes where the absence of electoral processes compels 
political parties to rely on other means to further their liberal ideals. 
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politics, was still conspicuously absent. In a notable exception Holmes and Gutiérrez de 
Piñeres (2002) showed how Alberto Fujimori had bolstered public support for his 
program of economic stabilization by bringing terrorism in Peru under control. 
Elsewhere, Jacobson (2003) argued that terrorism influenced voters’ choice at the 2002 
US mid-term elections. 
The literature on the effects of terrorism on domestic politics took off in the 
aftermath of the attacks on Madrid’s transportation system in 2004. Rarely before, if ever, 
had a terrorist attack of such magnitude been carried out so close to a national election. 
The implications on Spanish politics were almost instantaneous as the socialist party 
(PSOE) was able in the eleventh hour to overcome its deficit in the poll to claim an 
electoral victory. Thereafter the impact of terrorism on electoral campaigns and election 
results generated a number of studies with for instance Garfinkel (2004) suggesting that 
the threat of terrorism influences political competition, and Montalvo (2006) 
demonstrating that the Madrid bombings had a substantial impact on the election results 
by notably bringing to the polls people who had not voted previously. Spanish politics 
and the attacks of March 11 remained the flavour of the day with studies by Chari (2004), 
Colomer (2005), van Biezen (2005), Bali (2007), and Olmeda (2008). Others looked at 
the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on US politics. Campbell (2005) in particular argued that 
Bush’s 2004 reelection was closer than expected because of a declining public support 
for the military operation in Iraq. For their part, Oates and Postelnicu (2005) 
demonstrated how both US and Russian political elites tried to instrumentalize the issue 
of terrorism for their electoral benefit during the 2004 round of elections. 
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Others like Berrebi and Klor (2006) have looked at the behaviour of Israeli parties 
during terrorist crises and have suggested, among others, that the level of terrorism 
influences electoral results, and vice versa. In their latest article on Israeli politics, 
Berrebi and Klor (2008) argue that terrorist attacks occurring within three months of an 
election increase support for parties on the right of the political spectrum.  
Despite this burgeoning literature, comparative studies on the effects of terrorism 
on the domestic political game have been scarce. George Kassimeris’ collective effort 
Playing Politics with Terrorism (2007) has shed light on the interplay between politics 
and terrorism in several countries but has done so without the benefit of a unified 
framework of analysis that would have allowed for cross-country comparisons. More 
recently Indridason (2008) in a study on 17 Western countries has argued that terrorist 
activity influences the formation of coalition governments. 
Finally this round-up of the state of research would not be complete without a 
reference to the literature on crisis management, which over the years has produced some 
very interesting studies on governmental reaction to terrorism and other related crises 
(Rosenthal et al. 1989; and more recently Boin et al. 2005; 2008). However the focus of 
these works is more on government’s handling of affairs during critical times and not so 
much on party politics and non-governmental political elites. Moreover terrorist attacks 
are just one of many sorts of crises (man-made or natural) used to illustrate the reaction 
of governments. 
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Conclusion 
 
Terrorism is a political act as potent today as it was 4,000 years ago when tyrants used it 
as an instrument of coercion. Relied upon by states and sub-state actors alike, terrorism 
has brought down empires, triggered wars, and led to millions of deaths. Its impact on our 
societies is inescapable, and so is its impact on politics. For what is terrorism but a 
negation of the peaceful practice of democracy. Terrorist groups are the exact opposite of 
what political parties stand for. They seek to bypass the processes of representative 
democracy by coercing rather than by convincing. And yet our understanding of the 
impact of terrorism on the domestic political game has not improved markedly since the 
pioneering days of terrorism studies. 
To be sure, the attacks of 9/11 in the US and 3/11 in Spain have transformed 
terrorism studies by bringing into the discipline much needed input from scholars 
working in other fields. Yet, whereas there is an information overload on certain aspects 
of terrorism, there is too little on other aspects. It is particularly striking that so much is 
published on counterterrorism (notably with regards to civil liberties), yet so little is 
written on the effects of terrorism on political parties and their elites. At the end of the 
day, those political elites are in charge of responding to terror and devise counterterrorist 
legislations. Understanding how terrorism affects their behaviour as politicians, 
legislators and decision-makers is therefore crucial. My own modest effort is an attempt 
at analyzing whether terrorism (domestic and international) changes the way party 
politics operates, and in particular whether it brings governmental elites and opposition 
elites closer, the implication being that a rapprochement between these two sets of actors 
can have an impact on the response to terror, and in particular on counterterrorist 
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legislation, but also on electoral outcomes. Do parties and elites rally around the flag or 
rail against the government in times of crises? This central question, which has been 
touched upon in chapter one with regards to foreign policy crises, is addressed this time 
in the context of terrorist crises. 
 
 
Chapter 3 
In the Shadow of the Flag: Patriotic Imperative vs. Partisan Interest 
 
 
 
“L’amour de la patrie est la première vertue de l’homme civilisé” (Napoléon Bonaparte, 
Maximes et Pensées) 
 
 
 
“On ne dispute pas sur des cadavres, c’est vrai; on ne se dissoute pas sur des cadavres, 
c’est encore vrai. Mais il faut faire en sorte qu’ils ne se multiplient pas. Sinon la politique 
est fondée à s’en emparer” (Philippe Boucher, Le Monde) 
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Introduction 
 
On September 14, 2001, atop rubbles of concretes and mangled steel in what would be 
known from now on as Ground Zero, President Bush grabbed a bull horn and addressed a 
crowd of rescuers amid chants of “USA! USA!”. The words pronounced by the President 
mattered little. Here at Ground Zero Bush, the incidental president, became commander-
in-chief of a nation at ‘war’. The American people were invited to pray for the lost ones 
and support the troops. As for the US Congress, all it could do was stand still in the 
shadow of the flag and hope for a short war.63 A week later Bush declared: “The war will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and 
defeated”.64 
 In his study of consociationalism Arend Lijphart (1968; 1969) suggested that 
external threats provide political elites with an incentive to cooperate across partisan 
cleavages. Historical examples of this type abound, not just in the US, and tend to suggest 
that in times of uncertainty rallying around the government or the head of state is a 
common reflex. Yet examples to the contrary exist as well. The various ways in which 
elites and public opinions across the world reacted to the impending military invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 by US-led coalition forces are a case in point. Unfortunately, if an important 
literature exists on the behaviour of elites and public opinions during foreign policy 
crises, little has been written on the behaviour of parties during terrorist crises. Thus, one 
is left to wonder whether the aftermath of 9/11 is atypical or not. 
                                                
63 According to the Washington Post, Wal-Mart sold 88,000 US flags on September 12, 2001, up from 
6,400 flags sold on the same day a year before. Washington Post, September 13, 2001. 
64 The New York Times, September 20, 2001. 
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The following chapter begins by a discussion of what constitutes a rally around 
the flag. I proceed by reviewing the two main contentions on why and how rallies 
develop. I then discuss how political elites, media and public opinion might affect each 
other’s reaction during critical times. In the second section, I discuss the notion of the 
patriotic imperative and how it might take precedence over the partisan interest, and I put 
forth my first hypothesis. The third and final section introduces the magnitude-repetition 
model, identifies key variables likely to influence the reaction of political elites to acts of 
terrorism, and presents a series of hypotheses. 
 
3.1. The rally-around-the-flag phenomenon 
 
Put simply, a rally around the flag is a very large movement of public support in favour 
of a government or whoever might be holding the executive power. Such a popular 
movement generally aims at defending the country in the face of adversity, a sort of levée 
en masse reminiscent only in spirit of this formidable army of ragged sans-culotte that 
coalesced in Valmy to defend the soon to be proclaimed Republic.65 In the following 
section I discuss the rallying phenomenon and differentiate it from other forms of 
support. I then look at why and how rallies develop. Finally, I assess the influence of 
political elites during critical times. 
 
 
 
                                                
65 Although there are rallies in support of other types of community (e.g. religious communities), we will 
consider in this thesis only rallies around the flag, that is in support of the state – i.e. its symbols or 
representatives. 
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3.1.1. Rallies and other forms of public support 
 
As witnessed in the aftermath of 9/11, rallies around the flag are a powerful phenomenon 
that can literally bring party politics to a standstill and severely limit for a period the flow 
of criticism coming from mainstream political elites and media outlets. However, the 
concept of rally is still often misunderstood and misused by scholars and pundits alike. 
Surges in approval ratings of the president or the head of the government in particular are 
often seen as bona fide rallies when in fact they might only reflect a higher degree of 
appreciation within parts of the general population.66 As a result, rallies around the flag 
are often seen as one-dimensional forces arising within the population and revealed by 
opinion polls. What constitutes a rally is then a matter of interpretation as to how steep – 
i.e. in terms of percentage points – the surge in the approval rating needs to be. 
Approval ratings are just part of the story. Rallies cannot simply be equated with 
instant plebiscites in the polls and must encompass other dimensions as well. Evidently 
the support must be massive but it must also come from different segments of society. It 
is my contention that a rally around the flag definition should incorporate this 
multidimensional aspect. Tentatively I define a rally as a movement of widespread 
support in favour of the government within the mainstream political elite – crucially from 
the opposition parties – an equally widespread support within the general population, and 
last but not least a support from most media outlets.67 Obviously what qualifies as 
‘widespread support’ is arbitrary, particularly with three indicators involved, and is 
                                                
66 Marc J. Hetherington and Michael Nelson, for instance, describe a rally effect as “the sudden and 
substantial increase in public approval of the president that occurs in response to certain kinds of dramatic 
international events involving the United States” (2003, 37). Cindy Kam and Jennifer Ramos, for their part, 
state that “rally events refer to a dramatic upsurge in presidential approval, triggered by an international 
crisis” (2008, 620). 
67 I present here a conceptual definition. I will present in the methodological chapter an operational 
definition better suited to the gathering of data. 
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discussed at more length at the end of this section when I try to disentangle the interplay 
between media, elites and general population. The point, however, is that a rally should 
encompass more than just favourable public opinion polls.  
This being said, we would not expect the support to be even across the full 
spectrum of a society's groups and subgroups. Someone, somewhere, is always going to 
disagree and refuse to join the rally no matter how severe the crisis is.68 Radicals and 
fringe elites, in particular, might have a different response reflecting a different political 
agenda. And yet, there are throughout history instances of near complete support for a 
government. The inception of major wars obviously provides the incentive to rally, even 
for radicals. A well-known example is that of the French and German socialists in the run 
up to World War I, who despite their initial reluctance to support a ‘bourgeois’ war 
eventually rallied around the flag – what the French called union sacrée – just days 
before the armies received their marching orders (Eley 2002). 
 
3.1.2. Why rally? Two competing explanations 
 
John Mathews (1919, 213) in a pioneering article on political parties’ attitudes during 
military conflicts remarked shortly after the end of the First World War that “one effect 
of war upon the party system (…) is to bring about, at least for a time, a relatively greater 
stability of party control, if not complete quiescence of partisanship, either through 
coalition or through cessation of party opposition, or both”. He concluded, however, that 
this union of political elites and parties was neither perfect nor durable:  
                                                
68 Phil Scraton (ed.) presents a patchwork of dissenting voices on the events of 9/11 and their aftermath in 
Beyond September 11: An Anthology of Dissent (2002). 
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“While there may be practical unanimity upon the question of entering the 
war, there is more likelihood of a difference developing in the reaction of 
the parties toward the questions involved in the method of prosecuting it 
and of terminating it” (Mathews 1919, 214). 
 
Whilst the capacity of wars and diplomatic crises to trigger rallies has been 
acknowledged by many scholars (Polsby 1964; Waltz 1967; Mueller 1973; MacKuen 
1983; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Brody 1991; Oneal and Bryan 1995; Hymans 2005; and 
many others), there is far less agreement as to how and why this rallying process comes 
about. Two main explanations have emerged over the years: the ‘patriotic reflex’ 
interpretation put forth by John Mueller (1973), and the ‘opinion leadership’ explanation 
put forth by Richard Brody (1991). 
 
3.1.2.1. The patriotic reflex 
 
Although he was not the first one to detect a propensity amongst people to rally in times 
of crisis, John Mueller was the first to go beyond the passing remark and to offer 
systematic insight into the phenomenon. To be fair, Mueller’s seminal work War, 
Presidents and Public Opinion dealt with more than just rallies, and his contribution to 
understanding political behaviour is far more extensive than that. His reflections on 
rallies were part of a larger study on the causes of the downward trend of presidential 
popularity in the US – rallies being studied as a case of temporary upturn.  
Mueller (1973, 209) suggests that people will rally around the flag in the wake of 
specific, dramatic and sharply focused international events directly involving the US and 
its president.69 They will do so in the hope of maximizing their nation’s prospect in the 
                                                
69 Since then most studies on rallies around the flag have focused exclusively on the United States of 
America. 
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crisis at hand. According to Mueller, six types of events have the potential to trigger 
rallies: sudden US military interventions abroad such as the Bay of Pigs (1961), major 
military operations in ongoing wars like the Tet Offensive (1968), major diplomatic 
developments such as the 1948 Berlin Blockade or the announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine (1947), dramatic technological developments like the launch of Sputnik (1957), 
meetings between the American president and his Soviet counterpart, and the start of 
each presidential term.  
Interestingly, international terrorism was not listed as a potential catalyst. Yet 
terrorist attacks certainly fit the above description of events likely to trigger rallies, and it 
seems obvious that international terrorism could be added to Mueller’s list of events 
alongside major military or diplomatic crises. Mueller’s omission was likely due to the 
fact that in the early 1970s – i.e. the aforementioned War, Presidents and Public Opinion 
was published in 1973 – international terrorism was still in its nascent phase and not yet a 
major security concern for the White House. The attack by the Palestinian organization 
Black September at the Munich Olympic Games had literally just happened and US 
citizens were still relatively safe within their own borders.70 
Mueller also excludes domestic crises, which in his view are more “likely to 
exacerbate internal divisions” (1973, 209). In addition, Mueller considers that only 
sudden events can trigger rallies, whereas the impact of gradual changes on public 
attitudes is likely to be diffused. Obviously economic recessions and chronic 
environmental degradations lack the suddenness of a declaration of war, but one could 
argue that even the most sudden foreign policy events often unfold over longer periods 
                                                
70 Munich stands out for the sheer audacity of the act, which insured an instant and by the minute 
international coverage of the hostage crisis. However, already in the 1940s and 1950s actions by groups 
such as Irgun, the Stern Gang and the FLN had drawn worldwide attention through similar strategies. 
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before they reach a breaking point. This being said, the argument of suddenness is far 
more compelling than the one about domestic events. Domestic events such as the death 
of a political figure, or more joyful moments such as celebrations can trigger rallies just 
like international events.71 
Mueller’s pioneering work has spurred a host of studies based on the assumption 
that public support varies depending on how events unfold on the battlefield – i.e. on the 
number of casualties. Essentially, the ‘casualty hypothesis’ holds that the more battle-
deaths there are, the less people will support their government (Gartner and Segura 1998; 
Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2006; Karol and Miguel 2007). In the end, the general 
population will rally if the benefits of a successful war are perceived as greater than the 
costs. 
The patriotic reflex explanation has attracted a fair amount of criticism over the 
years, notably for its inability to account for the fact that not all specific, dramatic, and 
sharply focused international events trigger rallies or have similar impacts on the 
president’s approval ratings (see in particular Kernell 1975; Lee 1977). Still, hardly 
anyone would dispute the fact that elites’ behaviour in such critical times is closely linked 
to the severity of the event. Mueller, however, stops short of explaining the process by 
which different groups of people will overcome their disagreements, perhaps even their 
enmity or distrust, to rally in support of their leader. In fact, he does not distinguish 
between the reaction of the political elite and that of the general population. In his view, 
                                                
71 Following France’s triumph in the 1998 football World Cup President Jacques Chirac gained 15 points of 
popularity overnight – from 53 percent to 68 percent of respondents approving his action (www.ipsos.fr). 
Whether this constitutes a full-fledged rally is doubtful. Despite joining in the celebration the opposing elite 
certainly did not rally. 
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the rally is essentially the result of a patriotic reflex that encompasses all segments of 
society – i.e. decision-makers, opinion leaders, and ordinary citizens alike.72 
 
3.1.2.2. The opinion leadership explanation 
 
Richard Brody fills the theoretical gap left by the patriotic explanation by adopting a 
different line of reasoning. Instead of looking at what kind of events triggers rallies in the 
first place, Brody focuses his attention on how rallies develop or rather how criticism of 
the government is subdued (Brody and Shapiro 1989; Brody 1991). Like Jong R. Lee 
(1977) and Karlyn Keene (1980) before him, Brody attempts to account for the puzzling 
fact that Americans, by and large, seem to rally around their presidents following major 
international events “regardless of the success or failure of the U.S. policy”, while at the 
same time explaining the few instances when they do not rally (Brody 1991, 53). A rally 
when things go well and the president is a positive force seems natural, but what of rallies 
in support of faulty policies and blatant mismanagement by the executive branch of the 
government? 
Unlike Mueller, Brody makes a distinction between different actors of public life, 
namely the political elite, the media and the general population. Brody suggests that in 
times of crisis, “when events are breaking at an unusually rapid pace, when the 
administration [i.e. the White House] has a virtual monopoly of information about the 
situation, opposition political leaders tend to refrain from comment or to make cautiously 
                                                
72 Psychological theories provide some insights into the behavior of people during trying times and suggest, 
for instance, that members of a group are likely to be more cohesive when facing a common threat (Huddy 
2003), notably a terrorist threat (Landau et al. 2004). Landau et al. suggest that “heightened concerns about 
mortality should intensify the appeal of charismatic leaders” (2004, 1136). 
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supportive statement” (1991, 63).73 This restraint on the part of opposition elites is 
explained to some extent by a natural tendency to be supportive of the president when 
American interests abroad are at stake – Mueller’s thesis. However, Brody insists that the 
decision of opposition elites to hold back is above all a consequence of being out of the 
loop – presumably only top White House officials are in it – and not having the necessary 
information to criticize the government. What this means is that during foreign policy 
crises the opposition is not able to provide the media with critical views on the 
government and its handling of the crisis. In turn, the media cannot use its traditional 
sources within the opposition elite to offer balanced news. At the end of the line, this 
absence of criticism projects an image of a government doing a fine job and thus 
encourages the general population to rally as well. This situation prevails until the 
opposition elite makes such countervailing evaluation of the government’s handling of 
affairs available to the media, and they in turn make it available to the general population.  
Bruce Russett follows a similar line of reasoning and argues that “some of their 
[the leaders] best opportunities to insulate their actions from domestic politics occur in 
the realm of foreign and national security policy” (1990, 9). Russett remarks that “much 
foreign policy is literally and figuratively distant from most citizens; its interpretation is 
thus particularly subject to selective release of information and careful media 
presentation – a prime candidate for symbolic politics” (1990, 34). Cindy Kam et al., for 
their part, suggest that “political sophistication is likely to shape which citizens hear elite 
messages and to what extent they resist or accept them” (2004, 23). The argument, based 
on John Zaller’s Reception-Acceptance model (1992), suggests that rallies will be largest 
amongst moderately politically aware individuals. Similarly, Adam Berinsky (2007) 
                                                
73 It is worth underlying the fact that Brody considers remaining silent a sign of support. 
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suggests that people, notably poorly informed ones, will take cues from the elite and that 
if they choose to support their government it is not because the war appears successful 
but because their elites chose to rally. Berinsky argues that the ‘elite cue’ theory explains 
why the mass public remained supportive of the US government all through the Second 
World War even though casualties increased markedly from 1944 to April 1945.74 
Others have been more critical of Brody’s thesis. Matthew Baum (2002) in 
particular finds that elite support for the president – especially from the opposition party 
– while perhaps necessary, is not a sufficient condition for a rally. More recently, Baum 
and Groeling (2004) have gone as far as suggesting that elites do not in fact suspend 
partisan attacks in times of crises. Lian and Oneal (1993) argued similarly that there was 
no consistent rally effect following the use by the President of military force. Others have 
pointed out that Brody’s understanding of the rallying phenomenon is incomplete; the 
argument being that the support offered by the opposition elite is often nothing more than 
a reaction to the popular mood (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). In other words, the 
mechanism is circular; the elite avoids criticizing the president because it believes public 
opinion is backing him. 
Finally, at a contextual level, Robert Entman (2006) suggests that since the end of 
the Cold War events taking place on the international scene have become more 
ambiguous and culturally less congruent, making it difficult for the White House to frame 
foreign policy news the way it wants. In other words, ambiguity opens space for dissent. 
However, Entman (2006, 18) argues that during culturally congruent crises such as the 
multiple attacks of 9/11, elites, media and public will fall into line. Norris, Kern and Just 
                                                
74 Despite being a resolute opponent of Mueller’s ‘event response’ theory, Berinsky still acknowledges that 
some cataclysmic events such as 9/11 and the attack on Pearl Harbor can directly influence public opinion. 
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suggest that “in times of shared crisis, a sense of threat often means that journalists freely 
offer their collaboration. Even if journalists seek opposing views on government war 
policies, they are constrained by their dependence on government success in order to 
write the news” (2003, 296). Moreover “even if politicians and journalists have doubts or 
disagreements, they will probably suppress explicit criticism out of concern for damaging 
public morale or fear of public backlash” (Norris et al. 2003, 298). 
 
3.1.2.3. Patriotic leadership? 
 
William Baker and John Oneal (2001) conducted an assessment of both theoretical 
approaches and concluded that the opinion leadership model accounted more accurately 
for the phenomenon than the ‘patriotic reflex’ model. In their view, “the public does not 
rally in response to crises in and of themselves, but rather to the president’s handling and 
presentation of events (…)” (2001, 682). Cindy Kam and Jennifer Ramos (2008) reached 
a different and more nuanced conclusion by analyzing the evolution of public support for 
president Bush in the aftermath of 9/11. In their view “rallies occur not just as a 
consequence of elite discourse (Brody 1991), but also as a consequence of patriotism – 
through renewed emphasis on national identity brought on by presidential rhetoric” (Kam 
and Ramos 2008, 641). 75 
Although they start from different premises, Mueller and Brody’s views are not 
necessarily incompatible with one another. For instance, Jacques Hymans (2005) adopts 
                                                
75 It is worth noting that others have distanced themselves from Brody’s and Mueller’s interpretations, 
stressing notably the importance of individual-level dynamics. For instance, Sigelman and Conover study 
of public opinion during the Iranian hostage crisis indicates that support of the President (in this case 
Jimmy Carter) is enhanced “if one holds a favorable personal image of the President, if one’s own policy 
preferences are congruent with the President’s actions, and if one belongs to the President’s party” (1981: 
303). 
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an approach midway between the patriotic and opinion leadership explanations by 
suggesting that four conditions are necessary for a rally to occur: a major international 
event or a disaster, mass patriotism, a substantial coverage by the media with a national 
framing, and the expectation on the part of public opinion that the country will prevail 
and come out of the crisis successful. In particular, Hymans considers that a rally cannot 
appear unless the feeling of belonging to a country is stronger amongst citizens than 
partisan feelings, and the framing and priming is orchestrated by the elite.76  
Brody (2002) himself recently acknowledged that following Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990, leaders of the Democratic Party decided at first to support President 
Bush because of patriotic considerations. Commenting on the events of 9/11, Brody 
declared:  
“It is likely that future analyses of the rally following the attacks on the 
towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon will also find that 
patriotism and opinion leadership affected public support for President 
Bush” (2002, 6-7). 
 
Evidently neither Mueller nor Brody took specific interest in the impact of 
terrorism on political elites, yet their works do offer clues as to how these elites might 
react to terrorism. The implications of terrorism for the national interest suggest a priori 
that this form of political violence offers a fertile ground for rallies. Terrorism ticks the 
same boxes as military and diplomatic crises. To paraphrase Mueller, it is dramatic – 
often more so than far away military crises or opaque diplomatic disputes – it is usually 
specific, it is sudden and as a matter of national security it necessarily involves the 
president or head of the government. As for Brody’s argument that in times of crisis 
                                                
76 Hymans suggests that the large number of rallies taking place in the US during the past 60 years is due in 
part to the fact that the US is a superpower and that its citizens have come to expect success whenever the 
US might is tested. 
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when events break at an unusual rapid pace the government has a monopoly of 
information and the opposition is muted, it is particularly well suited to terrorist events, 
which by nature unfold swiftly. In fact, terrorist attacks are far more sudden than foreign 
policy crises that can develop over months if not years. As a result of this time 
compression, elites must react in an instant. Opposition elites, in particular, do not have 
the luxury of time to appraise the situation and cannot for instance rely on polls to assess 
the public’s reaction to the event. Nor do they have necessarily an easy and by the minute 
access to classified information without which criticisms of the government remains 
difficult. 
 
3.1.3. Elites, media and public opinion: who leads the pack? 
 
Rallies around the flag in times of foreign policy crises are frequent but they are also 
ephemeral and not always characterized by massive surges in the popularity of the 
President. What is particularly noteworthy is that scholars have often chosen to consider 
rallies around the flag and spikes in approval ratings – i.e. of the President – as one and 
the same (Hetherington and Nelson 2003; Kam and Ramos 2008). Yet whereas a sudden 
surge in approval ratings can indicate the presence of a rally around the president within 
the general population, it does not necessarily indicate a rally within the political elite. 
Nor is it absolutely clear whether one follows from the other, though Brody goes some 
way into explaining how the two might interact. 
Both George Herbert Walker Bush and his son provide an interesting case in 
point. In 1991 during the first Gulf War the elder Bush enjoyed an 83 percent approval 
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rating in the poll, up from 59 percent before the launch of Operation Desert Storm.77 His 
son would enjoy a similar albeit slightly less impressive rise in his approval rating in the 
midst of the second Gulf War – from 58 percent before the launch of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom to 71 percent after the start of the war.78 The two presidents would however 
receive a markedly different support from the Senate. Whereas 77 senators against 23 
voted in favour of military action against Iraq in 2002, only 53 senators against 47 
approved the use of force some ten years before. 
Beyond the semantic, what distinguishes a rally from a mere show of support 
remains debatable. How much of a surge should there be in the polls? How many 
members of Congress or any assembly of representatives should support the president or 
the government? Admittedly each and everyone can come up with thresholds. Perhaps 
the answers to these questions are better left to spin-doctors. Let us simply acknowledge 
the fact that rallies are of different size and magnitude, and that public opinion and 
political elites will not necessarily offer a similar support.  
Crucial, however, is the behaviour of mainstream opposition parties. Whereas 
surges in approval ratings are not uncommon, support from opposition elites is a rare 
occurrence. After all, the confrontation between the government and the opposition is an 
essential aspect of party politics, a sort of default mode for elites. A show of support from 
the opposition elite, when it does happen, has therefore tremendous symbolic and 
political value, particularly if as suggested by Brody the elite’s behaviour determines that 
of the general population. Hence the importance of understanding the mechanism by 
which the political elite ceases, at least temporarily, to criticize the government. 
                                                
77 Source: Gallup Polls, January 3-6 and January 17-20, 1991. 
78 Source: Gallup Polls, March 14-15 and March 22-23, 2003. 
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 Brody’s contribution to understanding elite behaviour in the midst of fast-
breaking international crises underlines the importance of the flow and distribution of 
information between different set of actors – i.e. government, opposition, media, and 
public opinion. One of the essential points raised by Brody is that when a crisis erupts 
elites need to react fast, a point made particularly clear in Charles F. Hermann’s 
definition of a crisis as:  
“a situation that (1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making 
unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the 
decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the members of the decision-
making unit by its occurrence” (Vasquez 1996, 192).  
 
Despite this time constraint governmental elites have an edge. By controlling the 
flow of information the government is able, at least temporarily, to entice the support of 
the other actors, crucially that of the opposition. In other words, ceteris paribus, crisis 
situations favour the government by essentially making it difficult for elites and media to 
dissent. 
Evidently there are different degrees of threat, time constraints and amount of 
surprise depending on the type of crisis. Yet, as pointed out by Boin et al., “serious 
threats that do not pose immediate problems – think of climate change or future pension 
deficits – do not induce a widespread sense of crises” (2005, 3). Terrorism, unlike global 
warming, poses an immediate problem and does not allow for much time to react. 
Brody’s argument is here particularly relevant. By controlling the availability of sensitive 
information the government is able to acquire the support of the opposition, the media 
and of course the general public. 
The emergence of a rally depends on a chain of reactions between governmental 
elites, opposition elites, media outlets and public opinion. The question raised by Brody 
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is whether the reaction of one of these groups sets in motion the reaction of the other ones 
and ultimately triggers a rally. To be fair others suggest that the mechanism is circular 
and that much like a driver looking in his rear-view mirror before taking a decision, the 
government will first evaluate the mood of the population. Kull and Ramsay, for instance, 
argue that policymakers and elites are constrained by their perception or misperception of 
what the public deems acceptable (in Nacos et al. 2000, 95). The ‘leaders follow masses’ 
theory is based on the assumption that “societal interests shape the behavior of 
governments and therefore of states, because rational politicians adapt to the interests of 
society in order to assure reelection and stay in power” (Schuster and Maier 2006, 228; 
see also Risse-Kappen 1991). In other words, the government acts as a “transmission 
belt” (Moravcsik 1997, 518). John F. Kennedy’s attitude during the 1962 Cuba Missile 
Crisis is a case in point. He chose to follow public opinion, which according to polls 
conducted at the time by Gallup was slightly in favour of tough actions against Fidel 
Castro’s regime. In addition the Senate – including the opposition – was also favouring a 
tough approach. With elections looming, JFK chose the blockade and saw his job-rating 
rise sharply (Russett 1995, 36).79 In that case, however, the crises lasted a couple of 
weeks and JFK could afford to wait for polls to come in. 
Then again public opinion no matter how vocal it is on issues of foreign policy 
will not always be able to impact foreign policy. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a case in 
point. Most governments that gave their support to the US military plan did so amidst 
popular backing for a peaceful solution. 
                                                
79 US Presidents have a tendency to follow the public, particularly during election periods, but they become 
less responsive outside this period (Nacos et al. 2000, 231-234). 
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The question of who leads and who follows during critical times is complex. 
However contrary to foreign policy crises that can unfold over weeks, terrorist attacks are 
sudden. Governmental elites and opposition elites must react in an instant. The time-
constraint means that the opposition has little time to appraise the situation and gather 
enough information. Thus siding with the government represents the most likely reaction, 
at least in the short-run. The same holds for the media. Initially background and in-depth 
information, notably on the perpetrators, might not be available. The media are dependent 
on what the government feeds them. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) suggest that they can 
influence the public in matters of foreign and security policy, and all things related to 
symbolic politics, but that they cannot on their own change attitudes. During tense 
periods such as terrorist crises, journalists are also likely to back the government in order 
to preserve their privileged relationship with the government or simply to avoid being 
accused of disloyalty (Norris et al. 2003).80 
The debate is complex and far from over but there are reasons to believe that 
during terrorist crises the elite is leading the pack (at least in the short-run), and the media 
and general population are bandwagoning. Unable to access crucial information the 
opposition is likely to support the government and thereby trigger a rally within other 
segments of society.  
Next we turn to the likely determinant of elite behaviour in critical times, namely 
the national interest. 
                                                
80 Norris et al. quote two journalists of the New York Times who reported the following in an article 
published by their journal two days after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: “Some reporters investigating claims 
against Iraq said they felt no compunction to poke holes in the administration’s case because they did not 
find it to be so off base. Many reported being in the same position as the administration: confident that Mr. 
Hussein is hiding weapons of mass destruction but unable to definitively prove it.” Jim Rutenberg and 
Robin Toner, ‘Critics Say Coverage Helped Lead to War’ New York Times, March 22, 2003. 
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3.2. The patriotic imperative 
 
The rational choice school of thought posits that party behaviour reflects a preference or 
possibly a combination of preferences between basically three objectives: vote-seeking, 
office-seeking and policy-seeking. Yet historical examples, notably some presented 
earlier in the text (see chapter 1), suggest that these preferences apply only to ordinary 
times. Critical or extraordinary times generally make these electoral objectives less 
prevalent in the minds of our elites and give rise to another concern, namely the raison 
d’État. Faced with a foreign policy crisis, the political elite must then decide whether to 
think in terms of what is best for its party or best for the country, which might not 
necessarily be one and the same, particularly for opposition elites. Yet time and again 
mainstream political elites rally in support of their government, even if only for a brief 
period of time, to defend the national interest. We are reminded here of Edmund Burke’s 
definition of parties: “a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the 
national interest”. Yet despite its capacity to bring down political cleavages and rally 
people, the notion of the national interest remains elusive. We all have an idea of what it 
means but would be hard-pressed to define it in precise terms. 
The national interest is first and foremost a concept used by proponents of the 
realist school of thought in international relations to make sense of foreign policy making 
in an environment that is anarchic and conflictual by nature, and in which countries are in 
a permanent state of insecurity (Smouts, Battistella and Vennesson 2003). The national 
interest is influenced by the cultural context and political traditions, and thus each 
country is likely to have a slightly different take on what its national interest is 
(Morgenthau in Vasquez 1996). Yet there is a common denominator, at least among 
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countries sharing similar cultures and values, which Hans Morgenthau (Vasquez 1996, 
147-148) captures in the following excerpt:  
“In a world where a number of sovereign nations compete with and 
oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must 
necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements. Thus all 
nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, 
and external identity against encroachments by other nations (…). Taken 
in isolation, the determination of its content in a concrete situation is 
relatively simple; for it encompasses the integrity of the nation’s territory, 
of its political institutions, and of its culture” 
 
Morgenthau goes on to suggest that “bipartisanship in foreign policy, especially in times 
of war, has been most easily achieved in the promotion of these minimum requirements 
of the national interest” (in Velasquez 1996, 148). Mueller (1973, 209) makes a similar 
point when he describes the type of event likely to bring political elites (and the general 
public) together. Clearly, most of the events Mueller refers to (e.g. Berlin 1948, the first 
Soviet atomic test, Cuba 1962) would fall under the category ‘threats on physical, 
political, and external identity’ of the United States (and other countries for that matter).81 
The notion of national interest and more exactly of threats thereon conjures up 
images of tanks crossing borders, saber-rattling rhetoric by foreign leaders, or the 
occasional and more entertaining shoe-banging at the United Nations’ General Assembly. 
Yet obviously the national interest encompasses other threats besides those related to 
foreign policy crises. Shortly before becoming President Bush’s National Security 
Advisor, Condoleezza Rice remarked that the national interest in the post-Cold War era 
must encompass conventional and unconventional threats, notably terrorism (Rice 2000). 
                                                
81 The realist take on the national interest has been criticized by liberal thinkers for whom the concept is a 
changing one because it depends on which societal actors are prevalent at any one time, and on their 
capacity to impose their view of the national interest at the state level (Smouts et al. 2003: 283). The 
constructivists, for their part, even suggest that the national interest is defined by norms and values shared 
by states on the international scene rather than by elites in each state (Smouts et al 2003: 283-284; see also 
Finnemore 1996).  
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Obviously the very idea that terrorism can threaten the survival of a state is still hard to 
fathom. Far-fetched scenarios involving the use of nuclear devices by terrorist groups 
have perhaps clouded our judgment one way or the other. Let us however bear in mind 
that the Tupamaros hardly relied on any fancy weapons to bring down democracy in 
Uruguay.82  
Terrorism might not necessarily threaten the territorial integrity or the existence of 
democratic institutions, but it is a negation of the state’s authority and monopoly of 
violence on its own territory. After all, homeland security is first and foremost about 
securing the borders and the territory against terrorist actions. As pointed out by David 
and Gagnon “le terrorisme a (ré)insufflé à la question sécuritaire une dimension 
territoriale” (2007, 1).83  
More importantly still, terrorism encroaches on people’s daily life. I refer here in 
particular to what Amitai Etzioni calls the ‘Primacy of Life’, that “is the recognition that 
all people have an interest in and right to security, understood to include freedom from 
deadly violence, maiming, and torture” (2007, 1). Put differently, the national interest 
encompasses a human security dimension as well, namely: 
“The condition under which most people, most of the time, are able to go 
about their lives, venture onto the street, work, study, and participate in 
public life (politics included), without acute fear of being killed or injured 
– without being terrorized” (Etzioni 2007: 2). 
 
The security of a state is what makes it possible for its citizens to pursue their 
private interests (Smouts et al. 2003). Thus, political elites are likely to consider that the 
national interest encompasses terrorist threats as much as diplomatic and military threats. 
                                                
82 Of course paradoxically the military junta that took over the power did so to ‘protect’ the nation from the 
Tupamaros.  
83 Terrorism reasserted the territorial dimension of national security (my translation). 
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If and when the national security and more precisely the ‘Primacy of Life’ is being 
threatened, the patriotic imperative is likely to overpower the partisan spirit. 
The frequent occurrence of rallies around the flag following military or diplomatic 
crises suggests that a comparable phenomenon is likely to take place within mainstream 
political elites following acts of terror. The logic should be similar. Political elites will 
stick together when the nation is under attack or is facing a threat. Crises threatening the 
interest of a country should not offer much room for manoeuvre. Parties are likely to 
think in terms of the national interest and thus offer a unified front. Hence the first 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: Acts of terrorism cause mainstream opposition parties to rally in support of the 
government. 
 
3.3. The magnitude-repetition model 
 
Not all diplomatic or military crises trigger rallies and arguably the same is true for 
terrorist crises. The support given by the opposition to the government is not automatic 
and depends on a series of factors. I suggest that in the case of terrorist attacks, the 
reaction of the political elite depends to a large extent on two variables: the magnitude of 
the terrorist act in terms of fatalities, and the repetition of these acts over time. The 
magnitude-repetition model presented below is then completed by a number of secondary 
variables likely to influence party and elite behaviour. Each primary and secondary 
variable presented below introduces a new hypothesis on the reaction of political elites to 
terrorist acts. 
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3.3.1. Casualties and trends 
 
Doughery and Pfaltzgraff remind us that “it is difficult to give operational meaning to the 
concept of national interest” (1981, 125). Obviously not all terrorist acts result in a 
genuine menace on human security. Whereas human tragedy is always a likely outcome 
of any terrorist action, more often than not the end result will rarely lift an eyebrow 
amongst politicians. The impact on human security and on the ability of people to go 
about their life must be manifest to elicit a reaction. The number of fatalities, much like 
battle-deaths in war, is a particularly relevant indication of how serious the terrorist crisis 
is and one to which political elites are likely to pay attention. 
Terrorism is a tragedy, and the human tragedy is quintessential to the way elites 
and other segments of society react. Terrorism is what Mark Juergensmeyer calls 
“performance violence” (2002, 3), an act of communication meant to impress upon the 
public. The more lives are threatened or taken, the more people are impressed and the 
deeper the crisis.  
Acts of terrorism are essentially rated according to their destructiveness or 
lethality. Media are particularly sensitive to this aspect, with tabloids and quality 
newspapers alike splashing their first page with deaths counts, and news networks doing 
very much the same with their news banners. Societies, at least in the Western world, 
have come to evaluate the newsworthiness of terrorist attacks by the numbers of victims, 
which after all is the way most catastrophes are evaluated. The total number of casualties 
is then a proxy for the severity of the attack. In fact, the literature on conflict often 
considers casualties as the most salient cost of conflict. Thus the impact of casualty rates 
and casualty trends on political behaviour and decision-making is nothing new. 
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Essentially, the longer and deadlier the crisis becomes, the less people are ready to 
support their government (Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner, Segura and Barratt 2004; 
Boettcher and Cobb 2006; Gartner 2008). The rate at which bodies of US soldiers were 
flown out of Vietnam accounts to a large extent for the growing unpopularity of the war 
and the decision to cease America’s involvement in that particular conflict (Mueller 
1973; Zaller 1992). The same remark applies for the present military operation in Iraq 
(Gartner 2008). 
A similar logic is likely to apply to terrorist crises. The response of mainstream 
political elites to acts of terror should depend to a large extent on two variables: the 
magnitude of the act (measured through the number of fatalities) and the repetition of 
terror acts (measured through the number of previous terrorist events). For instance, 
opposition parties and elites should be less inclined to openly criticize the government 
when an event has high casualty rates. In those cases, one would expect parties to think in 
terms of the national interest rather than particular interests, and thus offer a unified front. 
However, the magnitude of the crisis is just part of the story. Just like the duration of a 
military conflict affects the behaviour of elites, we expect the repetition of terror acts to 
have a significant influence on elites’ behaviour. Those in charge of governing the 
country are expected to limit the occurrence of terror acts. If they fail, those in the 
opposition who wish to replace them in government will likely criticize them. The 
duration of the crisis, that is the failure to end the crisis, will activate the partisan 
(electoral) interest and encourage opposition parties to break away from the rally. Put 
differently, rallies have an expiry date. Mainstream opposition parties will likely be 
patient when the government faces its first terrorist acts and therefore be supportive. 
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However, this support will fade if acts of terror keep repeating themselves. In other 
words, more fatalities can mean less support if there is a multiplication of acts. The 
magnitude-repetition model suggests the two following hypotheses: 
 
H2: Political parties and elites are more likely to rally around the flag as the terrorist 
act causes a larger number of fatalities. 
 
H3: The repeated occurrence of acts of terror under a same government (and same 
mandate) makes a rally around the flag less likely.84 
 
3.3.2. Rallying around the state 
 
Although the magnitude and repetition variables might account to a large extent for the 
reaction of the mainstream political elites, other secondary variables are likely to play a 
role as well. First amongst these potentially influential variables is the target of the attack, 
particularly when the gun sight is pointed at a representative of the state. Obviously 
corporatism beyond political cleavages might render members of the political elite 
particularly sensitive to acts aiming one of theirs and as a result more susceptible to rally. 
If rallying around the flag essentially means rallying around its symbols and 
representatives then political elites will likely rally promptly when one of their own is 
targeted because of his or her position within the state apparatus (government officials, 
police officers, mayors, and other civil servants). One of the main reasons for rallying 
                                                
84 This hypothesis implies that each new government or each government starting a new mandate will be 
given a clean sheet and will not necessarily be held responsible for the homeland security failures of the 
previous government. 
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under such circumstances is the risk of being perceived as disloyal to the country if one 
abstains from rallying. When a terrorist hides a bomb in a public place his or her 
intention might be to kill as many bystanders as possible, but his actual target is the wider 
public, those bewildered and frightened television viewers or newspapers readers. With 
attacks on public officials and other representatives of the state, the logic is slightly 
different. Here too terrorists attempt to scare many, but their choice of a state target 
reveals another objective, namely demonstrate that they can target leaving embodiments 
of the state and what it stands for (i.e. order and rule of law). Put differently, terrorists are 
not able to conquer land or aim at the territorial integrity of a state, but they can strike at 
the ‘flesh and blood’ embodiment of the state. An act aimed at such a symbol challenges 
the government’s authority and especially its monopoly of physical force on the national 
territory.  
The necessity to appear loyal should be particularly strong when the state is 
targeted, as disloyalty or perceived disloyalty to the country in times of crises can be 
severely reprimanded by the voters. For instance, Regens, Gaddie and Lockerbie (1995) 
demonstrated that members of Congress who voted against America’s entry into the First 
World War had a lower probability to be reelected than those who voted in favour. 85  
The fourth hypothesis follows:   
 
H4: Ceteris paribus, terrorist acts aimed at symbols of the state are more likely to 
trigger a rally around the flag. 
 
                                                
85 For a long time political dissent was a criminal offense in the United States in times of war. The 1918 
Sedition Act outlawed “conspiracy to publish disloyal material intended to obstruct the war and cause 
contempt for the government of the United States” (Stone 2004, 139). 
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3.3.3. The threat from within vs. the threat from abroad 
 
If the target matters, then arguably the identity of the perpetrators could also influence the 
reaction of the political elite. Attacks coming from abroad could be perceived as more 
threatening for the national interest than attacks originating from within. In particular, the 
political elite might perceive such an attack as not only a menace on human security but 
also as a threat on the national interest in the traditional realist sense of the word. The 
likelihood that terrorists originating from abroad might be supported financially and 
logistically by foreign states can only reinforce the sense of threat. Moreover, terrorist 
acts perpetrated by foreigners might be perceived as targeting the country as a whole, 
hence making it difficult for political elites to openly disagree with one another. Acts 
committed by home-grown terrorists on the other hand might exacerbate existing 
divisions within the political elite (e.g. disputes might surface if the terrorists are 
ideologically ‘closer’ to one or the other party). This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: When confronting a terrorist attack originating from abroad (or perceived as 
such) the mainstream elite is more likely to rally. 
 
3.3.4. Rallying around the hawks? 
 
If the identity of the perpetrators influence the behaviour of the political elite, the reverse 
could be true as well. In particular, the party in power might influence terrorist activities. 
The terrorists could avoid committing acts when the party with the toughest antiterrorist 
approach is in government. By concentrating their activities when the party with the 
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softest approach is in power, the terrorists might be able to create disunion within the 
elite and encourage those with a tougher approach to criticize the government for being 
too lax. For instance, Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor (2008) argue that in Israel the 
occurrence of terrorism increases popular support for right-wing parties. Berrebi and Klor 
(2006) also found that the level of terrorism in Israel is higher when the Left is in power. 
Therefore, it appears possible that in certain cases terror organizations choose the timing 
and location of an attack because of the expected reaction of the elite. 
Some studies suggest that right-wing parties are more hawkish than their left-wing 
counterparts (Budge and Hofferbert 1990), while others have suggested that the rally 
effect will be probably strongest for tough actions (Russett 1990). For instance, in the US 
the Republican Party has often been regarded by public opinion as better able to deal with 
issues of national security than the Democratic Party.86 In 1986, during Reagan’s 
presidency, 56 percent of Americans trusted the Republicans to do a better job in dealing 
with terrorism, whereas only 25 percent trusted the Democrats more (Nacos 2007, 187).87 
The immediate post 9/11 period revealed a similar trend with 57 percent of Americans 
trusting the Republican party to do a better job at handling terrorism and only 15 percent 
                                                
86 Party ideologies affect the conduct of the state (Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 1996; Alesina et al. 1997; Boix 
1998). However, the ‘parties-do-matter’ hypothesis is concerned above all with the influence of parties on 
public policy, notably with regard to socio-economic issues (Schmidt 1996 for a good review; see also 
Downs 1957; Sartori 1976; Budge and Robertson 1987; Blais, Blake and Dion 1993). Parties from the 
Right are more likely to support market-oriented policies, whereas parties from the Left are more likely to 
favour state intervention. Similarly, social-democratic parties tend to spend more on foreign aid (Thérien 
and Noël 2000). As for foreign policy, Schuster and Maier (2006, 233) remark that in Western Europe “the 
party affiliation of a government seems to be a good indicator of how a country behaved during the Iraq 
crisis”. For instance, out of the six European Union members that joined the US led coalition, five were 
governed by center-right parties (see also Noël and Thérien 2008). 
87 Petrocik (1996) reports similar differences on national defense, with 68 percent trusting the Republicans 
and 17 percent trusting the Democrats. Interestingly enough, the GOP is not necessarily doing a better job 
and is certainly not always tough against terrorists – Reagan for instance pulled out US troops from 
Lebanon after the 1983 attacks that killed several hundred marines (Nacos 2007, 188). Reagan also 
negotiated with Iran the liberation of hostages held by the Hezbollah in exchange for secret arms shipment 
(Nacos 2007, 188). Nacos suggests that the Democrats are perhaps still paying for Jimmy Carter’s 
mishandling of the hostage crisis in Teheran (Nacos 2007, 188). 
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trusting the Democrats more (Nacos 2007, 187).88 Yet recently the gap has narrowed with 
only 40 percent trusting the GOP in May 2006 and 35 percent trusting the Democrats 
(Nacos 2007, 187).89 
In essence, what we have is a right-wing ownership of security related issues. The 
idea is that on some issues parties are more credible than others (Damore 2004). Parties 
on the right of the political spectrum are perceived as more capable of dealing with issues 
of national and public security, whereas parties on the left are perceived as having more 
credibility on social and environmental issues. According to the theory of issue-
ownership, parties and their candidates put forward issues on which they appear more 
credible than their political adversaries. Voters then use issue-ownership as a cue to 
evaluate parties.90 This being said, reputations are not frozen and can evolve. Parties can 
try to steal an issue – what David Damore (2004) calls ‘issue-trespassing’ – just like 
when Bill Clinton successfully took away from the Republicans the issue of crime during 
his first presidential campaign (see Holian 2004).91  
                                                
88 According to a January 2002 poll. 
89 A similar trend is being observed elsewhere in the world: in Israel Likud has a better reputation on 
security issues than Labor (Berrebi and Klor 2006); same in the United Kingdom where the Tories enjoyed 
for a long time the same kind of reputation (Budge and Farlie 1983), although recently the Labour Party 
might have taken over the role of the hawkish party (Oborne 2007); likewise in France where Jacques 
Chirac (right-wing) was seen as the best candidate to deal with terrorism during the 2002 presidential 
campaign (Mayer and Tiberj 2004). 
90 Reputation is not enough to convince a voter. Eric Bélanger and Bonnie Meguid (2005) suggest that 
issue-ownership affect the vote only when the voter considers the issue to be relevant. For instance, 
Nadeau, Blais, Gidengil and Nevitte (2001) point out that more Canadians voted for the Liberal party when 
it was perceived as more competent on issues such as job creation and national unity. 
91 We can still expect inertia to influence behavior. Downs in particular argues that parties are obliged by 
electoral competition to have consistent policy positions over time (Downs 1957, 103-109). This being said 
electoral competition can drive parties to make certain types of promises and all the while make sure that 
they remain consistent (Downs 1957, 103-109). Leaders who do not follow the type of policy advocated by 
their supporters run the risk of losing support. Warwick (1992) shows that this is happening as far as 
economic policies are concerned. At the same time, Downs suggests that parties in a two-party system will 
converge towards the center to maximize votes, a process which should favor issue-trespassing. 
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These days, terrorism and security issues are of course a hot commodity on the 
political and electoral market. Among the policy benefits that voters seek and leaders can 
promise is security, which of course parties will want to advertise as one of their 
paramount concern when seeking votes. Berrebi and Klor (2006) have demonstrated that 
during the period 1991-2003, the Israeli Labour party was forced to be tougher in its 
policies than Likud, precisely because the latter was perceived by the population as better 
qualified to deal with terrorism. Thus left-wing parties, in particular, might be tempted to 
appear more credible on issues pertaining to national security by adopting a tougher 
stance. If both right-wing and left-wing parties adopt similar approaches, the likelihood 
of a disagreement over the handling of terrorism might diminish. As a result, a right-wing 
opposition should find it more difficult to criticize a left-wing government for being too 
soft. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: Rallies are not less likely when the Left is in power.92 
 
3.3.5. Railing against the mainstream elite 
 
So far I have taken into consideration mainstream parties only. But what of radical parties 
and fringe elites? Do they have a different rationale when it comes to partisan interests 
vs. national interest? The American left, particularly its intellectuals, were quick to point 
out that the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as symbols of capitalism and modern 
warfare got what they deserved (Weinberg and Eubank 2008). Even Reverend Pat 
Robertson, a conservative Southern Baptist and hardly Chomsky’s soul mate, was 
                                                
92 This hypothesis clearly rests on the assumption that issue-trespassing is taking place with regards to 
terrorism and national security. 
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initially as critical as Gore Vidal and co., though for entirely different reasons – i.e. 
Robertson saw the attacks as a sign of God’s displeasure with American ‘sins’ such as 
abortion and gay marriage (Weinberg and Eubank 2008). 
Much like the socialists of yesteryears who railed against the bourgeoisie’s 
penchant for war, today’s radical elites are likely to follow a different logic than their 
mainstream counterparts. It is not at all impossible that they will seize the opportunity 
created by terrorist attacks to criticize not only the government but also the whole 
political system. Unlike mainstream elites, radical elites are unlikely to be deterred by the 
prospect of looking disloyal to the state. Hence my seventh hypothesis: 
 
H7: Radical parties do not rally around the flag following acts of terror and are on 
the contrary outspoken in their criticism towards the government. 
 
3.3.6. The 9/11 effect 
 
The events of 9/11 have profoundly influenced international affairs in the past eight 
years. But to what extent has it influenced domestic politics in the US and in European 
countries? Following the fateful events of 9/11, political elites across the Western world 
rallied in support of the US president.93 Of course this feeling of compassion subsided 
rapidly, yet 9/11 left a scar, and more than before national unity might be perceived as 
crucial in the struggle against terrorism. Mainstream opposition elites might feel that they 
now have less room for manoeuvre than prior to 9/11, and that in order to avoid being 
lambasted as disloyal to the country they must rally. This suggests the final hypothesis: 
                                                
93 Jean-Marie Colombani, chief editor of Le Monde, famously declared on the front-page of his newspaper: 
‘Nous sommes tous Américains!’. 
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H8: Mainstream parties have a greater probability of rallying in the post 9/11 period. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present chapter challenges the notion that the behaviour of political parties is always 
determined by partisan interests and the electoral agenda, by suggesting that during 
dramatic events when the national interest is being threatened, the patriotic imperative 
might prove too much to brush aside, particularly for mainstream opposition parties. The 
rally-around-the-flag phenomenon is traditionally associated with events such as military 
and diplomatic crises. I argue here that during terrorist crises the need to defend the 
security of its citizens is a powerful incentive for the elite to support the government. The 
magnitude-repetition model suggests that elites will be likely influenced by the 
magnitude of the attack and the repetition of terrorist acts. I also suggest that secondary 
variables, such as the target of the attack or the origin of the perpetrators, are also likely 
to influence the reaction. 
 Next, I take up the advice of Michael Shermer that “there is only one surefire 
method of proper pattern recognition, and that is science” by describing in the following 
chapter the data and method of analysis used to test my hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 
Methodology 
 
 
 
“Cold blooded mass murder requires cold-blooded analysis, the careful selection of 
words to convey precise meaning uncluttered by emotional rhetoric” (Brian Jenkins, The 
Organization Men) 
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Introduction 
 
Ariel Merari once remarked that “terrorism is a study area which is very easy to approach 
but very difficult to cope with in a scientific sense” (in Schmid and Jongman 1988, 179). 
Of particular concern to him was the lack of “precise and extensive factual knowledge” 
necessary for any kind of scientific inquiry into the field of terrorism. The first extensive 
databases on terrorist events – the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) 
database and the RAND database – were launched in the early 1970s but were until very 
recently available only to a select few (corporate customers for PGIS and affiliated 
researchers for RAND). This meant that a majority of studies on terrorism had to be 
qualitative. For instance, from 1995 to 1999 only about 3 percent of research papers 
published in the two main journals on terrorism – Terrorism and Political Violence and 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism – used inferential analysis of data, while another 15 
percent included descriptive statistics (Silke 2002). In comparison, over the same time 
frame 86 percent of papers published in forensic psychology and 60 percent of those 
published in criminology used either inferential or descriptive statistics (Silke 2002). 
Fortunately, an increasing number of freely accessible databases on terrorist events 
means that statistical analyses are now easier to produce.  
My own research is based on a two-step approach integrating quantitative and 
qualitative methods of analysis. At the core of this study is an original dataset on terrorist 
events and the reaction of political elites to them. The purpose of the quantitative analysis 
is to establish through both descriptive and inferential statistics a pattern of behaviour 
amongst mainstream political elites, and indicate whether these trends and findings can 
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be generalized outside of the sample. The qualitative approach is then used to 
complement, notably through in-depth case studies, and nuance the statistical findings.  
 Section one of the following chapter describes the scope of the research. In 
section two, I discuss how the data source for terrorist events was selected, and in section 
three which sources have been selected for the reaction of elites. I then proceed, in 
section four, with a description of how the database was put together and in particular 
how the reaction of the elite was coded. Finally, in the last section I detail what I hope to 
achieve through this two-step approach combining quantitative and qualitative methods 
of analysis. 
 
4.1. Scope of research 
 
The study of the reaction of political parties and their elites to terrorism implies certain 
restrictions. First of all, political parties must be free to oppose their government. The 
rally, if they choose to rally, can therefore not be forced upon them by the government or 
any other authority. The choice to rally must always be theirs. Thus, the selected 
countries must be stable democracies. Autocracies, even those operating under the veil of 
democratic institutions or single-party regime, cannot be considered. Second of all, 
terrorism must be nothing new for the selected countries, for there is no point in studying 
the reaction to terrorism if the phenomenon is absent or of such low-intensity that it 
remains unnoticed by the elites. Finally, these countries must be relatively peaceful and 
cannot be in the midst of a civil war or any other enduring military crisis. In other words, 
ordinary politics as defined in chapter one must be the rule. These restrictions mean that 
neither Israel nor Russia or India were included in this study. In addition, the information 
   
 
119 
on the reaction of the elite (see below) had to be available and in a language understood 
by the author of this thesis.  
Taking into account these restrictions, the countries selected were the following: 
France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries 
have been stable democracies and the political parties free to oppose their government at 
least for the past 25 years.94 Although terrorism might have been a more acute 
phenomenon in recent years in some countries (e.g. Spain) than in others (e.g. Germany), 
it remains a recurring problem for all of them. 
Finally, this study is also limited in time. Of particular concern was the need to 
avoid any overlap with the Cold War, a period which could have influenced the reaction 
of political elites. For instance, the Soviet Union and its allies were often blamed for 
providing support to terrorist groups, notably Palestinian groups and West European 
groups. Among others, Claire Sterling in The Terror Network (1981) fuelled this notion 
that Russia conspired to destroy the West through an international network of terrorists. 
Although proofs of this support are murky at best, it is not improbable that certain 
segments of the political elite, particularly right-wing politicians, gave credence to this 
accusation. As a result, the period under scrutiny will be stretching from the end of the 
Cold War in 1990 to 2006.95 
 
 
 
 
                                                
94 See notably their rankings at www.freedomhouse.org in terms of political rights and civil liberties. 
95 With the exception of the qualitative analysis which will cover the period 1980 to 2006. 
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4.2. Selecting a database for terrorist events 
 
An increasing number of databases on terrorism are available (most of them freely 
accessible online). However, none of them provide information on the reaction of 
political elites to terrorist events. Thus the dataset necessary for this project had to be 
created by using an already existing database of terrorist incidents and adding the data on 
the reaction of political elites.  
The selection of a database on terrorist events is a delicate matter not the least 
because a great deal of what is included in it depends on what the original developer 
considered to be terrorist in nature and intent. Thus, by choosing a certain database we 
also accept the definition of terrorism that comes with it (see chapter 2). The definition 
used will in turn have an impact on the number of observations that are being recorded. 
Ideally a large N is preferable but a dataset that is too inclusive is also less desirable as it 
tends to include cases that might only be remotely connected to terrorist activities (e.g. 
criminal activities and street protest). The objective remains the study of the reaction to 
terrorism, not to political violence in general. 
At the time the data collection process for this project started, several databases on 
terrorist events existed, each with their own strengths and weaknesses (see annex A for a 
summary of options). After careful examination of what several databases had to offer, 
the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) developed by the RAND Corporation in 
cooperation with the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism (MIPT) was selected. The TKB emerged from a database of terrorist events 
developed and maintained by a team of researchers at the RAND Corporation from the 
early 1970s onwards, amongst them respected scholars such as Brian Jenkins and Bruce 
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Hoffman. This terrorism chronology was used until the end of the 1990s exclusively by 
RAND experts, but in 2001 the project was given a new impulse by a grant from the 
MIPT. The resulting MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base is divided into two datasets: 
- The RAND Terrorism Chronology for incidents collected between 1968 and 1997 
includes cases of international terrorism that is acts perpetrated by individuals 
coming from abroad to strike their target, domestic targets associated with a 
foreign state, or attacks on airline passengers or equipment. 
- The RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, which records domestic and 
international terrorist incidents from 1998 onwards. Domestic terrorism is here 
defined as incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic 
target. 
The TKB was constructed on the premise that not every act related to political 
violence should be regarded as terrorist and that “terrorism is defined by the nature of the 
act, not by the identity of the perpetrators”.96 This means that a criminal act perpetrated 
by a known terrorist organization would not have found its place in the database. Equally 
important, an exchange of fire between a terrorist organization and a regular army would 
not have been considered terrorist.97 
In 2004 the TKB was launched online as a free and open source database 
providing data and related information on close to 30,000 terrorist incidents across the 
world since 1968. Unfortunately this remarkable research tool was discontinued on 
                                                
96 See www.mipt.org/TKB.asp  
97 The MIPT website gives the example of an exchange of fire between al Fatah and the Israeli Defense 
Forces in border areas between Israel and the Occupied Territories. However, an attack such as the one 
against the USS Cole in Yemen would be considered terrorist. 
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March 31, 2008, after the US Department of Homeland Security, which oversaw its 
funding, decided that the money would be better spent elsewhere.  
A number of other databases were available at the time the collection process 
started. They differed notably in the size of the N. The largest database – the Pinkerton 
Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) database – reported over 67,000 incidents for the 
period 1970-1997 (Lafree and Dugan 2007). In comparison the RAND-MIPT database 
(TKB) had close to 30,000 incidents and ITERATE and TWEED about 10,000 each. To a 
large extent this difference in the number of observations is a result of the definition of 
terrorism used in gathering incidents (see annex A). PGIS, for instance, defines terrorism 
as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, 
economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (Lafree and 
Dugan 2007). This wider definition reflects the original purpose of the Pinkerton 
database which was to provide risk assessment to companies, hence the need to 
incorporate too much rather than too little. For instance, PGIS includes attacks on 
property as well as acts of violence during demonstrations. 
Recently the Pinkerton database has been taken over and computerized by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at 
the University of Maryland – available online as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).98 
GTD1, which covers the period 1970 to 1997 (not 1993)99, defines terrorism using almost 
the same wording as Pinkerton (except for the part in italics) namely as “the threatened or 
actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, 
                                                
98 Since TKB ceased its operations, elements of its database are in the process of being merged with the 
Global Terrorism Database. 
99 Data for the year 1993 have been lost during the transfer of the original hard copies of the Pinkerton 
database. 
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economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation”, whereas 
GTD2, which covers the period 1998 until 2009, has no set definition and uses a 
“configurable approach covering several definitions of terrorism”.100 
  Among other databases worthy of attention is the International Terrorism: 
Attributes of Terrorist Events better known under its acronym ITERATE. This database 
is widely used – it includes over 10,000 incidents (1968 to 2004) – but does not 
incorporate cases of domestic terrorism. The Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data 
or TWEED covers a far broader period (from 1950 to 2004) but does so only for 
domestic incidents occurring in 18 West European countries. Other databases such as the 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), Triton, or ‘La base de données sur les 
actes terroristes’ are far more limited in their scope, in the period they cover, or their 
accessibility. 
 TKB is not flawless but none of these databases are, its main flaw being the 
absence of information on the reaction of political elites, which of course none of the 
other databases include. I selected TKB first of all because it is based on a clear 
definition, which distinguishes for instance terrorist acts from other acts of political 
violence. Second of all, it provides comprehensive data for all of the five countries 
selected for this study and over the period 1990-2006. In addition, for each terrorist act a 
wealth of information is available (target, perpetrators, etc.) and its content is constantly 
updated (and corrected when necessary). Finally, it has been created and maintained by 
scholars and for a scholarly purpose, unlike other databases that served commercial 
interests. 
 
                                                
100 See www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/gtd1_and gtd2.asp  
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4.3. Selecting a data source for reactions 
 
Neither TKB nor any other existing databases on terrorist events include information on 
the reaction of political elites. This information is however available in most major media 
outlets such as national and international newspapers. Choosing media outlets as a source 
is not only practical but also logical in view of the symbiosis that exists between 
terrorism and media. 
Political elites’ reactions to terrorist acts have been gathered using national 
newspapers. For each of the five countries chosen for this study one national newspaper 
has been selected, namely: Le Monde for France, Frankfurter Allgemeine for Germany, 
El Pais for Spain, The Times for the United Kingdom, and The New York Times for the 
United States. These five newspapers are renowned and respected sources of information, 
thus concerns with their impartiality and accuracy in reporting (e.g. factual errors) should 
be minimal. It should be noted that reactions reported by these newspapers are often 
based on press releases from the parties themselves (usually via press agencies). 
Furthermore, in order to avoid reporting bias, opinion editorials have not been taken into 
account. Finally, a limited review of other leading national newspapers in France and the 
US has been carried out in order to further verify that reactions are reported accurately 
and check for any discrepancies. The analysis of the coverage of thirty randomly selected 
terrorist events (15 in France and 15 in the United States) in the database by four 
additional newspapers – Washington Post and USA Today for the United States; 
Libération and Le Figaro for France - indicates that the coverage of the elite’s reaction is 
very similar to that of the selected papers – i.e. Le Monde and The New York Times. All 
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these newspapers seem to report essentially the same reactions, even though their 
interpretation of these reactions sometimes differs. 
 
4.4. Creating the database 
 
After limiting the countries and period under consideration another limitation had to be 
set in, namely the magnitude of the terrorist events. Indeed a preliminary survey revealed 
that most low magnitude incidents, that is those causing a minimal number of wounded, 
simply did not register on the media radar and did not elicit any reaction at all from the 
political elite.101 Including these acts would have brought no valuable information and 
would have lengthened considerably the process of data gathering. Thus it was decided 
that acts that had caused no fatalities and wounded less than six people would not be 
included in the database.102 In addition, only acts perpetrated on the national territory 
were taken into account. For instance, an IRA attack against a British military barrack in 
Germany would show up in the database – provided it injured at least 6 people – but only 
for Germany, not for the United Kingdom. In all, the database comprises 192 terrorist 
events.  
In chapter three, I defined, tentatively, a rally around the flag as: 
A movement of widespread support in favour of the government within 
the mainstream political elite – crucially from the opposition parties – an 
                                                
101 It should be pointed out that TKB relies on a much larger pool of sources to gather observations 
(newspapers, governmental agencies such as the CIA, etc.). Thus it is not at all surprising if on occasions 
reactions to a terrorist event do not appear in the newspapers selected for this study but are recorded by 
TKB. An organization like the CIA is likely to keep track of incidents that will not necessarily be deemed 
newsworthy by a national newspaper. For instance, an attack wounding one person might not make it into a 
national newspaper but might be recorded by a governmental agency in charge of keeping track of all 
violent actions. 
102 The TKB website, when it still existed, allowed to search the dataset by casualties. The lowest casualty 
group was comprising acts that had injured 1 to 5 people, hence the threshold chosen for this project. 
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equally widespread support within the general population, and last but not 
least a support from most media outlets. 
 
This conceptual definition refers to a massive rally amongst the political elite, the media, 
and public opinion. Yet it does not help determine what qualifies as a rally within the 
political elite. Thus, what we need here is an operational definition for rallies within the 
elite. For the purpose of this study a rally around the flag within the political elite is said 
to exist, 
whenever the mainstream opposition parties support the government. This 
support can either be explicit – i.e. support made public by a spokesperson 
or a leading figure of the opposition – or implicit – i.e. silence implies 
consent. A rally involves at best a truce in party politics – i.e. total support 
of the government – and at the very least an absence of criticism on the 
part of mainstream parties as far as the government’s reaction to the act of 
terror and to the issue of national security is concerned.103 In order to 
constitute a rally, this support must last a minimum of five consecutive 
days following the terrorist event.  
 
I assume like Richard Brody (1991) that silence implies consent. In other words, if the 
elite remains silent I consider it as an instance of rallying.104 Silence might not have the 
symbolic weight of a public declaration of support but nonetheless it indicates that the 
opposition does not intend to argue with the government. Silence might be motivated by 
reluctant support or a need to appear loyal, but it is still a sign of support. Parties always 
have the choice to remain critical and signal their disagreement with how the government 
handles national security related issues such as terrorism. The absence of criticism, that is 
a deliberate decision by the opposition to stay mute and to break from traditional partisan 
politics, is in itself sufficiently unusual to be considered as a show of support. Although 
different from a jingoistic rally, silence represents consent, a sign that a common purpose, 
                                                
103 In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the issue of national security is often so prevalent that other issues 
are temporarily disregarded. 
104 In that case the newspaper reports the act but the elite does not react publicly to it. 
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in that case the national interest, must prevail.105 Even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 
not all members of the US Congress chose to voice their support of the government, 
many simply decided to stay mute and avoid partisan politics for the good of the country. 
In other words, regardless of whether the support is explicit or implicit, what really 
matters is that political criticism is subdued.106 
Put somewhat differently then, there is a rally when none of the mainstream 
opposition party either through a leading figure or spokesperson blames the government 
for the act or makes public criticism of its handling of national security. Furthermore the 
decision to focus on the first five days following an act is not arbitrary. Indeed, 
preliminary research suggested that elites react very soon after the event, sometimes only 
a few hours after the attack took place, and that the bulk of reactions to an act of terror 
appear during the five-day period that follows the act. Important terrorist acts will 
typically fall off the front pages of the newspapers by the third of fourth day. By the fifth 
day, parties have taken a stance and are either supporting the government or being 
critical. Of course rallies have an expiry date but studying the duration of rallies is not the 
objective of this thesis. 107  
For each act recorded in the database I carried out a content analysis of elite 
discourse. I looked at how mainstream political parties reacted and determined whether 
                                                
105 The tenth edition of the Oxford Dictionary offers the following definition of a rally: bring or come 
together for concerted action. 
106 Similarly Cunningham (1991, 245) in his book on British government policy in Ulster defines 
bipartisanship (a phenomenon akin to a rally) as “the tendency of the party in opposition to support or, 
slightly differently, not to oppose the policy of the government towards Ireland”. 
107 The reaction might evolve afterwards notably in light of new information, but what we are looking at in 
this study is how elites behave in the heat of the moment. A number of studies have been looking beyond 
the initial stages of crises and looked at the duration of rallies: Brody (1991), Callaghan and Virtanen 
(1993),  Lian and Oneal (1993), Kam and Ramos (2008) to name a few. Kam and Ramos (2008) suggest 
that at first patriotism and national in-group identification triggers and maintains support for the president, 
but that eventually partisan identities will give rise to criticism of the president. 
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there was criticism from the opposition, expressed either by a spokesperson or a leading 
figure of the party (isolated criticisms from backbenchers where not taken into account). 
In other words, I have not been looking for explicit declaration of support but for explicit 
criticism. Furthermore, since the present study deals exclusively with the reaction of 
political elites at the national or federal level (and their support or lack thereof for the 
government), criticisms voiced by political representatives at the provincial, regional or 
local level were not taken into account. Criticisms from trade union leaders were not 
taken into consideration either.108 
In order to have an idea of how the mainstream opposition behaves in the absence 
of terrorism, I have also compiled the reactions of political elites five days prior each of 
the terrorist attack included in the database. The proximity to the terrorist act means that 
all variables in the comparison group (except for those related to the terrorist act itself) 
are the same. Yet one should remember that this thesis is concerned primarily with party 
behaviour during critical times. Thus this compilation of reactions prior to a terrorist 
attack (or what I have called elsewhere ordinary times) is just meant to give some kind of 
benchmark and allow some simple comparison. The dynamics of behaviour are likely to 
be very different. For instance, silence in the five-day period prior to the act does not 
have necessarily the same meaning as during the five-day period after the act. Perhaps the 
silence of the elite before the attack is due to some other reason (e.g. summer break in 
                                                
108 The decision to use a dichotomous variable (support or no support) rather than a gradation in support 
(e.g. strong support, mild support, weak support, no support, or strong criticisms, mild criticisms, etc.) was 
a consequence of a lack of detailed information on the reaction of political elites. In order to create such a 
scale I would need to have access to the reactions of many more front-benchers and backbenchers. An ideal 
system would be one were the reaction of each member of parliament, member of government, and other 
prominent politicians would be coded. An instance of strong support would be one were 95% of 
respondents support the government over a certain period of time. Ideally such a gradation system would 
allow to give more weight to prominent figures such as ministers and less to backbenchers. Needless to say 
that such an endeavour, if at all possible, would necessitate far more time and resources than what was 
available for this thesis. 
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parliament, absence of events worth debating about, etc.). Whereas in the aftermath of a 
terrorist act the issue of national security is likely to be prevalent (sometimes to the point 
of being the only issue discussed by the elite), during a ‘normal’ period national security 
will be just one issue amongst many others. 
 
4.5. Treatment of data 
 
The database is used to conduct quantitative analyses and produce both descriptive and 
inferential statistics. I then use a qualitative approach to analyze cases that diverge from 
an ideal-type magnitude-repetition model – i.e. cases when the elite responds 
unexpectedly to the two main variables (magnitude and repetition). 
 
4.5.1. The quantitative analysis 
 
The extent of the rallying phenomenon during terrorist crises (hypothesis 1), both overall 
and in each of the five countries under consideration, is measured through univariate 
descriptive statistics. The other hypotheses (with the exception of hypothesis 7 on radical 
parties) are tested using univariate descriptive statistics on the effects of the following 
variables: magnitude (hypothesis 2), repetition (hypothesis 3), target (hypothesis 4), 
perpetrators (hypothesis 5), right-wing/left-wing (hypothesis 6), and 9/11 (hypothesis 8). 
The hypotheses are then tested jointly using the following logistic regression 
model to assess the likelihood of witnessing a rally – i.e. that of having no criticism 
towards the government – in the five days following the attacks: 
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Log(p/(1-p)) = ! + "1*First5Attacks + "2*Magnitude + "3*Pact + "4*Crisis + 
"5*Domestic + "6*Post9/11 + "7*France + "8*UK + "9*Spain 
where p is the probability of having a rally.  
Variables used in the model include:  
First 5 Attacks, which takes value 1 if the attack is one of the first five under the current 
government, and 0 otherwise; 109 
Magnitude, which takes value 0 if there were two deaths or less involved in the attack 
(but at least six injured) and value 1 if there were three fatalities or more; 110  
Pact (Spain), which takes value 1 if the attack took place in Spain during the period 
covered by the Spanish antiterrorist pact – i.e. between December 2000 and March 2004 
– and 0 otherwise;111  
Crisis, which takes value 1 if the attack happened during a period of diplomatic crisis or 
military conflict for the country under attack, and 0 otherwise;112 
Domestic, a variable taking value 1 if the group claiming the attack (or perceived as 
having perpetrated the attack) is a domestic group, and 0 otherwise. Domestic groups 
                                                
109 Since the original RAND dataset for the period 1990 to 1997 does not include all the domestic acts (only 
those related to international terrorism are included) I created an alternative repetition variable that also 
accounts for other domestic acts over the period 1990-1998. These data, which are only added for the 
repetition variable, were imported from the Global Terrorism Database. Two international acts that 
occurred in Germany did not appear in the TKB and were thus added. Of course, the definition used by 
GTB is more inclusive than the one used by TKB but broadly compatible. 
110 The database does not take into consideration acts of terror that have caused no fatalities and less than 
six injuries. A preliminary survey of these low magnitude incidents in the newspapers used to determine the 
reaction indicates that they simply do not register on the media radar and do not elicit any reaction from the 
political elite. Including these acts would have brought no valuable information and would have lengthened 
considerably the process of data gathering. 
111 The conservative PP governed during the period covered by the pact. In December 2000, the two main 
political parties (the conservative PP in government since 1995, and the socialist PSOE) signed an 
antiterrorist pact whereby they agreed to support one another in the fight against terror. ‘El pacto de Estado 
por la libertades y contra el terrorismo’ was announced on 9 December 2000, and signed four days later. El 
Pais December 9, 2000, and December 13, 2000. 
112 Crises include notably the First Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), the NATO operation in 
Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
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encountered in the dataset are almost exclusively separatist groups; they include the IRA, 
INLA, RIRA, CIRA (groups which operated mostly in the UK), ETA (operating mostly 
in Spain), as well as Corsican, Basque and Breton separatist groups (operating in France); 
and 
Post 9/11, which takes value 1 if the attack took place before September 11, 2001, and 0 
if it took place afterwards (September 12, 2001, or after). 
  I use binary controls for the three countries for which sufficient data is available:  
France takes value 1 if the attack took place in France and value 0 otherwise;  
Spain takes value 1 if the attack took place in Spain and value 0 otherwise; and 
UK takes value 1 if the attack took place in the UK and value 0 otherwise. 
 
4.5.2. The qualitative analysis 
 
The qualitative analysis will focus on two sets of cases: deviant or outlier cases, that is 
cases where the reaction of the mainstream political elite did not conform to expectation 
with regard to magnitude and repetition; and cases outside of the period studied in the 
quantitative chapter. This approach makes it possible to uncover other variables. 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett remind us that “statistical analysis can help 
identify outliers or deviant cases, and case studies can then investigate why these cases 
are deviant, perhaps leading to the identification of omitted variables” (2005, 35). In 
order to determine which cases are deviant I create an ideal-type model based on the 
magnitude-repetition model presented earlier on, and which rests on the assumption that 
the behaviour of mainstream political elites depends primarily on two variables – i.e. 
magnitude and repetition of terrorist acts. It implies four different scenarios (see table I): 
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1. Low repetition and high magnitude: the opposition is expected to support the 
government. 
2. High repetition and high magnitude: the opposition is expected to offer no 
support to the government. 
3. High repetition and low magnitude: the opposition is likely to support the 
government though the high repetition might give it an incentive to criticize 
the government particularly since the number of casualties is low. 
4. Low repetition and low magnitude: no reaction from the opposition or from 
the government is expected, and the media are unlikely to report the act. In 
other words, the terrorist act simply does not register on the radar. 
 
Table I. The impact of magnitude and repetition on the reaction of the opposition 
 
 Low Magnitude High Magnitude 
 
High 
Repetition 
 
Likely Support 
 
No Support 
 
Low Repetition 
 
No Reaction 
 
Support 
 
 
Of course this ideal-type model is not a carbon copy of the reality but rather a simplified 
schematic of how mainstream political elites are likely to react in the event of a terrorist 
attack. 
Of particular interest in this chapter are instances that do not conform to the ideal-
type model (e.g. event X scored high in terms of magnitude and low in terms of repetition 
but failed to trigger a rally). In order to determine which cases conform or do not 
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conform to the ideal-type model, I assign a threshold for the magnitude variable and 
another one for the repetition variable. I rely here on the thresholds used in the logistic 
regression presented above whereby:  
- Two fatalities or less is considered an instance of low magnitude, whereas 
three fatalities or more is considered a case of high magnitude.  
- When five acts in a row or more occurred before the act being considered for 
analysis we consider it an instance of high repetition, and if four acts or less 
occurred before we consider it an instance of low repetition.  
Obviously the division is slightly arbitrary but I need a cut off point. 
The qualitative analysis and case studies serve many purposes. As pointed out by 
George and Bennett, case studies have the “ability to accommodate complex causal 
relations such as equifinality, complex interactions effects, and path dependency” (2005, 
22). A qualitative approach makes it possible to analyze the effect of other variables 
which could not be tested in the in the statistical analysis. Furthermore a qualitative 
approach, particularly the use of detailed case studies, makes it possible to analyze the 
interaction between government and opposition and the evolution of their attitude, and 
assess the extent of the rally (e.g. public support from the opposition or silent support). 
This approach makes it also possible to broaden the range of observations by analyzing 
the reaction to events outside the selected period. Historical depth can provide useful 
insights, particularly if there is an element of path dependency. Finally, through this 
approach, I intend to test hypothesis seven and address the role of radical elites. In the 
end, the qualitative analysis might confirm most of the statistical results, but it might also 
nuance some of these results.  
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This analysis will focus exclusively on France and its experience with terrorism 
from 1980 to 2006. The decision to select France rather than any of the other four 
countries studied previously is three-fold: France has had by far the most wide-ranging 
experience in terms of diversity of terrorist groups (revolutionaries, separatists, religious, 
etc.); the ideological cleavage between right-wing and left-wing parties is broad; and 
radical parties and elites are a force to reckon with. 
Finally, the qualitative analysis is based on a larger pool of newspapers and 
magazines, namely: Le Monde, Libération, Le Figaro, Les Échos, L’Humanité, Le 
Parisien, Le Journal du dimanche, L’Express, Le Point and Le Nouvel Observateur. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The dual methodological approach advocated in this chapter is not meant to compare the 
merits of the quantitative method versus those of the qualitative method. On the contrary, 
both methods are viewed as complementary. Statistics can suggest trends in behaviour, 
evaluate the explanatory power of variables, and confirm or refute certain postulated 
relationships. The qualitative approach, as envisaged in this thesis, is meant to uncover 
other explanatory variables, analyze complex processes rather than just end results, and 
evaluate the validity of hypotheses that could not be tested using statistics (I refer here in 
particular to the behaviour of radical elites).  
Chapter 5 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
 
 
“The powers in charge keep us in a perpetual state of fear, keep us in a continuous 
stampede of patriotic fervor with the cry of grave national emergency. Always there has 
been some terrible evil to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing 
the exorbitant sums demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have 
happened, seem never to have been quite real” (General Douglas MacArthur) 
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Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to expose patterns in the behaviour of elites during 
terrorist crises. In particular, I look at the rallying rate across countries and at the 
univariate effects of the magnitude and repetition variables. I also examine a host of 
secondary variables such as the ideological position of the party in power – i.e. right-
wing or left-wing – the 9/11 effect, and the impact of international and domestic 
terrorism. Then, I analyze all variables jointly through a logistic regression and 
summarize the sensitivity analyses that were used to test the robustness of the model. 
Finally, I provide a specific analysis for each of the five countries selected for this study. 
 
5.1. Results 
 
The population of the dataset amounts to 192 cases of terrorist attacks.113 A number of 
terrorist acts (22 percent) do not register on the media radar and do not initiate any public 
reactions on the part of the spokespeople or leaders of the mainstream parties (see table 
II). Part of the explanation for the lack of interest (and of coverage) for certain terrorist 
acts lies with their magnitude in terms of fatalities. Terrorist acts with low human costs 
are unlikely to elicit much interest from media outlets, unless they involve public figures 
such as presidents or members of governments in which case they might become more 
‘newsworthy’. On the other hand, acts causing three fatalities or more in this database are 
almost never ignored by the selected newspapers (table III). Another explanation points 
to the type of target. Attacks against state targets are reported 91 percent of the time by 
                                                
113 However due to the unavailability of information on the reaction of German political elites between 
1990 and January 1993, this figure is down to 181. 
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our newspapers, but only 72 percent of the time for attacks on other targets.114 Finally, 
country specific reporting attitudes may also play a role. France and Spain exhibit larger 
reporting numbers with respectively 89 percent and 98 percent of all terrorist acts 
reported in the selected newspapers. In comparison, rates in the other three countries 
range from 55 percent for Germany and 57 percent for the United Kingdom to 68 percent 
for the United States. To some extent the high reporting rate for Spain is to be expected in 
a country where terrorism, particularly Basque-related terrorism, has been at the centre 
stage of public life for the better part of the last 40 years. Germany on the other hand has 
been relatively spared in the last 15 years by the horror of terrorism, consequently its 
media might have been less interested in pursuing terrorist-related stories. 
As postulated in hypothesis 1, political elites tend not to criticize their government 
in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. More precisely, table II shows that following reported 
acts of terrorism, political elites have been critical of the government only 16 percent of 
the time (or rallied 84 percent of the time). It is worth reminding that this 84 percent 
rallying rate includes cases when the elite remained silent throughout the five-day period 
under scrutiny and did not explicitly support the government. As argued previously, 
silence might not imply a massive and enthusiastic rally, yet by putting its criticisms on 
hold the opposition does indicate that it supports the government. This point is made 
more apparent by the striking difference between the behaviour of the political elite after 
the attack and before the attack. Table II suggests that in ‘normal’ periods (during the 
five-day period before the terrorist act) political elites in the five countries criticize the 
government 67 percent of the time (compared to 16 percent after an attack). Prior to 
attacks, the elite is particularly critical in the United States (82 percent) and Spain (76 
                                                
114 This difference is significant at the 5 percent level. 
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percent), whereas it is relatively less disapproving in the United Kingdom (53 percent). 
This suggests that the advent of terrorism has an impact on the attitude of parties. Yet as I 
remarked in chapter four, these are two very distinctive periods. The comparison provides 
merely an idea of the contrast. But it is inherently difficult to compare an ‘ordinary’ 
period to an ‘extraordinary’ one. The rules of behaviour are not the same, and the nature 
of the political debate itself changes dramatically. Thus I am reluctant to read too much in 
this statistical difference. 
Table II also reveals that in the aftermath of a terrorist act, French and Spanish 
political elites tend to rally relatively less often than their German, American and British 
counterparts with respectively 22 percent and 21 percent of reported attacks with 
criticisms. The context might account for this difference. Spain and France are 
experiencing more reported acts of terror than Germany or the United States. As a result, 
opposition parties in those two countries might be less patient towards their 
government.115 The fact that the French and Spanish presses cover terrorism so 
abundantly makes it also easier for political elites in these two countries to be more 
critical (this issue never vanishes, making it easier for elites to discuss it). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
115 The UK is dealing with a number of reported attacks similar to that of France, but most of them tend to 
occur in Ulster rather than in the streets of London or Manchester. Additionally, unlike what takes place in 
France the British political elite usually relies on a bipartisan approach to tackle terrorism. 
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Table II. The rallying phenomenon 
 
 
 
5.1.1. The magnitude effect 
 
Findings are supportive of hypothesis 2. The magnitude of the terrorist act (i.e. number of 
fatalities) plays an important role in the reaction of the mainstream political elite. 
Essentially the more fatalities there are, the more rallies and fewer criticisms there are. 
Table III shows that 87 percent of all terror acts causing three fatalities or more trigger a 
rally in support of the government, whereas amongst attacks causing less than three 
fatalities, only 58 percent elicit support for the government. Moreover, giving credence to 
the motto ‘if it bleeds it leads’, 28 percent of attacks causing less than three deaths are 
ignored by the media altogether, whereas only 7 percent of terrorist acts causing three 
fatalities or more are not reported by the media. Amongst media reported attacks only, 80 
percent of the attacks with less than three fatalities resulted in rallies, versus 93 percent 
Total Criticism
Country Number of Prior to the
Attacks Attack (%)
1
France 36 64% 32 89% 7 22%
Germany 
4
11 73% 6 55% 0 0%
Spain 59 76% 58 98% 12 21%
Spain - no Pact 
5
33 82% 32 97% 11 34%
United Kingdom 53 53% 30 57% 2 7%
United States 22 82% 15 68% 1 7%
Total 
6
181 67% 141 78% 22 16%
Notes:
Criticism (%)
Number of Newspaper
2
Reported
3
 Attacks (%)
Number of Reported
Attacks With 
5 Spain - no Pact uses only attacks occuring outside of the antiterrorist pact period (December 2000 to March 
2004) during which governing and opposing parties (respectively PP and PSOE) agreed to present a unified front 
towards terrorists.
6 Total statistics use France, Germany, Spain, UK and USA.
1 For each terrorist act, the occurrence of criticism from mainstream parties was evaluated during the 5 days 
preceding the attack for comparison purposes.
2 Newspapers used to define media reporting are Le Monde for France, Frankfurter Allgemeine for Germany, El 
Pais for Spain, The Times for the United Kingdom, and The New York Times for the United States of America.
3 Factors affecting newspapers reporting include targets (state targets are reported 91% of times versus 72% for 
other targets) and size of the attacks (acts with more than 2 victims are almost never ignored in the media in the 
4 The sample for Germany is restricted to attacks taking place after January 1, 1993 due to limited public access to 
newspaper archives.
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for attacks causing three deaths or more. It should also be noted that most attacks are of a 
relatively low magnitude (mean and median by countries). 
 
Table III. The magnitude effect 
 
 
5.1.2. The repetition effect 
 
As proposed in hypothesis 3, terrorism can represent a severe test of resilience for a 
population, but it is also very much a test of aptitude for those in government. If the 
government cannot maintain order and security, the political opposition will grow 
impatient and increasingly critical. Table IV supports this hypothesis and indicates that 
following the first three terrorist acts, opposition parties have always supported their 
government (100 percent rallying rate), but that they were less inclined to do so when the 
acts kept on repeating themselves. After attack number 8 and beyond that, the rallying 
rate drops to 75 percent. This suggests that the opposition is monitoring the government’s 
performance and success in the fight against terror. The repetition of attacks makes it 
possible for an opposition party to criticize its government without having to fear too 
much about being labelled as disloyal to its country. 
Number
1
 of Attacks (%)
Attacks not Reported in the Press 39 (28%) 1 (7%)
Attacks Without Rally - Criticism 20 (14%) 1 (7%)
Attacks With Rally - no Criticism 81 (58%) 13 (87%)
Total 140 (100%) 15 (100%)
Notes:
1 Attacks in Spain during the antiterrorist pact period are not included in this analysis in order to control for the 
artificial rallying effect of the pact.
Less Than 3 Fatalities 3 Fatalities or More
   
 
141 
Table IV. The repetition effect 
 
 
5.1.3. The target effect 
 
Findings do not support hypothesis 4. The bull’s-eye has been placed on representatives 
of the state in 31 percent of the cases (see table V). However, contrary to expectation, 
aggregate data for the five countries do not seem to indicate that more rallies occur when 
the state is targeted by the terrorists. On the contrary, the rallying rate is at 70 percent 
when the state is hit and at 86 percent when other targets are struck. Hypothesis 4 still 
holds for France and the United States where attacks on symbols of the state trigger more 
rallies (respectively 83 percent and 100 percent) than attacks on other targets (77 percent 
and 92 percent). This result might not be surprising since France is the embodiment of a 
centralized state. One would expect French political elites to strongly condemn attacks on 
its symbols or representatives, or at the very least to refrain from criticizing those in 
charge of the state. However, the United States do not exactly share this Jacobin tradition 
and yet rally massively around their leaders when the state is targeted.116 
 
                                                
116 A caveat must be introduced here as the quantity of observations for the USA is fairly limited in this 
respect. 
Frequency of Attacks 1
Attacks Leading to Rallies / Total Number of Attacks 2 28 / 28 17 / 20 48 / 64
Percentage of Rallies
2 Attacks in Spain during the antiterroristpact period are not included in this analysis in order to control for the 
artificial rallying effect of the pact.
Notes:
1 Number of attacks under the same government (and same mandate).
0-3 4-7 8 or more
100% 85% 75%
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Table V. The target effect 
 
 
5.1.4. The right-wing effect 
 
Findings are supportive of hypothesis 6. Over the period 1990-2006, right-wing parties 
and left-wing parties were in government almost an equal number of years. 117 In the 
database, 55 percent of the attacks occurred under a right-wing government. Overall, 
right-wing parties did not benefit from more rallies (or less criticisms) when they were in 
government (see table VI). In fact, the rallying rate for the Right and the Left is 
remarkably similar. The rallying rate around right-wing governments was 84 percent, one 
percent point less than for left-wing governments. However, one should be careful in 
interpreting these overall results as the number of attacks under right-wing governments 
                                                
117 Left and Right have been in power 8 years each in France, Spain, Germany and the United States. In the 
United Kingdom the Left has been in power slightly longer (9 years) than the Right (7 years). 
Total Number
of Attacks State Targets Other Targets
France 36 7 19% 83% 77%
Germany
2
22 3 14% N/A 100%
Spain 59 38 64% 78% 81%
Spain - no Pact
3
33 20 61% 58% 77%
United Kingdom 9 1 11% 100% 100%
United Kingdom - Ulster 44 7 16% 75% 95%
United States 22 3 14% 100% 92%
Total
4 192 59 31% 70% 86%
Notes:
State
1
 Targets (%)
Country
4 Total statistics use France, Germany, Spain, UK, UK - Ulster and the USA for total number of attacks and number 
of attacks with state targets. Statistics regarding percentages of attacks with rallies however use only attacks 
outside of the pact period in Spain to control for its rallying effect.
3 Spain - no Pact uses only attacks occuring outside of the antiterrorist pact period (December 2000 to March 
2004) during which governing and opposing parties (respectively PP and PSOE) agreed to present a unified front 
towards terrorists.
% Reported Attacks With Rally
1 State targets include government, military and police targets. 
2 Information regarding rallies is limited to the eleven attacks taking place after January 1, 1993 for the Germany 
sample due to limited public access to newspaper archives. The total number of attacks and number of attacks 
with state targets however include all attacks in Germany during the period covered (1990-2006).
Number of Attacks with
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differs markedly from one country to the other. In addition, right-wing parties in France, 
the United Kingdom and the United States benefited from more rallies than their left-
wing counterparts, whereas in Spain the Left benefited from more rallies. 
 
Table VI. The right-wing effect 
 
 
5.1.5. The 9/11 effect 
 
Findings are also supportive of hypothesis 8. The average yearly number of attacks prior 
to 9/11 was 23.5 (see table VII).118 In the period that followed 9/11, the average number 
of attacks for our five countries dropped to 8.2 per year. More importantly still, the 
rallying rate followed a different trend. In the period before 9/11 there were 77 percent of 
reported attacks with rally, whereas in the period that followed 9/11 the percentage of 
rallying increased to 94 percent. This trend is particularly impressive for France and 
                                                
118 The 9/11 effect is based on observations between 1998 and 10 September 2001 for the first part (to 
avoid confounding due to the higher proportion of international attacks in the database prior to 1998), and 
11 September 2001 and 2006 for the second part. 
Total Number
of Attacks Right Left
France 36 18 50% 93% 67%
Germany
2
11 9 82% 100% 100%
Spain 59 54 92% 77% 100%
Spain - no Pact
3
33 28 85% 59% 100%
United Kingdom
4
53 7 13% 100% 93%
United States 22 11 50% 100% 88%
Total
5 181 99 55% 84% 85%
Notes:
Wing Party
1
 in Government (%)
% Reported Attacks With Rally
5 Total statistics use France, Germany, Spain, UK and the USA for total number of attacks and number of attacks with 
state targets. Statistics regarding percentages of attacks with rallies however use only attacks outside of the pact period 
in Spain to control for its rallying effect.
3 Spain - no Pact uses only attacks occuring outside of the antiterrorist pact.
Country
1 Right-wing Parties include RPR (and then UMP) and UDF for France; CDU-CSU for Germany; PP for Spain; the 
Conservative Party for the United Kingdom; and the Republican Party for the United States.
2 Information regarding rallies is limited to the eleven attacks taking place after January 1, 1993 for the Germany sample 
due to limited public access to newspaper archives.
4 Ulster included.
Number of Attacks with Right-
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Spain where the rallying rate increased by respectively 45 points and 16 points. These 
figures suggest that political elites felt more compelled to unite after the events of 9/11. 
Of course, 9/11 was unique by most accounts but these results seem to indicate that the 
effects of large terrorist crises can cross borders. Both the magnitude of this attack and 
the perceived proximity of the targeted country and its victims (culturally if not 
necessarily geographically) probably played an essential role. 
 
Table VII. The 9/11 effect 
 
 
 
5.1.6. The international terrorism effect 
 
Table VIII suggests, as hypothesized, that political elites are less critical of their 
government when the attack is perpetrated by a group originating from abroad than when 
the act is caused by a domestic group. As I pointed out before, a foreign threat is likely to 
trigger the same defensive mechanism regardless of whether the threat is military, 
diplomatic or terrorist. The fact that attacks perpetrated by terrorists originating from 
Total Number of 
Attacks (>1998) Pre 9/11
1
Post 9/11 Pre 9/11
1
Post 9/11
France 17 2.9 1.1 55% 100%
Germany
2
2 0.5 0.0 100% 100%
Spain 57 10.1 3.6 73% 89%
Spain - no Pact
3
31 6.1 1.5 55% 88%
United Kingdom 2 0.3 0.2 100% 100%
United Kingdom - Ulster 41 8.3 1.9 90% 100%
United States 12 1.3 1.3 100% 100%
Total
4 131 23.5 8.2 77% 94%
Notes:
4 Total statistics use France, Germany, Spain, U.K., U.K - Ulster and the U.S.A. for total number of attacks and number of attacks 
with state targets. Statistics regarding percentages of attacks with rallies however use only attacks outside of the pact period to 
control for the rallying effect of the pact.
3 Spain - no Pact uses only attacks occuring outside of the antiterrorist pact period.
Country
% Reported Attacks With Rally
1 The pre 9/11 statistics are based on the 1998-2001 period to avoid confounding due to the higher proportion of international 
attacks in the database prior to 1998. The post 9/11 statistics correspond to the 2001-2006 period.
2 Information regarding rallies is limited to the eleven attacks taking place after January 1, 1993, for the Germany sample due to 
limited public access to newspaper archives.
Average Yearly Number of Attacks
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within generate more criticism could also be linked to the duration of the crisis. Domestic 
groups have often been carrying out their terror campaign for longer periods than groups 
from the outside. Thus, cases of domestic terrorism (particularly for groups whose raison 
d’être is secession of part of the national territory) can be perceived by members of the 
elite as security issues that have been dragging on for too long and have not been 
adequately managed by those in government. 
 
Table VIII. The international terrorism effect 
 
 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
 
A logistic regression is used to jointly model the impact of the repetition and magnitude 
of attacks on the likelihood of witnessing a rally – i.e. that of having no open criticism 
towards the government – in the five days following these attacks. This analysis also 
controls for the unifying effect of the Spanish pact, whereby the two main parties pledged 
to support one another in the fight against terrorism, and that of diplomatic and military 
crises. The type of group perpetrating the attack is also accounted for, thereby providing a 
control for domestic terrorism. I also include controls for the effect of 9/11, and country 
effects. 
Number
1
 of Attacks (%)
Attacks not Reported in the Press 11 (14%) 3 (14%) 26 (49%)
Attacks Without Rally - Criticism 17 (21%) 2 (9%) 2 (4%)
Attacks With Rally - no Criticism 52 (65%) 17 (77%) 25 (47%)
Total 80 (100%) 22 (100%) 53 (100%)
Notes:
Unknown
1 Attacks in Spain during the antiterrorist pact period are not included in this analysis in order to control for the 
artificial rallying effect of the pact.
Domestic International
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Results shown in table IX confirm that the repetition of acts significantly 
increases the chances of open criticism towards the government regardless of the 
magnitude.119 For events taking place after the initial five, probability of dissention are 
increased by roughly 22 percentage points compared to the first five events. 
The magnitude of the act is, as expected, a unifying factor. As acts cause more 
victims, rallies are more likely to be observed. An attack causing three fatalities or more 
translates into an approximate 16 percentage points increase in the probability of 
witnessing a rally compared to attacks with two fatalities or less. 
The unifying effect of the Spanish pact is important and statistically significant, as 
one would expect. Acts taking place in Spain during the corresponding period result in a 
probability of open criticism that is reduced by more than 21 percentage points compared 
to acts observed during regular times. 
The probability of rally is 15 percent less when the group claiming the act is a 
domestic group. Diplomatic or military crises, as well as the 9/11 effect are not 
statistically significantly correlated with the probability of a rally, although both 
coefficients are positive as expected. 
Various robustness checks were performed. Results remained qualitatively the 
same for potential alternate specifications of the model, including removing country 
controls, restricting the time period and varying the cut-off points for the magnitude and 
repetition variables. Conclusions were also stable when removing controls that were not 
statistically significant, or adding a control variable indicating whether the government 
                                                
119 Since the original TKB dataset did not include all domestic incidents, observations from the START 
database (GTD) were used to measure more accurately the number of events (domestic and international) 
taking place over a given period of time. 
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was criticized in the five-day period preceding the attack (not statistically significant 
either). 
 
Table IX. Factors affecting the probability of rally 
 
 
 
5.3. Country specific reports 
 
5.3.1. Spain 
 
Of the five countries included in this study, Spain is the one with the highest number of 
recorded events, the highest percentage of reported events (2 percent of terror acts were 
not reported by El Pais), and the lowest rallying rate (66 percent). Even when including 
the period covered by the antiterrorist pact, whereby the PSOE (socialists) pledged to 
Variable1 Parameter Estimate Probability Change2 p-value
Intercept 1.48 - 0.27
First 5 Attacks 3.66 22.1% 0.003
Pact (Spain) 3.34 21.5% 0.004
Magnitude 1.6 16.0% 0.045
Domestic -1.9 -15.4% 0.03
Post 9/11 1.23 9.9% 0.24
Crisis 0.22 2.0% 0.89
France -1.61 -16.2% 0.21
UK 1.3 10.7% 0.34
Spain -1.21 -11.9% 0.32
3 N=141. Model fit: Likelihood ratio test was statistically significant at the 0.0001 level. R-Square=24%. Adjusted 
(Nagelkerke) R-Square=42%. C Statistic=87%.
Notes:
1  The repetition variable (First 5 Attacks) takes value 1 if the attack was one of the first 5 and value 0 if the attack 
was number 6 or more. The pact (Spain) variable takes value 1 if there was a pact and value 0 if there was no pact. 
The magnitude variable takes value 0 if there were 2 deaths or less involved in the attack (but at least 6 injured) and 
value 1 if there were 3 fatalities or more. The domestic variable takes value 1 if the attack was perpetrated by a 
domestic group and value 0 otherwise. The post 9/11 variable takes value 1 if the attack took place before 9/11 and 
value 0 if it took place afterwards. The crisis variable takes value 1 if there was a major military or diplomatic crisis at 
the time of the attack and value 0 otherwise. The France variable takes value 1 if the attack took place in France and 
value 0 otherwise. The UK variable takes value 1 if the attack took place in the UK and value 0 otherwise. Finally, the 
Spain variable takes value 1 if the attack took place in Spain and value 0 otherwise.
2 Changes in the probability of a rally are marginal effects calculated from the regression estimates by measuring the 
average simulated impact of a change in the relevant variable across all observations.
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support the conservative government (PP) in its fight against Basque terrorism, the 
overall rallying rate was just 79 percent.120 Part of it has to do with the fact that terrorism 
has become an electoral issue over which the main parties try to gain the upper hand. The 
attempt by the conservative government of José Maria Aznar to blame ETA for the 
March 2004 bombings of commuter trains in Madrid just days before the legislative 
elections is a case in point. 
 Most attacks in Spain are directed at state targets, far more than in the other four 
countries (61 percent outside the pact compared to 19 percent in France and even less 
elsewhere). This is of course due in large part to ETA, which traditionally targets people 
representing the Spanish state. The rallying rate following attacks against the state is the 
lowest (58 percent when there is no pact) of all five countries. Even during the period 
covered by the antiterrorist pact the rate was only 78 percent. 
 The Partido Popular (PP), which was in power for most of the acts included in the 
dataset, did not benefit from more rallies than the Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE), on the contrary. In fact, with a rallying rate of 59 percent outside of the pact, the 
PP had the lowest rallying rate of all right-wing parties in the study. 
 Finally like the other four countries, Spain experienced more rallies in the post 
9/11 period (89 percent) than it did before (73 percent). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
120 The PSOE was in power until 1996 when the PP took over. The PSOE returned to power in 2004. 
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5.3.2. France 
 
France has with Spain the lowest rallying rate (78 percent). Although it has experienced 
less terror acts between 1990 and 2006 than Spain or the United Kingdom, France has 
been targeted by a more diverse range of terror groups than her two European 
neighbours. The French political elite has been particularly prompt to rally when symbols 
of the state were targeted (83 percent).121 
 The right-wing effect is particularly strong in France. The French Right and the 
French Left have experienced the exact same number of attacks when in power but right-
wing governments have enjoyed far more rallies than their left-wing counterparts (93 
percent of reported attacks with rally for the Right; 67 percent for the Left). To some 
extent this difference might be due to the perceived permissiveness of the Left and to the 
traditional ownership of security related issues by right-wing parties.122 
Finally the 9/11 effect has been especially impressive in France with a rallying 
rate going up from 55 percent prior to 9/11 to 100 percent afterwards. 
 
5.3.3. Germany 
 
Terrorist activities since 1990 have been less intense in Germany than in any of the other 
four countries included in this study. With the exception of a 1996 arson attack on a 
refugees hostel in Lübeck, which killed 10 and injured another 38, most attacks claimed 
two fatalities or less (many causing only injuries). Most of these terrorist acts were either 
                                                
121 The Socialist party (PS) was in power until 1993 when the right-wing UDF and RPR took over. In 1997 
a left-wing coalition led by the PS was elected and remained in power until 2002. The right-wing UMP 
(previously RPR) has governed since then. 
122 The French case is covered extensively in the next chapter. 
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racially motivated or perpetrated by people with no clear political cause (except for the 
Kurdish activists) and were as such borderline cases. Faced with low intensity terrorism 
with sometimes unclear messages, the Frankfurter Allgemeine and the German political 
elite have usually ignored those attacks.123 Only 55 percent of terrorist acts were reported, 
leading to a rallying rate of 100 percent. Overall, the small number of observations for 
Germany makes it difficult to establish patterns of behaviour. 
 
5.3.4. The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom has both the lowest percentage of reported events (less than 60 
percent), and one of the highest rallying rate (93 percent). The fact that the opposition is 
rarely critical following attacks can be explained by the bipartisan approach to 
terrorism.124 In other words, the relative agreement of the main parties on the aims and 
methods to deal with terrorists (mostly Ulster related terrorism) ensures a more or less 
constant support from the parliamentary opposition. 
 The Right (i.e. the Conservative Party) has benefited during its years in power 
from the complete support of the opposition (Labour and Liberal Democrats), whereas 
Labour has enjoyed a slightly lesser rallying rate (93 percent). Finally the post-9/11 
period has witnessed an increase in the rallying rate (from 90 percent prior to 100 percent 
after). 
 
                                                
123 The CDU/CSU (right-wing) and its coalition partner – FDP (centre-right) – were in power from 1982 to 
1998. The SPD (left-wing) and its coalition partner – Grüne (ecologist) – governed from 1998 to 2005. 
After the 2005 election a grand coalition (CDU-SPD) took over. 
124 See notably Cunningham (2001). The Conservative Party was in power until 1997 whereupon the 
Labour Party took over. 
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5.3.5. The United States of America 
 
Despite the horrific events of 9/11, terrorist attacks are rare, at least amongst those 
causing a minimum of six injured (the limit set for being recorded in the database). There 
were between 1990 and 2006 twenty-two attacks of at least this magnitude (the second 
lowest tally among countries selected for this study). These attacks were committed by a 
wide variety of groups ranging from Christian extremists to militias, white supremacists, 
and Islamic extremists. 
Rallying around the president in times of international crises is common and so is 
rallying around the president during a terrorist crisis (93 percent of rallying rate). 
However, only 68 percent of terrorist attacks are reported in The New York Times. 
Democrats and Republicans were in power for the exact same number of terrorist events, 
however the latter benefited from a complete support (100 percent rallying rate), whereas 
the Democrats had an 88 percent rallying rate in their favour. Unfortunately, the 9/11 
effect cannot be assessed as all terrorist acts taking place in the USA after 1998 triggered 
rallies.125 
 
Conclusion 
 
Rallying around the flag following terrorist acts is frequent among the political elites of 
the five countries covered by this study though more so in some (Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) than in others (France and Spain). Overall, the results 
show that the repetition of acts of terror is a strong factor affecting parties’ responses to 
                                                
125 Since the TKB database was incomplete with regards to domestic acts taking place prior to 1998, I 
chose to compare the period 1998-2001 to post-2001. The United States had a Republican administration 
until 1992 when the Democrats took over. The Republicans returned to power in 2000. 
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terrorist acts, as repetition is more likely to prompt criticism. The magnitude of the act is 
also associated with a rallying effect as larger attacks are more likely to result in a unified 
front across parties. Mainstream political elites are also more likely to rally when a group 
originating from abroad perpetrates the terrorist act. Finally, the existence of a formal 
anti-terrorist pact between the parties, such as the one that existed in Spain, increases the 
likelihood of rallies. 
The results reported here are both limited in time (since 1990) and scope (five 
countries) but indicate at the very least a tendency among mainstream parties and elites to 
be less critical of the government in the aftermath of terrorist attacks.  
The following qualitative study focuses on the dynamics of elite behaviour during 
terrorist crises in France, a country where parties rally comparatively less often than in 
the other four countries. 
Chapter 6 
Case Studies 
 
 
 
“In the blinding flash of exploding bombs, the contours of political parties and the 
dividing lines of the class struggle disappear without a trace” (Leon Trotsky, Bankruptcy) 
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Introduction 
 
The statistical analysis conducted in chapter five has revealed several important trends in 
the reaction of mainstream political parties to acts of terrorism. Two variables in 
particular stand out: the magnitude of the attack in terms of fatalities, and the number of 
terrorist acts prior to the act under consideration. Results suggest that mainstream 
opposition elites are less inclined to criticize their government in the immediate aftermath 
of a terrorist attack that claims many victims, as long as the occurrence of terror acts is 
limited. The statistical significance and explanatory power of these two variables fits well 
with the casualty hypothesis developed by other scholars with regards to public support 
for wars and military operations. Yet it does not mean that other influencing factors are 
not at work as well. For instance, an electoral context could shed light on the behaviour 
of political parties whose raison d’être is a priori to win elections, although the national 
interest might be the guiding principle in troubled periods.  
The qualitative analysis presented in this chapter is an attempt to bring into 
consideration a host of other variables that could not be included in the statistical model. 
A qualitative analysis, and in particular case studies, makes it possible to detail the 
reactions of the political elite by analyzing the interaction between the government and 
its opposition. Indeed, the statistical analysis cannot capture the dynamic of the political 
debate, nor can it capture the extent of a rally. Are we in the presence of a weak support 
from the mainstream opposition parties, or do we have a full-blown jingoistic rally that 
has taken over the country as a whole? Admittedly, determining the extent of a rally is 
difficult if not impossible mainly because exhaustive data on the behaviour of all 
segments and sub-segments of society (general population, media, elites, etc.) are not 
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available. Yet one can try to understand the prevalent mood amongst the elite and within 
society. Finally, in this chapter the period under consideration is extended so as to shed 
light on how terrorism impacted elites prior to 1990. It is not at all unlikely that what 
occurred prior to 1990 – in terms of terrorist activities and responses to it or on other 
levels – determines to some extent the reaction of political elites afterwards.  
Put somewhat differently, we acknowledge that the magnitude and repetition 
variables do not necessarily tell the whole story and that other variables can help make 
sense of parties’ reactions in critical times. 
In addition, in this chapter I look beyond the mainstream political elite to analyze 
the behaviour of fringe parties and radical elites. My interest in these parties is twofold. 
First of all these parties, which do not necessarily share the same objectives as their 
mainstream counterparts, might not necessarily support their government in the aftermath 
of terrorist attacks. Second of all, their behaviour might influence the reaction of 
mainstream parties. 
The following analysis will focus on two sets of cases: selected cases from the 
period 1980-1990 (based on five criteria detailed further on), and deviant cases where the 
reaction of the mainstream political elite did not conform to theoretical expectations 
based on magnitude and repetition. In order to determine which cases do not conform to 
expectation I create an ideal-type model which I present in section four.  
This chapter focuses exclusively on France. In many ways French experience with 
terrorism is unique, not because it is particularly different from that of the other four 
countries studied in this research, but rather because France has had over the last 70 years 
the most wide ranging experience of terrorism or terrorist related activities of them all: 
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state-terrorism under the Vichy Government (1940-1945); guerrilla warfare during the 
Second World War126; anti-colonial terrorism across its overseas empire, and notably 
during the Algerian War (1954-1962); the closely related ethnic-separatist terrorism; 
revolutionary terrorism; and finally the latest avatar, transnational terrorism particularly 
in its jihadist form.127  
In addition, unlike the British with the IRA or the Spaniards with ETA, French 
experience with terrorism is not associated with a particular type of terror, let alone a 
particular terrorist organization. Equally important, terrorism has been recurrent without 
being a constant threat.  France unlike Spain (or the United Kingdom in Ulster) has not 
faced an almost constant terror campaign for a prolonged period of time, nor does it have 
the same casualty rate as its Iberian neighbour. In other words, terrorism has not become 
an unending issue of the kind that could possibly distort the way party politics is 
conducted. 
Finally, France with its wide array of political sensibilities provides the possibility 
to analyze the impact of variables such as the ideological divide between Left and Right, 
and the reaction of radical and fringe elites. 
 This chapter begins with an overview of the terrorist groups that have been active 
in France during the last 30 years. Section two gives a similar overview of French 
political parties over the same period of time. Section three presents an analysis of 
parties’ reactions to terrorist attacks during the so-called années de plomb or years of 
                                                
126 I am not equating resistance to terrorism but merely pointing out that the experience of occupation could 
affect the way certain terrorist groups are perceived by the French political elite. 
127 Obviously many other types of terrorism have existed or still exist in France: reactionary terrorism most 
notably from the OAS (Organisation de l’armée secrète) during the later stages of the conflict in Algeria; 
but also ecoterrorism or cyberterrorism. 
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lead. Finally, section four analyses reactions to terrorist attacks during the period 1990-
2006, and in particular cases that diverge from the ideal-type model. 
 
6.1. Terrorism in France 
 
Over the last four decades, three types of terrorist groups have been prevalent in France: 
separatists, revolutionaries, and ‘international’ terrorists.128 The following sections aims 
at describing these groups and the threat they posed to the French state throughout their 
period of activities. 
 
6.1.1. Separatists and autonomists 
 
One of the most inexorable forms of terrorism against the French state has come from 
separatist or autonomist groups operating in Corsica, and on a smaller scale in the Basque 
Country, in Brittany, and in the overseas French territories.129  
 
6.1.1.1. Corsican terrorism 
 
First amongst separatist groups in terms of resilience and resources are the Corsican 
groups, many of which are splinter groups from the Front de Libération Nationale de la 
Corse (FLNC). Initially the first Corsican activists were autonomists seeking more land 
for local farmers, and opposing the development of mass tourism on the island. However, 
                                                
128 As of 2005 estimates were that 358 people were imprisoned in France for terrorist-related activities 
(Sanchez 2008). Among them 159 were Basque separatists, 76 were Corsican nationalists and 94 were 
Islamists. 
129 Of course the idea of more autonomy, let alone full-fledged independence, has always been anathema in 
a centralized country like France, even in the current post-Jacobin period. 
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early setbacks and heavy handed response from the authorities opened the door to more 
radical groups advocating the independence of Corsica through the use of force. The 
FLNC was formed in 1976 to claim back the Corsican territory from the French state and 
became thereafter the standard-bearer for all separatists. Their slogan ‘la valise ou le 
cercueil’ – the suitcase or the coffin – left no doubt as to what their intentions were.130  
During its ‘opening act’ on May 5, 1976, the FLNC perpetrated 16 acts in one 
night. This type of operation also known as ‘nuit bleue’ would become a trademark for 
Corsican groups. Most of these attacks were aimed at administrative buildings, and 
private properties and resorts owned by ‘continentals’ – i.e. non-Corsicans. Targeted 
buildings were usually vacant at the time of the attacks and thus casualties were kept low. 
Yet there have been exceptions, particularly as far as representatives of the French state 
are concerned.131 By the early 1980s the attacks had become almost daily or nightly 
routines. In 1982 Corsican terrorists perpetrated 800 attacks of which 99 in a single night. 
Although most operations were carried out on the island, the terrorists did venture on the 
mainland on a few occasions, most notably on May 31, 1979, when the FLNC struck 22 
targets in Paris in one night.  
In March 1992, the nationalists obtained around 25 percent at the local elections, 
yet most Corsicans were becoming disillusioned with the terrorist groups.132 At first these 
groups had been seemingly fighting a battle for the Corsicans (more land for the locals, 
                                                
130 Quoted in La Croix January 15, 2008. Autonomists for their part remained opposed to the use of 
violence. 
131 On April 16, 1981 shortly after the arrival of French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing at Ajaccio 
airport, an explosion killed one and injured 8 people. In 1983 the secretary general of the department of 
Haute-Corse was shot down by the FLNC. 
132 The separatist movement is also represented by political parties and associations, some of which act as 
legal representatives of the terrorist groups. Unione Naziunale regroups several parties among them Corsica 
Nazione Indipendente (independantists) and Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (autonomists) and has 8 seats in the 
current Assembly of Corsisa. 
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less resorts on the coast) but by the 1990s the difference between the nationalist struggle 
and outright banditry or vendetta had become particularly slim. The extortion, notably 
through the revolutionary tax, and the killings were conjuring up images of mafia-like 
organizations, and the worsening reputation of the island particularly abroad was putting 
the tourist industry in jeopardy.133 
The assassination of Prefect Claude Erignac on February 6, 1998, served as a 
wake-up call for the population and the political elite both on the island and on the 
mainland. Shortly after the murder of Erignac, the government of socialist Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin stepped up its efforts to reach a political solution. As a show of good will 
most clandestine nationalist organizations announced a cease-fire. In July 2000, the 
Assembly of Corsica approved the Jospin plan – known as the ‘processus de Matignon’ – 
to give the islanders more legislative power and promote the Corsican language. 
However, this plan provoked tensions notably within the Jospin-led government. By 
August 2000 Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of Interior, had resigned accusing the 
government of threatening the integrity of the French state. Meanwhile, President Jacques 
Chirac opposed the transfer of legislative power to the Corsican assembly arguing that 
this was tantamount to transforming the unitary French Republic into a ‘federation of 
regions’.134 The plan was eventually accepted by the National Assembly following some 
heated debates.135 
In a referendum held in July 2003, 51 percent of Corsicans chose to reject the 
proposed new territorial assembly – a plan which had received the support of all 
                                                
133 See Pizam and Smith (2000) for the impact of terrorism on tourism. 
134 During this period the right-wing Chirac shared the executive power with the left-wing Jospin (a period 
known as cohabitation). For a chronology of events see : www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossier/corse  
135 Eventually the Conseil Constitutionnel declared the transfer of legislative power unconstitutional. 
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nationalist groups – a clear sign that a majority of residents are opposed to more 
autonomy, let alone sovereignty. Figures on the number of Corsicans supporting full 
independence are hard to come by, but some have projected it to be around 20 percent of 
the island’s population – about 200,000 of its inhabitants (Sanchez 2008). 
Terrorism in Corsica never reached the intensity of terrorism in Ulster or in Spain. 
As a result, casualties have always been kept at a relatively low level. Still, as of 2003 the 
FLNC had been responsible for more that 10,000 acts, claiming in the process the lives of 
220 people and injuring thousands more (Gregory 2003). The latest figures indicate that 
the number of incidents is decreasing (from 235 acts in 2006 to 180 in 2007).136 
 
6.1.1.2. Basque terrorism 
 
Though nowhere close in terms of operational capacity and political weight to the FLNC, 
let alone to their ‘brothers in arms’ of ETA south of the border, the Basque separatists of 
Iparretarrak (IK) – i.e. ‘those of the north’ – have been at times lethal and disruptive since 
their creation in 1973. Between 1975 and 1988, when its leader Philippe Bidard was 
arrested, Iparretarrak committed more than 50 attacks killing in the process four people – 
all from the police or gendarmerie – injuring hundreds more and damaging countless 
buildings and homes (Gregory 2003). Much like the Corsican separatists, IK targeted 
above all the French state and the tourist industry. Its objectives were essentially twofold: 
the defence of the Basque language, and the self-determination of the Basque people 
(Moruzzi and Boulaert 1988). Throughout the 1980s IK provided logistical support and 
refuge to members of ETA. However, ever since the arrests of its main leaders at the end 
                                                
136 Le Figaro January 9, 2008. 
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of the 1980s, the organization has been dormant, though it did resurface on occasion at 
the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000.137 Electorally, the independentists have 
never received more than 5 or 7 percent of the vote (Moruzzi and Boulaert 1988). 
 
6.1.1.3. Breton terrorism 
 
The least known of the main separatist organizations fighting against the French state is 
also the oldest. The Front de Libération de la Bretagne (FLB) was created in 1964 and its 
military branch, the Armée Révolutionnaire Bretonne (ARB), in 1971. The ARB never 
engaged in the sort of operation that could spill blood, and targeted instead mainly 
infrastructures – most notably the regional office of former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin 
in 1999. They did, however, unintentionally kill the manager of a MacDonald’s 
restaurant in April 2000. As a response to this tragic event a number of prominent 
separatists asked the ARB to cease its activities. Denis Riou, an imprisoned activist, 
summed up the mood amongst separatists by declaring that if the people of Brittany have 
been led to fear the ARB then this organization has failed in its mission.138 Until then the 
ARB had been supported by some and tolerated by others only in so far as it did not arm, 
let alone kill anyone.139 
 
 
 
 
                                                
137 In February 2007 Philippe Bidart was freed. 
138 Le Monde May 9, 2000. 
139 L’Express April, 27 2000. 
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6.1.1.4. Caribbean and New Caledonian terrorism 
 
The decolonization process was completed by the early 1960s. Yet France retained a 
number of overseas territories – les confettis de l’empire – notably in the Caribbean and 
the Pacific where supporters of independence undertook terrorist activities in a last 
attempt to oust the French state. During the 1970s and early 1980s these groups carried 
out bombings in the Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, as well as in 
French Guyana. However, by the late 1980s police operations and political 
accommodations put an end to these activities (Gregory 2003). A similar process took 
place in New Caledonia where the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
(FLNKS) was trying to loosen the French grip. The FLNKS, which benefited from the 
operational and financial backing of Libya and the Corsican FLNC through the 1980s, 
was able to obtain a political autonomy deal from Paris (Gregory 2003). Although less 
murderous and destructive than the FLNC, the FLNKS campaign ended in a bloodbath in 
1988 following a hostage crisis that left 20 dead. 
 
6.1.2. Revolutionaries and reactionaries 
 
In parallel to the separatist threat, French authorities dealt from the early 1970s to the 
mid-1980s with a revolutionary brand of terrorism targeted mainly at the state and the 
capitalist establishment. This revolutionary terrorism had taken Western Europe by storm 
and became particularly intense in Italy and Germany with the infamous Brigate Rosse 
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(BR) in the former, and Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and Bewegung Zwei Juni (B2J) in 
the latter.140  
In France, Action Directe (AD) became the standard-bearer for what was also 
known as Euroterrorism. Action Directe targeted as much the French state as its 
perceived ally, corporate business. Amongst its most infamous fait d’armes are the 
assassinations at point-blank of General René Audran in January 1985 and Renault 
Chairman George Besse in November 1986. Yet Action Directe’s resources and 
manpower remained small in comparison to that of Brigate Rosse and the Rote Armee 
Fraktion. Despite this limited operational capacity, members of Action Directe were still 
able to strike at the headquarters of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and of Interpol. By 1981, AD had already split into four different 
groups operating under different names, some working on the international scene notably 
with the RAF or the Belgian Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC), some focusing 
on domestic targets. In the end, the movement proved far less durable than the Corsican 
FLNC. Particularly problematic was its social and intellectual depth, or lack thereof 
(Chaliand and Blin 2004). The organization never received the kind of support – albeit 
limited – enjoyed by other similar groups in Italy and Germany. Throughout the 1980s, 
Action Directe relied increasingly on bank robberies to finance its activities. By the end 
of the decade its last members were arrested and imprisoned, generally for life. 
Reactionary and neo-fascist groups such as the Faisceaux Nationalistes Européens 
(FNE) and the Fédération d’Action Nationale et Européenne (FANE) have caused far less 
                                                
140 This was a worldwide groupuscular phenomenon with revolutionary chapters in the USA (the 
Weathermen and the Symbionese Liberation Army), in Japan (the Japanese Red Army), in Belgium (les 
Cellules Communistes Combattantes), etc. In Italy this brand of terrorism was responsible for 12,690 
incidents between 1969 and 1980, killing 362 people and injuring another 4,524 (Townshend 2002). 
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nuisance, particularly in comparison to similar organizations in countries such as Italy 
and Germany where right-wing extremists have carried out particularly murderous 
operations.141 Their actions have never reached the intensity of those of the Organisation 
Armée Secrète (OAS) during the Algerian war. Amateurish and logistically incapable of 
threatening the French state, these gangs have made the headlines by either desacralizing 
cemeteries (usually Jewish tombs) or setting fire to centers for North-African guest 
workers. More recently on July 14, 2004, Maxime Brunerie, a young neo-Nazi, attempted 
to kill President Chirac during a military parade on the Champs-Élysées. 
 
6.1.3. International groups 
 
France’s colonial past as well as its meddling in international affairs, particularly in the 
Middle East, has been an unrelenting source of terrorist activities within its borders or 
against its interests and citizens abroad.  
For much of the 1970s and 1980s, the most acute problem came from pro-
Palestinian activists. No stranger to the Arab-Israeli conflict, France became a destination 
of choice for Arab terrorists particularly after de Gaulle resuscitated France’s politique 
arabe in an attempt to reclaim the position of influence it had lost in the Middle East 
following the Suez crisis in 1956. Chief amongst these groups operating on French soil 
was the Lebanese-Palestinian Comité de Solidarité avec les Prisonniers Politiques Arabes 
et du Proche-Orient (CSPPA), which targeted both Israeli and French individuals and 
interests, the latter as a mean to force the liberation of Arab prisoners detained in French 
                                                
141 The bombing of the Bologna train station known as the Strage di Bologna (Bologna Massacre) killed 86 
people on August 2, 1980. On September 26, 1980, an explosion killed 13 people at the Munich 
Oktoberfest. 
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jails on account of terrorist offences (Gregory 2003). The CSPPA targeted among others 
the high-speed train between Paris and Marseille and the Eiffel Tower (both of which 
failed). In September 1986, the CSPPA set the streets of Paris ablaze with five bombings 
in the space of ten days, killing nine passersby and wounding more than 160 others. 
Meanwhile French nationals were also targeted abroad either through assassinations or 
kidnapping.142 
 Palestinian terrorism in France disappeared shortly after the 1986 wave of attacks 
but was soon replaced by Algerian terrorism. Having sided with the ruling Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) party in Algeria in an attempt to quell the Islamic upsurge – 
the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) was on its way to winning a majority of votes at the 
December 1991 general election – the French government soon faced a new terrorist 
threat aimed at ending its meddling in Algerian affairs. The islamists’ cause was taken 
over by former FIS members who formed in 1992 the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA). 
Over the following decade, the GIA became infamous for its murderous acts in Algeria 
where more than 50,000 people lost their lives. 
The GIA’s first fait d’armes against France took place on December 24, 1994, 
with the hijacking of an Air France Airbus en route from Algiers to Paris. The hostage 
takers killed three passengers before French police forces stormed the plane in Marseille, 
killing in the process all members of the commando.143 The hijacking was followed a few 
months later by a wave of attacks reminiscent of the one that had hit Paris in 1986. By the 
                                                
142 On October 23, 1983, a suicide operation (likely organized by the Hezbollah) killed 58 soldiers stationed 
in Beirut. Hours later 241 US soldiers perished nearby following a similar attack. 
143 The tally would have been far worse had the GIA activists been able to carry out their initial plan, which 
was either to crash the plane against the Eiffel Tower or blow it up over Paris. 
   
 
166 
end of October 1995 the bombings (mainly in Paris but also in Lyon) had claimed the 
lives of 10 people and had injured close to 300 more. 
 Other groups or individuals have imported their conflicts in France over the last 
25 years, notably the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) 
whose most tragic fait d’armes killed 8 and wounded 60 when a bomb exploded at Orly 
airport (1983), the Iranian secret services, and the infamous Carlos the Jackal. Although 
often cited by Bin Laden as a target, France has been relatively spared by al Qaeda 
operatives.144 
 Overall France has been targeted over the past 30 years by a wide variety of 
terrorist groups. Homegrown organisations such as the Corsican FLNC or the far-left 
Action Directe have been active over longer periods than most foreign groups operating 
on the French territory, but attacks by the latter have usually been far more lethal. 
French political parties have thus been confronted to terrorism on a regular basis. 
 
6.2. Political parties in France 
 
It is generally accepted that the terms Left and Right in politics originate from the French 
Revolution (1789-1794). Initially this typology reflected the seating plan within the 
newly created National Assembly, with those favouring the ancien régime and the king 
seated on the right side of the hemicycle, and those keen on limiting the powers of the 
monarch seated on the left. Although the meaning of Left and Right has changed over the 
centuries, the current seating plan still reflects basic ideological differences with on the 
                                                
144 In 2000, an attack against the Strasbourg Christmas Market by terrorists close to al Qaeda was foiled at 
the last minute. It should be noted that al Qaeda had developed ties with Algerian jihadists and notably 
members of the GIA during the 1990s. 
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left side what Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright (2006) call the ‘Party of movement’ 
and on the right side the ‘Party of order’.145 Historically speaking the ‘Party of 
movement’ embraced values such as secularism and social justice, whereas the ‘Party of 
order’ looked at social reforms with scepticism, shared many of the values defended by 
the Catholic Church and believed in strong political leadership (Knapp and Wright 2006). 
The difference between Left and Right has now shifted towards socio-economic 
considerations, yet despite this enduring cleavage France never had a bipartisan system. 
The following section aims at presenting the main political forces in France over 
the last 30 years and underline their stance on terrorism and national security. I first start 
with mainstream parties (Left and Right), and then proceed with radical and fringe 
parties. 
 
6.2.1. Mainstream parties 
 
6.2.1.1. The Parti Socialiste 
 
The Parti Socialiste (PS) was created in 1971 on the old remnants of the once Marxist 
Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO). Over the next decade, and with 
François Mitterrand at its helm, the PS slowly supplanted the Parti Communiste (PC) as 
the main political force on the left side of the political spectrum. In 1981, for the first 
time under the Fifth Republic, the presidential election was won by a left-wing candidate, 
namely Mitterrand. Many on the Right were bewildered by Mitterrand’s victory, he who 
a mere 17 years before had denounced the Fifth Republic as de Gaulle’s ploy to carry out 
                                                
145 Two expressions originally coined by French political scientist François Goguel. 
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a coup d’État permanent. Adding insult to injury for the Gaullists, Mitterrand appointed 
four members of the communist party – de Gaulle’s nemesis – to his government. 
Although François Mitterrand remained President of the Republic until 1995, he 
was forced to share power with right-wing governments on two occasions following 
socialist defeats at legislative elections (1986-1988 and 1993-1995). These periods 
known as cohabitation were both marked by intense terrorist activities. 
Initially the socialists were brought to power to “break with capitalism” and 
implement far reaching reforms based on a “Keynesian dash for growth” (Frears 1991, 
73). Humanism was the order of the day and quickly led to a series of symbolic measures, 
such as the abolition of the death penalty. The 110 measures on which Mitterrand had 
been campaigning in 1981 had a distinctively pacifist feel with, among other proposals, 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (the first measure in this list), peace in 
the Middle East, progressive disarmament of the Western and Eastern blocs, and an end 
to nuclear dissemination.146 Yet, with the socialists barely a year in power Realpolitik 
made a flashing return to the top of the agenda. After abandoning their Keynesian 
stimulus plan, Mitterrand went back on a number of foreign policy related promises, 
notably concerning weapons sales and the installation of US Pershing missiles on 
European soil. The participation of French military forces to the US-led Operation Desert 
Storm in 1991 further demonstrated that Mitterrand was no dove, even though some of 
his closest political allies within the socialist party were reluctant to follow a hawkish 
policy.147 
                                                
146 See www.lours.org/default.asp?pid=307  
147 Jean-Pierre Chevènement, unwilling to see France participate in Operation Desert Storm, resigned from 
his position of Minister of Defence shortly before the start of the military operation. It should be noted, 
however, that Mitterrand sparred no efforts in trying to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough during the crisis. 
   
 
169 
With regards to terrorism, the socialists made a series of gestures sympathetic to 
certain former activists. For instance, shortly after Mitterrand’s election the government 
passed a law granting amnesty that led to the liberation of two leaders of Action 
Directe.148 In 1985, Mitterrand went still further by establishing what would be known 
henceforth as the ‘Doctrine Mitterrand’, namely a pledge not to extradite former left-
wing Italian terrorists and members of Brigate Rosse.149 During that same year the 
Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE)150 sank the Rainbow Warrior, 
flagship of the organization Greenpeace, in order to prevent its crew from reaching 
French Polynesia where nuclear tests were carried out.151 The socialist government, it 
appeared, had greenlighted the use of terrorism to protect the interest of the country.152 
 
6.2.1.2. The Rassemblement pour la République 
 
The Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) was founded in 1976 to rekindle the 
Gaullist movement, regain leadership of the Right that had fallen in the hands of Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing (see below), and offer support to Jacques Chirac in the electoral 
campaigns that lay ahead (Knapp and Right 2006). Ideologically the gaullisme 
chiraquien resulted at first in an “aggressive, populist, anti-European, anti-free-market 
rhetoric” and towards the mid-1980s in an “aggressive pro-free-market rhetoric” amidst 
internal disagreement on the issue of Europe (Knapp and Right 2006, 226). 
                                                
148 www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/action-directe-rouillan-parle-et-pourrait-se-voir-prive-de-sa-semi-
liberte_579389.html  
149 www.mitterrand.org/La-France-I-Italie-face-a-la.html  
150 DGSE are a branch of the French secret service and are in charge of gathering intelligence outside 
French borders. 
151 One person was killed by the explosion. 
152 Minister of Defense Charles Hernu resigned in the aftermath of the crisis. 
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 After an initial bout as Prime minister (1974-1976) under President Giscard 
d’Estaing, Jacques Chirac returned to the Hôtel Matignon (the official residency of 
French Prime ministers) in 1986 after a right-wing victory (RPR and UDF) at the 
legislative elections. During this first period of cohabitation Chirac’s government tried to 
undo some of the more symbolic measures decided by the socialists, notably by 
privatizing some previously nationalized companies, but was frustrated by President 
Mitterrand’s refusal to ratify some of these policies.153 
 The RPR, which had been very critical of the socialists’ handling of terrorism 
earlier in the decade, was soon tested by a terrorist campaign carried out by Palestinian 
activists, which claimed the lives of nine people in September 1986. Shortly thereafter, 
Claude Besse, president of the state-owned carmaker Renault, was shot dead by members 
of Action Directe. During this period, several French citizens were abducted in Lebanon. 
Though most of them were eventually freed, the question remains whether the 
negotiation entailed some kind of financial retribution.154 Chirac ended his last mandate 
as Prime Minister with a heavy-handed policy in New-Caledonia where 18 
independentists were killed during an operation by French special forces to free hostages 
(Gregory 2003). 
The RPR returned to power between 1993 and 1995 though this time with 
Édouard Balladur in the Prime Minister’s seat. Balladur’s mandate was marked by 
several terrorist acts perpetrated by Algerian jihadists. On a more symbolic level, Carlos 
the Jackal who had masterminded several terrorist attacks throughout the world in the 
1980s was arrested by French police in Sudan. 
                                                
153 A second cohabitation took place between 1993 and 1995. This time the right-wing government was led 
by Édouard Balladur (RPR). 
154 The abductions were linked to the French support to Iraq in its war against Iran.  
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 In 1995 upon becoming President, Chirac faced a particularly intense wave of 
attacks perpetrated by Algerian terrorists, and in the end was widely praised for dealing 
effectively with this particular threat and for dismantling its operational base (Gregory 
2003). 
 
6.2.1.3. The Union pour la Démocratie Française 
 
The Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) was founded in 1978 to support Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing’s reelection bid and counter Chirac’s rising influence within the Right. 
In the event, the UDF relinquished its dominant position within the Right, though its 
distinctive pro-European stance made it more of a center-right political force anyway. 
The UDF took part alongside the RPR in each of the first two cohabitation governments 
and again in each right-wing governments under Chirac’s presidency (1995-2007)155 and 
Sarkozy’s presidency (2007-present)156. 
Perhaps wary of endangering its politique arabe Giscard d’Estaing’s government 
proved less resolute with Palestinian terrorists than with left-wing radicals.157 In January 
1977 after just ten days of detention, Giscard authorized the release of known terrorist 
Abu Daoud despite his involvement in the operation against the Israeli delegation at the 
1972 Olympic Games in Munich (Gregory 2003). Similarly his government offered a 
safe passage to Iraq to CSPPA activists responsible for taking hostages at the Orly airport 
(Gregory 2003). 
                                                
155 The UDF returned in the opposition after the victory of the gauche plurielle (PS and other left-wing 
parties) at the 1997 legislatives elections. 
156 The UDF was dissolved into two political parties following the 2007 presidential elections : Modem and 
Nouveau Centre. 
157 Two Action Directe activists, Nathalie Menignon and Jean-Marc Rouillan, were arrested in November 
1980 only to be freed a few months later after Mitterrand’s victory over Giscard d’Estaing at the 
presidential election.  
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 Finally, it was Giscard’s government that set up the Plan Vigipirate in 1978. This 
national emergency plan is intended for exceptional crises such as terrorist crises, and 
involves coordinated operations by the army, the gendarmerie and other police forces to 
protect public and sensitive sites such as airports, railway stations and nuclear power 
plants (Gregory 2003). 
 
6.2.2. Radical parties 
 
After more than thirty years in the opposition, the Parti Communiste (PC) returned to 
power in 1981, albeit in a junior role, and embraced most of the policies advocated by the 
Parti Socialiste, particularly its leniency towards left-wing activists. By 1984 however the 
communists had left the government only to return in 1997 following another socialist 
victory. The PC, which represented close to a quarter of the electorate at the end of the 
1970s, fell below the 10 percent mark in the 1990s. Throughout these years the PCF has 
maintained a rather permissive stance with regards to terrorism. 
 As for the Front National (FN), its first electoral breakthrough came in the early 
1980s. The far-right party led by Jean-Marie Le Pen became known for a tough rhetoric 
on crime and terrorism (insisting for instance that the death penalty be reinstated for 
terrorists). Following the 1986 legislative elections the FN obtained 30 seats in the 
National Assembly.158 Though the party lost most of these seats two years later, the FN 
remained a force to be reckoned with whether at local elections or at presidential 
elections. The FN popularity peaked in 2002 when Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the second 
                                                
158 A proportionnal representation system was used for the 1986 election in place of the traditionnal two-
round majority system. This change accounts to a large extent for the FN’s performance. 
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round of the presidential election after making security the number one issue during the 
campaign. 
 
Although right-wing parties and in particular the RPR might have had the ownership of 
the twin issues of national security and terrorism, it is fair to say that right-wing 
governments were at times as permissive with terrorists as left-wing governments. The 
socialists might have been more lenient with leftist radicals but the RPR and UDF hardly 
set the example with terrorists originating from the Middle East. In fact, Walter Laqueur 
in the Age of Terrorism considered France to be the “most permissive” of all West 
European countries in its handlings of terrorist groups (1999, 289). Yet whatever the 
strategy used, Shaun Gregory (2003) remarks that both left-wing and right-wing 
governments succeeded in eradicating the jihadist menace by defeating the GIA and 
preventing further attacks. 
 We now turn to the period 1980-1990 and examine how both the Left and the 
Right handled various terrorist crises. 
 
6.3. The ‘Years of Lead’ 
 
The expression ‘years of lead’ – for the French années de plomb – came to describe the 
peak of left-wing and right-wing terrorism in Western Europe throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s.159 Yet whereas the phenomenon was particularly acute in Italy and 
Germany, France’s experience was noticeably different although equally ruthless. From 
the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, France became the target of various domestic groups 
                                                
159 See footnote 32 for the origin of the expression. 
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(revolutionaries, separatists, etc.) but also foreign-based groups originating mainly from 
Palestine, Lebanon, Iran and Armenia. Assassinations of public figures, shootings in 
public places and explosions in busy streets became familiar.  
The following section presents a series of case studies covering the most 
important attacks, namely: the explosion rue Copernic (1980), the wave of attacks 
between March and September 1982, the wave of attacks in September 1986, and the 
assassination of Georges Besse (1986). This selection of cases is based on five criteria: 
the magnitude of the attack, the repetition of attacks, the type of target, the identity of 
perpetrators, and the party in power. In other words, I have selected the attacks with the 
highest fallout in terms of victims but also made sure to include attacks and wave of 
attacks with different targets (from civil servants to passersby), perpetrated by different 
groups (domestic and international). Finally, this selection includes acts taking place 
during periods with right-wing and left-wing governments. In so doing, I am able to 
analyze the impact of five key variables on the reactions of elites, both mainstream and 
radical. Furthermore, the international context of that particular decade (Cold War and 
tension in the Middle East) provides an interesting background to the decision-making 
process and behaviour of French political elites. Finally this analysis provides useful 
insights for understanding what happened during the 1990 to 2006 period.  
For each case study presented in this section (and in the remainder of chapter six) 
I follow the same procedure. The first part gives an account of the event and describes the 
political situation at the time of the attack. The second part indicates what the magnitude-
repetition model suggests will happen, details the reaction of both mainstream and radical 
elites, and compares it to what the model predicted (see table X for a summary). 
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Table X. Expected and actual reaction of the mainstream opposition based on the 
magnitude-repetition model (selected cases – period 1980-1990) 
 
 
Case study one: Explosion in rue Copernic (October 3, 1980) 
 
1) Account of the event and description of the political situation 
 
On October 3, 1980, at the end of the afternoon a bomb exploded in front of a Paris 
synagogue killing four people and injuring another 22. The tragedy could have been far 
worse had the commando been able to implement their original plan which was to place 
the device inside the premises where more than 300 worshipers were attending a religious 
service on the eve of Shabbat. However the presence of a security guard led the terrorists 
to dispose of the bomb outside of the synagogue. Responsibility for the attack was 
claimed straight away by the Faisceaux Nationalistes Européens (FNE), a far-right group 
Case Magnitude Repetition Expected Outcome Actual Outcome 
Explosion in rue Copernic – linked first 
to neo-Nazis and then Abu Nidal  (1980) 
High High No Support No Support 
 
 
Wave of attacks – linked to Middle 
Eastern Groups (1982) 
1st attack: High 
 
2nd attack: Low 
 
3rd attack: High 
 
4th attack: Low 
Low 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
Support 
 
Likely Support 
 
No Support 
  
Likely Support 
Support 
 
No Support 
 
No Support 
 
No Support 
 
 
 
Wave of attacks – linked to the CSPPA 
(1986) 
1st attack: Low 
 
2nd attack: Low 
 
3rd attack: Low 
 
4th attack: Low 
 
5th attack: High 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
Likely Support 
 
Likely Support 
 
Likely Support 
 
Likely Support 
 
No Support 
Support 
 
Support 
 
Support 
 
Support 
 
Support 
Assassination of Besse – linked to 
Action Directe (1986) 
Low High Likely Support Support 
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linked to the Fédération d’Action Nationale et Européenne (FANE), which had been 
dissolved by the French government a month before the attack. Marc Fredriksen, former 
leader of the defunct FANE, quickly issued a press-release disclaiming responsibility for 
the act. However the attack rue Copernic followed a host of anti-Semitic attacks in 
France and across Europe, notably in Bologna where 84 perished on August 2, 1980, and 
Munich where 12 died on September 27, 1980. As a result, dozens of people within neo-
Nazi circles were arrested in the days that followed.  
In the following week, Le Monde – and most other French newspapers – 
maintained throughout their editorials and articles that the attack had been the work of 
far-right terrorists. Eventually, as the police investigation proceeded, the blame shifted 
towards Abu Nidal – at the time a “hired gun” for Syria, Iraq, and Libya – whose prime 
purpose was to make money out of terrorist activities (Hoffman 2006, 259). The French 
authorities identified later on five Palestinians as prime suspects.160 However in the heat 
of the moment and in the days that followed, the reaction from the elite as well as from 
the main media outlets was based on the assumption that the attack was the work of neo-
Nazis. 
 
At the time President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was in the last year of his seven-year 
mandate. Presidential elections were scheduled six months later and reelection was far 
from certain for the incumbent. Although the right-wing coalition had been victorious at 
the 1978 legislative elections, Giscard’s party (the center-right UDF) came in only 
second behind the Gaullist RPR led by Jacques Chirac – Giscard d’Estaing’s former 
                                                
160 Abu Nidal’s last known fait d’armes took place on January 17, 1980, when a Palestinian activist was 
gunned down (an act which Abu Nidal never officially claimed). 
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Prime Minister.161 The opposition between UDF and RPR turned especially sour when 
Chirac claimed that the UDF was “le parti de l’étranger” – i.e. meaning both the party 
from abroad and the foreigner’s party – a clear attack on Giscard’s pro-European policies. 
The split between the two right-wing parties was confirmed in the following weeks when 
the RPR representatives in the National Assembly repeatedly refused to vote in favour of 
governmental bills. Meanwhile the situation on the left of the political divide was 
becoming heated again. The socialists (PS) and the communists (PC) after briefly allying 
themselves returned to their old rivalry with the latter accusing the former of taking a 
“virage à droite” – i.e. conservative turn.  
The end of Giscard’s mandate was marred by foreign policy crises and 
controversial decisions, such as the sanctuary offered to Imam Khomeini shortly before 
his return to Iran to lead the Islamic Revolution, and the government’s mild criticism of 
Moscow following the invasion of Afghanistan.162 The economic situation was even 
worse with the second oil crisis pushing inflation and unemployment rates up.  
 
2) Expectations, reactions, and implications for the model 
 
The explosion rue Copernic was an instance of high magnitude and high repetition. 
Therefore, the magnitude-repetition model leads us to expect criticisms from mainstream 
opposition parties. Radical parties for their part are expected to criticize both the 
government and mainstream opposition parties. 
 
                                                
161 The UDF regained some momentum when it finished first in the European elections of June 10, 1979. 
162 France was one of the few Western countries that did not boycott the summer Olympic Games held in 
Moscow in 1980. On a more personal note, in October 1979 a French newspaper accused Giscard of having 
received diamonds as a ‘present’ from Bokassa, at the time dictator of the Central African Republic.  
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Leaders of the Jewish community in France were the first ones to react to the attack and 
thereby set the tone. They deplored the tameness of the authorities and the indifference of 
those in charge of governing the country.163 Le Monde took a similar stance and in a 
front-page editorial blamed the state for its permissiveness – complaisance – and for 
being too lenient with far-right extremism.164  
The opposition was quick to capitalize on the controversy surrounding the 
perceived permissiveness of the government. François Mitterrand (leader of the Parti 
Socialiste) underlined the fact that this terrorist act was part of a long series of similar 
acts.165 He bemoaned in particular the impotence of the government and its inability to 
take into account the warnings. On a more personal level, Mitterrand pointed out that far-
right activists had been working as security agents for Giscard d’Estaing during the 1974 
presidential campaign and had subsequently won seats in the National Assembly under 
the banner of the UDF. Mitterrand’s point was that Giscard needed the far-right to govern 
and therefore was not at liberty to strike at neo-fascist groups when needed. In a similar 
vein, Gaston Defferre (leader of the socialist group at the National Assembly) remarked 
that by minimizing the danger posed by far-right extremists the government would never 
be able to control them.166 By October 7 (four days after the explosion rue Copernic), the 
socialists asked for Christian Bonnet’s resignation as Minister of the Interior. 
                                                
163 Alain de Rothschild, president of the Consistoire Central Israélite de France and the Conseil 
Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France spoke of “la passivité des pouvoirs publics et l’indifférence 
de nos gouvernants” – i.e. the passivity of public authorities and the indifference of those governing us (this 
translation as well as the other ones appearing in the text or in footnotes are mine). Le Monde October 5, 
1980. 
164 Philippe Boucher, author of the editorial, spoke of “laisser sur son sol croître la folie, s’épanouir 
l’horreur” – i.e. letting madness grow on our land, and horror bloom. Le Monde October 5, 1980. 
165 Le Monde October 5, 1980. 
166 Le Monde October 5, 1980. 
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Michel Pinton (spokesperson for the UDF) deplored the attempt by the socialist 
opposition to politicize the issue. Unfortunately for the government, criticisms were also 
voiced within conservative ranks and in particular amongst Gaullists.167 Bernard Pons 
(secretary general of the RPR) asked the government to finally realize that the danger 
posed by right-wing extremists is real. Michel Debré (de Gaulle’s former Prime Minister) 
was far less subtle and criticized the government for its hesitations and its lack of 
audacity. Chirac for his part refrained from openly criticizing the government. 
Surprisingly, radical parties did not seize the opportunity created by the attack to 
strongly criticize the government or the political system. George Marchais (secretary 
general of the Parti Communiste) merely issued a mildly critical statement asking the 
government to finally take all measures necessary to arrest and condemn the criminals 
and asked that a debate on terrorism be organized in the National Assembly.168 
Jean-Marie Le Pen (leader of the Front national) also refrained from criticizing the 
government. However, he used the opportunity to redirect the blame on the communists, 
claiming that this criminal act was part of a strategy of provocation that could only 
benefit communist subversion.169 In particular, Le Pen accused the KGB of wanting to 
destabilize the West.170 He also remarked that repeated warnings on a renewal of the Nazi 
scare would only deflect attention from the imminent Soviet invasion of Poland and from 
the various political scandals in France, notably those involving Giscard d’Estaing and 
Marchais.171 Elsewhere Le Pen used the opportunity to restate two key points in his 
                                                
167 Le Monde October 7, 1980. 
168 Le Monde October 7, 1980. 
169 Other far right groups simply declared their indignation without hinting at any communist-led 
conspiracy. 
170 Le Monde October 7, 1980. 
171 “Pendant qu’on crie à la résurgence de la baudruche nazie, on passe sous sience [sic] les crimes 
politiques du K.G.B., les préparatifs d’invasion de la Pologne ou encore les scandales permanents de la vie 
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electoral platform, namely the need to reestablish severe controls at the border, and the 
necessity to reinstate the death penalty against terrorists. 
 
As an instance of high magnitude (four people killed) and more importantly high 
repetition (this was the latest in a long list of terrorist attacks), it does not come as a 
surprise that the opposition was critical of the government in the aftermath of the 
explosion rue Copernic. Mitterrand himself made sure to remind everyone that this was 
the latest in a long series of attacks. In that respect, the magnitude-repetition model 
withstands the test. Yet to be fair, a number of other factors made sure that the Left and 
even part of the Right would avoid the rally. First of all, the act was perceived (wrongly 
as it eventually turned out) as part of a wave of far-right attacks which the government 
had failed to stop – Le Monde put the number of anti-Semitic attacks in France at about 
120 since 1975. This could only reinforce the feeling that the government was not 
handling the right-wing threat well enough. In addition, the reaction of the main Jewish 
organizations, echoed by the press, fuelled public dissatisfaction and resulted in several 
demonstrations across the country. As often in the aftermath of deadly attacks, a rally in 
support of the victim quickly developed. Thus the socialists but also the Gaullists were 
able to join the chorus of disapproval. The government, for its part, was unable to control 
the flow of information and impose its own framing on the events. Whether or not a rally 
would have been triggered had the perpetrators been correctly identified remains 
                                                                                                                                            
politique française, notamment l’affaire des diamants de Giscard et les nouveaux rebondissements de 
l’affaire Marchais” – i.e. While some scream at the resurgence of the Nazi scare, one forgets the political 
crimes committed by the KGB, the preparations to invade Poland and the never-ending scandals involving 
French politicians, notably President Giscard and head of the French Communist Party Georges Marchais. 
Le Monde October 7, 1980. 
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impossible to determine. Yet we do know from the statistical analysis conducted in the 
previous chapter that attacks originating abroad are more likely to trigger rallies. 
The electoral variable cannot be discounted either. With a presidential election a 
mere six months away, the political elite had an opportunity to strike at the incumbent. 
More importantly they could do so without any fear of their loyalty to the nation being 
questioned. After all the wave of criticism towards the permissiveness of the government 
with right-wing fanatics was coming from all political directions and all quarters of civil 
society. Interestingly, a right-wing government was criticized for being too soft on terror.  
What was perhaps more surprising was the behaviour of the main radical parties – 
i.e. Parti Communiste and Front National – neither of which were particularly critical of 
the government, certainly not more than mainstream parties. One of the reasons for this 
apparent leniency might have to do with the fact that criticizing the government could 
have been perceived as siding with the rest of the mainstream elite. There was clearly 
nothing to be gained at being more critical than the rest of the opposition. With elections 
less than six months away, the communists were keen to distance themselves from the 
socialists. The Front National for its part could hardly side with the critics and ask that 
the government be ruthless with far-right activists, many of which were sympathizers or 
even members of the FN.172 On the contrary, Le Pen found it more profitable to deflect 
the blame towards the communists at home and abroad, and to demand a reinstatement of 
capital punishment against terrorists. 
 In the end the high number of casualties coupled with the (mis)perception that this 
was the latest in a long list of acts committed by far-right terrorists left the government 
                                                
172 Although Le Pen had already made a name for himself, notably as a member of the Poujadist movement 
in the 1960s, the FN was still ‘groupuscular’ and had not yet gained a noticeable electoral support. 
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little chance to escape the crisis unscathed, particularly with presidential elections barely 
six months away. 
 
Case study two: Wave of attacks between March and September 1982 
 
1) Account of the events and description of the political situation 
 
Between the months of March and September 1982 a wave of attacks hit France killing 
12 people and injuring over 200. The first attack, an explosion in one of the coaches of 
the Paris-Toulouse train, took place on March 29. Five passengers were killed and 
another 27 wounded. Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez better known under his alias ‘Carlos’ was 
blamed for the attack although no official claim was issued. The second attack took place 
on April 22 and targeted the office of Lebanese newspaper Al Watan Al Arabi (i.e. The 
Arab Nation) rue Marbeuf in Paris. The explosion killed one person and injured another 
64. Syrian secret services were blamed for the attack on this pro-Iraqi publication.173 On 
August 9, six people were killed rue des Rosiers in Paris and another 22 were wounded. 
At the time, the shooting was thought to be the work of Abu Nidal or possibly Action 
Directe.174 Finally, on September 17 an explosion near Lycée Carnot in Paris claimed no 
life but injured 91 passersby. Although these attacks were thought to be linked to Middle 
Eastern groups, the eclectic nature of terrorist groups operating in France at the time 
made it difficult to blame one organization or the other. 
 
                                                
173 Through this attack, Syria was trying among others to force France to abandon its pro-Iraqi policy. 
174 Other attacks of lesser magnitude had taken place between the explosion rue Marbeuf and the shooting 
rue des Rosiers: an explosion on July 20 place Saint-Michel (15 wounded), and three attacks by Action 
Directe at the beginning of August. 
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After more than 23 years in opposition the Left was finally back in power. François 
Mitterrand (PS) had beaten his archrival Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (UDF) in May 1981 to 
become the Fifth Republic’s first socialist President. A month later a landslide victory at 
the legislative elections gave the socialists a majority of seats at the National Assembly. 
For the Right, who had been in power since May 1958, the defeat was bitter, particularly 
for the Gaullist party (RPR) of Jacques Chirac who considered the Fifth republic their 
creation. To add insult to injury, Mitterrand and most of the elite on the Left of the 
political divide had been initially bitterly opposed to the new constitution, which many of 
them viewed as autocratic and dangerous for democracy. Thus many right-wing 
politicians felt that Mitterrand did not deserve the extensive power bestowed upon him by 
a constitution he rejected so forcefully. Worse still for the Right was the inclusion of four 
communists in the government of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy. 
Keeping with electoral promises made during the campaign the socialists 
undertook major reforms, amongst them the nationalization (after a long-drawn-out battle 
in parliament that ended shortly before the attack on the Paris-Toulouse train) of five of 
the largest French industrial groups, 39 banks and two financial companies; the transfer 
of substantial power to regional councils; and the abolition of the death penalty. However 
by early 1982, economic setbacks were already putting the socialist plan for a ‘new 
society’ in peril. The revival of the economy through Keynesian inspired policies never 
materialized and increased massively the budget deficit, the public debt and the trade 
balance deficit (Becker 2003, 193). As a result the French currency underwent a series of 
devaluations. Meanwhile the inflation rate remained high (14.1 percent between March 
1981 and March 1982), notably in comparison to other European countries, and the 
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unemployment rate was rising inexorably.175 By June 1982 the government had 
abandoned its bold plan and was going back to the measures of austerity they had vowed 
never to use. As a consequence of this economic downturn, the approval ratings of both 
President Mitterrand and his Prime Minister decreased from respectively 74 and 71 
percent in June 1981 to 57 and 58 percent in December 1981 (Becker 2003, 194).176 By 
September 1982 the popularity of the President had plummeted even lower with 42 
percent satisfied of his actions and 45 percent dissatisfied (Becker 2003, 194). This 
decline was confirmed at the beginning of 1982 when the socialists lost three seats to the 
right-wing opposition following legislative by-elections (Becker 2003, 194). This string 
of electoral setbacks carried on with a major defeat for the Left at the cantonal elections 
in March 1982.177 
 
2) Expectations, reactions, and implications for the model 
 
According to the magnitude-repetition model the elite should have supported the 
government in the aftermath of the first attack (high magnitude and low repetition). 
Thereafter, the high repetition suggest a likely support following the second and fourth 
attack (both low magnitude attacks), and no support following the third attack (high 
magnitude). 
 
The first attack – an explosion aboard the train linking Paris and Toulouse – was not at 
first perceived as terrorist in nature. Even though ‘Carlos’ was mentioned in the news 
                                                
175 There were 1,6 million unemployed in March 1981 and over 2 million in March 1983 (Becker 2003, 
193). 
176 According to polls carried out by SOFRES. 
177 The Left lost more than hundred seats in the departmental assemblies as well as the presidency of 8 
conseil généraux (Becker 2003, 194). Each department has a conseil general, the equivalent of a 
departmental government. 
   
 
185 
reports because of an ultimatum he had given to the French government days before the 
explosion, other scenarios were put forth in the media (e.g. gangsters or autonomists 
transporting explosives).178 Within a few days a host of organizations claimed 
responsibility for the explosion: several far-right groups (amongst them an organization 
asking for the exclusion of the communist from the government), far-left groups and 
Carlos himself. 
 Initially the elite was slow to react to what was essentially the first major attack 
since Mitterrand’s election. Christian Bonnet (UDF) himself, whose resignation from the 
Ministry of the Interior had been demanded by the socialists less than two years before 
(see case study one), declared that terrorism was not a new phenomenon and that it would 
be unfair to lay the blame for recent terrorist activities on any particular government.179 
Besides, the absence of serious claims created a murky situation, and making sense of 
what had happened rather difficult. In addition, the particularly dense flow of events on 
the international scene – intensification of the war between Iran and Iraq, and invasion of 
the Falkland Islands by Argentinean troops – deflected part of the elite’s attention. 
The second attack elicited far more reactions from the opposition. Chirac (RPR) 
merely asked the government to endow the security forces with the necessary resources 
to combat terrorism, but Bernard Pons (secretary general of the RPR) went on the 
offensive accusing the government of letting people known for their connections with 
terrorist organizations free and of failing to take action despite knowing the whereabouts 
                                                
178 Le Monde March 31, 1982. Carlos had asked the government to release his close friend Magdalena 
Kopp. 
179 Le Monde April 2, 1982. Yet Bonnet did express concerns at some of the appointments made by the 
socialist government within the police forces. 
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of those responsible for the attacks.180 Even more critical yet, the UDF declared that the 
‘socialist-communist’ government had neglected the warnings it received from the 
opposition and shut its eyes on the rise of insecurity and violence, and concluded: “We 
were expecting actions, all we had were new victims”.181   
Criticisms were also widespread within right-wing leaning newspapers. Max Clos 
in Le Figaro claimed that the government was too permissive and thus responsible for the 
crisis; Pierre Charpy in La Lettre de la Nation asked for the dismissal of Claude 
Cheysson (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Gaston Defferre (Minister of the Interior) and 
Robert Badinter (Minister of Justice). 
Surprisingly the government refused to respond to these criticisms and 
accusations of carelessness, and simply indicated that using this drama for political gains 
was indecent.182  
 During the following days criticisms against the government continued with the 
same level of intensity. Senator Charles Pasqua (one of the leading figure of the RPR) 
and Jacques Toubon (close adviser to Chirac) claimed that terrorist groups were creeping 
in France, and accused the government of supporting violent organizations in other 
countries.183 Chirac for his part commented on the government’s lack of resolve to tackle 
the security problem.184 However, the most damning criticism yet was voiced by Claude 
Labbé (president of the RPR group in the National Assembly) who declared: 
                                                
180 Le Monde April 23, 1982. 
181 “On était en droit d’attendre des actes, on n’a eu que de nouvelles victimes” Le Monde April 23, 1982. 
182 Le Monde April 24, 1982. 
183 Le Monde April 27, 1982. 
184 “La sécurité procède d’une volonté et celle-ci est de plus en plus absente de l’esprit de nos gouvernants. 
J’en ai appelé au président de la République pour qu’il prenne enfin conscience des exigences de la sécurité 
de nos concitoyens” – i.e. “Security must be willed, and this will is more and more lacking in the minds of 
those governing us. I called upon the President of the Republic to finally realize what the security of our 
fellow citizens requires”. Le Monde April 29, 1982. 
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“Je le dis avec solennité et une certaine brutalité, nous avons à demander à 
ces dirigeants de partir. C’est notre rôle d’opposants. Qu’ils s’en aillent, ce 
sont des incapables.”185  
 
In response to the uproar provoked by this declaration within socialist ranks, Bernard 
Pons (RPR) remarked that though the declaration was excessive in its form, it did 
indicate a concern about the way the government had handled the national security so 
far.186 A few days later Bonnet and Labbé called again for the Prime Minister’s 
resignation, openly condemning what they considered to be a “rotten intellectual circle” 
within the Parisian left, a group of “conscientious objectors”.187 
The socialists through Georges Sarre expressed dismay at the use (or abuse) by 
the Right of the terrorist issue for political gains:  
“Je plains les hommes de droite qui, par souci d’exploitation politique 
n’ont pas hésité à faire des déclarations intolérables et abjectes contre le 
gouvernement de la République (…) La vérité est claire. Vous êtes animés 
par une véritable rage de détruire. Seule la revanche électorale, la 
reconquête du pouvoir vous intéressent”.188  
 
Claude Labbé (RPR) who launched the initial verbal attack maintained his 
declaration and even questioned the legitimacy of the socialist president: 
“Je ne considère pas que nous soyons véritablement dans une situation 
d’alternance. En se proclamant dès le jour de son accession à l’Élysée, 
président socialiste, François Mitterrand a commis une lourde faute et 
limité sa capacité à être reconnu comme président de tous les Français. En 
s’engageant dans une politique de bouleversement généralisé et ne 
correspondant pas vraiment au sentiment d’une large majorité de Français, 
                                                
185 “I say this with solemnity and a certain brutality, we must ask those in charge of governing to leave. 
This is our role as opponents. Let them go, they are useless”. Le Monde April 29, 1982. 
186 Le Monde April 30, 1982. 
187 “Moisissure d’une certaine société parisienne et d’objecteurs de conscience” Le Monde May 3, 1982. 
188 “I pity those on the Right who in order to make a political gain did not hesitate to make intolerable and 
abject declarations against the government of the Republic (…) The truth is plain. You are spurred on by a 
genuine rage to destroy. You only seek an electoral revenge, and to reclaim your lost power”. Le Monde 
April 28, 1982. 
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le gouvernement n’a pas respecté cette continuité du pouvoir par laquelle 
se définit l’alternance”.189  
 
Labbé and others were not just voicing criticisms but literally indicting the President and 
declaring him unfit to run the country. 
Faced with mounting accusations of permissiveness, the Left remained for the 
most part stoic, although Gaston Defferre (Minister of the Interior) accused the Right of 
negligence when it was in power, reminding public opinion that right-wing governments 
had in the past released known terrorists.190 
On August 8, more than three months after the explosion rue Marbeuf, Paris was 
again hit by terrorists. The shooting was aimed directly at the Jewish community and 
occurred at a time of extreme tension in the Middle East, in particular in Lebanon where 
an Israeli military operation was underway. Less than two years after the attack rue 
Copernic, the Jewish community set again the tone (see case study one). Mitterrand who 
shortly before the shooting had become the first French President to set foot in Israel on 
an official visit, was given a chilling welcome by the residents while visiting rue des 
Rosiers to pay his respects to the victims. The booing that greeted Mitterrand was 
reminiscent of Giscard’s cold reception in the aftermath of the terrorist attack rue 
Copernic.  
The UDF and the RPR renewed their criticisms of the government’s alleged 
laissez-faire with regards to terrorist activities.191 This time, however, criticisms towards 
                                                
189 “I do not consider that we are really in a situation where the Left has the power. By claiming on day one 
of his mandate to be a socialist President, François Mitterrand committed a major blunder and limited his 
capacity to be recognized as the President of all French people. By embarking on a programme of major 
disruptions that are not in accordance with what a majority of French people want, the government did not 
respect the continuity of power that defines periods when government changes hand”. Le Monde May 2, 
1982. 
190 Japanese terrorist Furyukata Muraya and Palestinian terrorist Abu Daoud. Le Monde May 2, 1982.  
191 Le Monde August 11, 1982. 
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the government remained limited, in large part because many felt that France was being 
wrongfully accused of anti-Semitism by the Israeli government. Menachem Begin (Prime 
Minister of Israel), in particular had brought up the possibility to ask French Jews to 
organize their collective defence if the French state failed to protect them. Rejecting any 
accusations of anti-Semitism, right-wing leaning newspaper Le Figaro declared:  
“Nous ne pouvons pas accepter que la France, fût-elle socialiste (…) soit 
accusée en tant que France de sentiments antisémites (…). Désigner le 
président de la République, un homme qui a été légitimement élu par une 
majorité des Français – même si nous pensons qu’il s’agissait là d’une de 
ces aberrations à laquelle l’histoire condamne, hélas, de temps en temps 
tous les peuples – comme l’instigateur, voire le complice, du massacre de 
la rue des Rosiers, c’est là une accusation ignoble que rien ne peut excuser 
à nos yeux.”192  
 
Bernard Pons (RPR) remarked that in view of the many casualties caused by the last 
attack it would be scandalous to try and take advantage of this act for political gains.193 
However, yet again the rally failed to materialize as once more the UDF issued criticisms 
of the government’s handling of affairs. The government’s perceived negligence with 
regard to security matters was again stigmatized. More surprisingly, Jean-Claude Gaudin 
(president of the UDF group in the National Assembly) asked the socialist government to 
cease its anti-Israeli stance. Others within the opposition argued that the socialists were 
making France a target for international terrorism, and underlined the weakening of 
justice and police under the socialist government.194 
                                                
192 “We cannot accept that France, albeit a socialist France (…) is accused of being antisemitic (…). To 
designate the President of the Republic, a man who has been legitimately elected by a majority of French 
people – even though we think that this was an aberration – as the instigator, even the accomplice, of the 
massacre rue des Rosiers, is a vile accusation that nothing can justify”. Le Figaro August 11, 1982. 
193 “Il y a eu des morts et des blessés très graves. Il serait scandaleux d’essayer d’exploiter politiquement 
cet attentat”. Le Monde August 12, 1982. 
194 Le Monde August 12, 1982. Other recent attacks included the assassinations of Israeli diplomat Yacov 
Barsimantov and of the PLO deputy director in Paris. 
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The fourth and final attack took place on September 17 and was thought to be the 
work of the Fraction Armée Révolutionnaire Libanaise (FARL), a Palestinian group 
based in Lebanon. Although the explosion did not cause any fatalities over 90 people 
were injured, and the proximity of a school nearby raised serious concerns, particularly as 
several of the victims were teenagers. Although milder, the criticisms still underlined the 
perceived inadequacy of the government’s response. Jean Lecanuet (president of the 
UDF) complained that the government talked a lot but failed to act decisively. For his 
part, former Prime Minister Raymond Barre (UDF) was far more incisive and claimed 
that the socialists had set terrorists free and had weakened the capacity of France to 
respond to terrorism.195 Others criticized the socialists for governing with what they 
perceived to be anti-Israeli communists.196 Chirac, as usual, was far less aggressive and 
as Mayor of Paris simply asked for a meeting with Mitterrand to discuss counterterrorist 
measures.197 It should be noted that ever since his defeat at the presidential election 
former President Giscard d’Estaing remained on the sideline and refrained from making 
any public comments on the attacks. Jacques Chirac had therefore become the de facto 
leader of the right-wing opposition.  
Despite being again in the line of fire, the government did not respond to the 
accusations of carelessness. Prime Minister Mauroy simply pointed out that unlike 
Germany or Italy, France was facing a brand of terrorism originating from abroad.198 
Throughout the crisis the communists remained supportive of the government, 
demanding only a severe response against the terrorists.199 This support was manifest 
                                                
195 Le Monde September 19, 1982. 
196 Le Monde September 19, 1982. 
197 Le Monde September 19, 1982. As Mayor of Paris, Chirac asked for the immediate hiring of 3,000 more 
police personnel. 
198 Le Monde September 19, 1982. 
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following the third attack when the Communist Party decided to postpone a planned 
demonstration against the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, and instead condemned 
vigorously the shooting rue des Rosiers.  
The Front National, for its part, went on the offensive against the government. Le 
Pen blamed the recent attacks on the presence of the “subversive” communists in the 
government and on the passive complicity of their socialist allies.200 Towards the end of 
the crisis, the FN raised again the spectre of an international conspiracy, arguing that the 
terrorists were on Moscow’s payroll, and that France was slowly descending into 
chaos.201 The Front National also claimed that the government’s policies with regards to 
immigration, asylum seekers, border controls (or lack thereof) and death penalty were 
favouring the rise of terrorist activities on French soil.202 
 
The magnitude-repetition model explains to a large extent why the mainstream elite 
rallied in support of the government following the first attack (high magnitude and low 
repetition). The right-wing opposition parties recognized that the government could 
hardly be blamed for what was essentially the government’s first major terrorist crisis. In 
addition, the lack of certainty as to who had carried out the attack made it all the more 
difficult for the opposition to criticize the government. The attack also coincided with the 
unfolding of two international crises with potentially serious implications for France – i.e. 
the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentinean troops, and a major Iranian victory at 
                                                                                                                                            
199 Le Monde April 1 and 24, 1982. 
200 Le Monde August 11, 1982. 
201 “Le processus de libanisation de la France s’accroît à une allure vertigineuse (…) Les limites de notre 
patience sont atteintes” – i.e. “The process of lebanisation of France grows at a dizzying pace (…) Our 
patience has reached its limit”. Le Monde September 19, 1982. 
202 Le Monde August 14, 1982. 
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the expense of the Iraqi army. The French political elite was thus less likely to show 
disagreement on matters pertaining to the security of the country. 
If the model proved conclusive for the first attack, it fails to explain why a rally 
did not materialize following the second attack. The low magnitude and high repetition 
made the support likely, and yet the opposition chose to be critical of the government. In 
all fairness, the attack was just a pretext for many within the opposition to lash out at the 
government. Ever since the election of Mitterrand, prominent figures within the RPR and 
UDF felt that the Left did not deserve to be in government and had no real legitimacy. In 
their view, Mitterrand had forfeited his right to lead the Republic after claiming to be a 
socialist president. More importantly, the Right called into question the moral values of 
the Left and asked whether the government had what it takes to lead the country through 
a terrorist crisis, hence the call by some for the government to step down. ‘The socialists 
lack the resolve necessary under this stressful times, they are doves, we need hawks’ was 
the consensus amongst many right-wing politicians. Personal agendas cannot be 
discounted either, as when Christian Bonnet asked the Prime Minister to step down, 
merely two years after being himself targeted by the socialists in similar circumstances. 
The model is conclusive for the third attack (high magnitude and high repetition), 
which resulted in additional criticisms. After being so critical following the second 
attack, the opposition could hardly rally whole heartedly around the government. Yet the 
right-wing parties (particularly the RPR) were more lenient this time around. Accusations 
of France being an anti-Semite country convinced part of the Right to tone down its 
criticisms. Menachem Begin’s threat to call for French Jews to defend themselves clearly 
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gave the political elite a common purpose. Yet many within the Right, particularly within 
the UDF, remained critical of the government’s perceived permissiveness. 
The fourth and final attack (low magnitude and high repetition) was an instance 
where support was likely. Yet part of the Right carried on criticizing the government. As 
was the case throughout this wave of attacks, the RPR remained less critical than its 
right-wing partner (UDF). The UDF and Giscard d’Estaing had been the main victims of 
the socialist victory in 1981, hence perhaps their hostility towards the government. For 
his part, Chirac (RPR) refrained from going on the offensive. Rising tension in Lebanon 
with the entry of Israeli forces in West Beirut, and the ensuing massacre of Sabra and 
Chatila probably helped mellow the debate somewhat. Yet with municipal elections 
looming and the ‘rentrée politique’ in full swing (a period traditionally known for its 
heated debates) the Right had every intention of remaining critical of the government. 
The communists for their part played the role of faithful coalition partners and 
constantly rallied to the support of the socialist majority. The Front National’s reaction on 
the other hand was more consistent with expectations with regards to radical parties. Le 
Pen instrumentalized the crisis by blaming the socialists and their communist allies and 
by using the opportunity to present his electoral platform (death penalty, tougher 
immigration laws, etc.). 
In the end the magnitude-repetition model proved conclusive for two of the four 
attacks. More importantly partisan and electoral politics played an important role and 
influenced the behaviour of the opposition, particularly after the second attack. Prominent 
right-wing politicians, considering that Mitterrand had no legitimacy to occupy the 
position once held by Charles de Gaulle, resented the presence of a socialist at the Élysée 
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Palace and were simply unwilling to rally around this controversial figure regardless of 
the situation. In all fairness, the socialists had set a precedent by being particularly 
vindictive of Giscard d’Estaing’s government in the aftermath of the attack rue Copernic 
(see case study one). 
 
Case study three: Wave of attacks of September 1986 
 
1) Account of the event and description of the political situation 
 
Between September 8 and 17, 1986, Paris was hit by a series of five explosions that set 
ablaze streets, department stores and subway trains killing nine people and wounding 
another 163, making it the worst wave of terrorist attacks in the capital since the events of 
1982. All of these attacks were linked to the Comité de Solidarité avec les Prisonniers 
Politiques Arabes et du Proche-Orient (CSPPA), an organization set up following the 
imprisonment in France of Georges Ibrahim Abdallah leader of the Fractions Armées 
Révolutionnaires Libanaises (FARL) for complicity in the murders of an American and 
an Israeli diplomat.203 At the time France was targeted not just by international groups 
but also by home-grown terrorists such as Action Directe. As a result terrorism became a 
prevalent issue during the 1986 campaign for the legislative elections, with attacks 
occurring on March 17 (a day after the election) and on March 20 (two days after the 
appointment of Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister).204 
 
                                                
203 FARL, a Palestinian organization created in 1979, was based in Lebanon. Its objectives were two-fold : 
creating a Palestinian state, and ousting French, American and Israeli forces from Lebanon. 
204 Upon receiving news of the latest attack, newly appointed Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua 
famously declared that his government would “terrorize the terrorists”. Le Monde March 22, 1986. In 
addition, by September 1986, eight French nationals were held hostage in Lebanon. 
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Turmoil in the streets was followed by constitutional turmoil when for the first time 
under the Fifth Republic, a President and a Prime Minister from different sides of the 
political divide, namely François Mitterrand (PS) and Jacques Chirac (RPR), were forced 
to share the executive power. A cohabitation became unavoidable following the 
socialists’ narrow defeat at the March 1986 legislative elections. Adding to the feeling of 
unrest was the controversy surrounding Mitterrand’s decision to switch from a majority 
runoff system to a proportional one, a decision which essentially handed the far-right 
Front National an unprecedented 35 deputies in the National Assembly (as much as the 
Communist Party which for its part was reaching a new low). 
 
2) Expectations, reactions, and implications for the model 
 
The magnitude-repetition model leads us to expect a likely support following the four 
initial attacks (each of them low magnitude and high repetition) and criticisms following 
the last attack (high magnitude and high repetition). However, considering the 
chronological proximity of these attacks – nine days separating the first and fifth attack – 
and the overlapping of reactions, a more logical approach might be to consider these 
attacks collectively rather than individually. The first attack on September 8 might still be 
considered separately, but the remaining ones (September 12, 14, 15, 17) are too 
clustered to disentangle the effects of repetition. In that case, the model predicts a likely 
support following the first attack, and criticisms following the remaining four attacks. 
 
Following the attack of September 8 the socialist opposition lost no time to rally around 
the government. Lionel Jospin (head of the Socialist Party) declared that the national 
community had to come together and the political forces had to display their will to 
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overcome this challenge.205 Likewise, Laurent Fabius (Chirac’s predecessor in the Prime 
Minister’s seat) gave his successor his complete support: 
“J’approuve tout à fait l’attitude [du premier ministre]. L’attitude de 
toute la population, de toutes les formations politiques, doit être de 
soutenir l’action de nos responsables. Pour ma part, c’est ce que je 
ferai.”206  
 
Despite a heated debate on some of the reforms proposed by the new government 
(e.g. gerrymandering or redécoupage électoral) the call for union was by and large 
respected. The example was set by none other than President Mitterrand who made his 
support for his right-wing Prime Minister public. Edouard Alphandery from the UDF 
summed up the state of mind of many of his colleagues left and right by declaring:   
“Nous n’allons pas chipoter le gouvernement sur les limites de cantons, 
alors que des bombes explosent; les gens ne comprendraient pas qu’on 
embête le gouvernement avec cela”.207 
 
Yet some within the Right felt the need to avoid a domestic backlash for the attack and 
preserve the reputation of the Right on issues of national security by claiming that the 
socialists were responsible for the crisis.208 The socialists did not counter back and simply 
asked for decency and an end to the controversy that they themselves had by and large 
                                                
205 “Face à ce terrorisme odieux et lâche, la communauté nationale doit se souder et l’ensemble des forces 
politiques affirmer leur determination face au défi qui est lancé à la France” – i.e. “Faced with this odious 
and cowardly terrorism, the national community must come together and all political forces must assert 
their resolve to overcome this challenge”. Le Monde September 10, 1986. 
206 “I approve the Prime Minister’s attitude. The entire population, as well as all political parties must back 
those in charge of governing the country. For my part, I will support them”. Le Monde September 10, 1986. 
207 “We will not bicker with the government over the limits of counties while bombs are exploding ; the 
people would not understand it”. Le Monde September 12, 1986. 
208 Jacques Toubon (secretary general of the RPR) declared: “Les socialistes, soit par idéologie, soit par 
faiblesse, avaient été complaisants à l’égard d’organisations étrangères qui portent une responsabilité dans 
les attentats terroristes” – i.e. “The socialists, either because of ideology or because of weakness, were 
permissive with foreign organizations bearing a responsibility in these terrorits acts”. Albin Chalandon 
(Minister of Justice) for his part lamented that France had become a sanctuary for terrorists. Some within 
the majority believed that the socialist government had agreed to the liberation of Georges Ibrahim 
Abdallah in exchange for the release of Gilles Peyroles (a diplomat taken hostage in Beirut) but eventually 
rescinded their offer when they realized that Abdallah was a much bigger fish than anticipated. Le Monde 
September 11, 1986. 
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avoided. In fact, the socialist opposition seemed eager to maintain the rally and declared 
once more that this was a time when the nation had to demonstrate its unity.209 As a 
result, the relative truce between the government and the opposition was maintained after 
the second attack on September 12 (41 people wounded).  
 After a third and fourth attack on September 14 and 15 killed three people and 
wounded more than 50, Mitterrand reiterated his earlier call for unity by declaring that 
the fight against terrorism concerned the whole nation, and by giving his support to a host 
of anti-terrorist measures proposed by the government: visa requirement for nationals 
from outside the European community, increased border controls by the army, and ‘secret 
actions’ against terrorists or those helping them.210 Again the socialists gave their full 
support merely insisting that these measures should respect people’s rights:  
“Le Parti socialiste a toujours souligné que la question du terrorisme ne 
devait pas être le prétexte d’une polémique intérieure (…) Il ne faut pas 
diviser la communauté nationale au moment où elle doit manifester sa 
solidarité face à des agressions qui visent à faire pression sur la France. 
Les citoyens attendent du gouvernement qu’il fasse preuve d’esprit de 
responsabilité et de fermeté dans l’action tout en respectant l’État de 
droit”.211  
 
                                                
209 The executive bureau of the PS declared: “L’heure n’est pas à la vindicte politicienne. Les difficultés 
que rencontre aujourd’hui la droite au pouvoir pour assurer la sécurité devraient l’inciter à plus de 
cohérence et de décence. Les propos de MM. Pasqua, Toubon, Peyrefitte et Chalandon sont non seulement 
injustifiés, mais indignes. Ils mettent en cause la cohésion de la nation au moment ou la communauté 
nationale doit manifester sa solidarité” – i.e. “This is not the time for political accusations. The difficulties 
encountered by the right-wing government to ensure national security should encourage it to be more 
coherent and decent. The declarations of Pasqua, Toubon, Peyrefitte and Chalandon are not only 
unjustified, but also disgraceful. They jeopardize the unity of the nation at a time when the national 
community must demonstrate its solidarity”. To be fair, Roland Dumas (former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs) blamed the RPR for the recent attack. Le Monde September 12, 1986.  
210 “La lutte contre le terrorisme est l’affaire de la nation tout entière” – i.e. “The fight against terrorism 
concerns the entire nation”. Le Monde September 16, 1986. 
211 “The Socialist Party has always made it clear that the terrorist issue should not be a pretext for domestic 
controversy (…) One should not divide the national community at a time when it must demonstrate its 
solidarity in the face of aggressions that aim at coercing France. The citizens expect the government to be 
responsible and resolute in its action while respecting the rule of law”. Le Monde September 16, 1986. 
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Yet former Prime Minister Mauroy who had been severely criticized by the right-wing 
opposition in 1982 (see case study two) deplored the Right’s inability to adopt a similar 
attitude of national concord.212  
The explosion at the Tati department store, which killed six people and injured 
more than 50 on September 17 (a mere nine days after the initial strike), was the last of 
the series.213 Again some prominent right-wing politicians blamed the Left for their 
handling of affairs in the past, and again the Left replied that this was not a time for 
polemics.214 Jospin (PS), still supportive of the government, argued that in order to 
enhance the cohesion of the political elite, the opposition parties should not be left out of 
the loop on matters pertaining to the crisis.215 As a show of good will, Chirac agreed to 
meet the parliamentary leaders of all groups, including the PC and FN.216 Following the 
meeting all parties expressed their support for the government with the exception of the 
Front National, which demanded the appointment of a government of public safety.217 
Despite reiterating his support and his call for national unity several time throughout the 
crisis, Jospin warned the Right about giving out lessons on how to handle terrorist 
crises.218 
The wave of attacks coincided with a significant rise in the popularity of Chirac 
and Mitterrand, with 47 percent of respondents approving the actions of the Prime 
                                                
212 Le Monde September 16, 1986. 
213 The following day the French military attaché was gunned down in Beirut. 
214 Le Monde September 19, 1986. 
215 Le Monde September 19, 1986. 
216 “Les circonstances exigent que tous les représentants de la nation apportent leur contribution à la lutte 
qui est engagée” – i.e. “Circumstance require that all of the nation’s representatives contribute to the 
ongoing struggle”. Le Monde September 20, 1986. 
217 Le Monde September 20, 1986. 
218 “Nous ne sommes pas venu pour nous prêter à une quelconque récupération politique, mais pour 
contribuer à souder la communauté nationale” – i.e. “We did not come here for political considerations, but 
to help bring together the national community”. Le Monde September 21-22, 1986 and Le Monde 
September 23, 1986. 
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Minister at the end of September (up from 40 percent in August 1986) and 57 percent 
approving the actions of the President (up from 51 percent).219 Nevertheless throughout 
the crisis Chirac appeared as the stronger of the two heads of the executive, and as the de 
facto President.220 As Le Monde remarked, Mitterrand who was known for his hands-on 
attitude in times of crisis was now leaving his Prime Minister in charge:  
“C’est le premier ministre qui se pose aujourd’hui en garant de l’unité 
nationale, celui autour duquel se cristallisent l’unité nationale, la solidarité 
du pays, de la classe politique et des gouvernements étrangers (…) 
[Chirac] apparaît aujourd’hui, dans le couple exécutif, comme celui qui 
exerce la réalité et la totalité du pouvoir”.221 
 
As an ultimate sign of appeasement and in order to preserve the national unity, 
Mitterrand decided after months of heated debates on the proposed project of 
redécoupage électoral – i.e. gerrymandering – to postpone his decision for after the 
crisis.222 
The radical parties were far less supportive than their mainstream counterparts. 
Georges Marchais (leader of the Communist Party) condemned the first attack vigorously 
but did not explicitly support the government.223 By the second attack, Marchais was 
railing against the government’s anti-terrorist measures, which he claimed were only a 
pretext for racist campaigns and an attempt to limit individual liberties. Furthermore 
Marchais considered that the confusion between war and terrorism only served to 
legitimate the arms race and acts of war committed by Israel and the USA.224 Alain 
Krivine, leader of the trotskist Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), shared a 
                                                
219 Le Journal du dimanche September 21, 1986. Source : IFOP. 
220 Chirac notably canceled an official visit to Canada whereas Mitterrand maintained his visit to Indonesia. 
221 “Today the Prime Minister garantees the national unity, he is the figure around which people rally and to 
whom the political elite and foreign governments show their solidarity (…) Within the executive couple, 
Chirac appears today as the one who holds all the power”. Le Monde September 18, 1986. 
222 Le Monde September 25, 1986. 
223 Le Monde September 10, 1986. 
224 Le Monde September 16, 1986. 
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similar opinion and considered that these attacks allowed the government to pass 
measures endangering civil liberties.225  
As in 1982, the FN remained opposed to any kind of rally, but suggested that it 
would accept to join a government of public safety: 
“Le Front national ne pourra jamais adhérer à un consensus fondé sur des 
rodomontades et une série de petites mesures prises à la sauvette (..) Nous 
n’avons pas confiance dans M. Chirac pour mettre en œuvre une politique 
efficace de lutte contre le terrorisme. Seule la constitution d’un 
gouvernement de salut public, incluant le Front national, et s’appuyant 
ainsi sur une véritable majorité, pourrait prendre les mesures concrètes 
qu’impose la guerre qui nous a été déclarée.” (Jean-Pierre Stirbois, 
secretary general of the FN).226 
 
Already in March 1986, shortly after the legislative elections, Le Pen had ridiculed the 
teary condemnations of the “gang of four” (i.e. PS, PC, RPR, UDF) which he found 
ineffectual.227 By September Le Pen was particularly critical of the anti-terrorist 
measures, which he considered dated, mediocre and inefficient.228 In his view, these 
attacks were acts of war and required the reestablishment of the death penalty.229  
Interestingly, a poll conducted at the beginning of the crisis confirmed Le Pen’s rising 
support notably on issues of security and justice (29 percent approved his stance on those 
issues in October 1985; 34 percent did so at the beginning of the September 1986 
crisis).230 
                                                
225 “Loin de terroriser l’impérialisme, ces attentats terrorisent la population prise en otage” – i.e. “Far from 
terrorizing the imperialism, these attacks terrorize the population held hostage”. Le Monde 16 September 
16, 1986. 
226 “The Front National will never adhere to a consensus based on saber-rattling and a series of half 
measures taken in a hurry (…) We do not trust Chirac to implement an effective anti-terrorism policy. The 
only way to take the necessary measures to fight this war would be to set up a government of public safety 
including the Front National and backed by a real majority”. Le Monde September 24, 1986. 
227 “[C’est une] action de guerre qui ne saurait se satisfaire des homélies larmoyantes habituelles aux 
politiciens de la bande des quatre” – i.e. “This act of war demands more than the traditionnal teary homilies 
with which politicians from the gang of four are accustomed to”.  Le Monde March 22, 1986. 
228 Le Monde September 16, 1986. 
229 Le Monde September 10, 1986. 
230 Le Monde September 25, 1986. Source: SOFRES (September 8-9). 
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The analysis of this particular case study within the established theoretical framework 
presents two important challenges. First, the line that separates the government from the 
opposition is blurred. Though in the opposition, the socialists still have one of their own 
at the highest echelon of the state and therefore still share part of the executive power, 
particularly with regards to matters of national security (traditionally the domain of the 
President). Even the National Assembly is almost evenly split with the right-wing parties 
having only a majority of two seats. Second, the series of attacks take place over a 
relatively short period of time (nine days) making it particularly difficult to disentangle 
the reactions. 
 Throughout the crisis, the socialist ‘opposition’ demonstrated its readiness to 
support the government. In that respect the model, which predicted a likely support for 
the first four attacks, is conclusive. Yet this truce in party politics was only relative as the 
right-wing ‘majority’ never showed a real desire to rally alongside the socialists. In fact 
members of the RPR and UDF repeatedly blamed the socialists for the situation. 
However none of the major figures of the government criticized the socialists. More 
importantly, the Prime Minister avoided the controversy and never criticized publicly the 
opposition or President Mitterrand. On the contrary, the two heads of the executive 
cooperated with  one another throughout the crisis. 
 The high occurrence of attacks since the return to power of the Right could have 
been interpreted by the socialists as a sign that the government was not handling national 
security well, hence encouraging the opposition to be critical. Yet the opposition (and the 
media) knew full well that the group responsible for this series of attacks (i.e. 
CSPPA/FARL) had already committed several terrorist acts on the French territory 
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before the March legislative elections. Both the Right and the Left shared a common 
responsibility with regards to French foreign policy in the Middle East. Under these 
circumstances the socialist opposition could hardly afford to criticize the government. 
Besides, foreign policy is traditionally the domain of the President (even during periods 
of cohabitation). Any criticism of the government could have been perceived as a 
criticism of Mitterrand. 
Criticisms coming from the RPR and the UDF only served one purpose it seems, 
namely protect and maintain their ownership of the national security issue, particularly 
with senatorial elections due at the end of September.231 The series of measures taken in 
the aftermath of the second attack served to reassure the people but also reestablish the 
Right’s credibility. In the event, the Right gained seats in the Senate and the socialists 
lost a few.  
The attitude of some right-wing politicians also confirms a recurrent 
unwillingness to side with the socialists under any circumstances, a pattern of behaviour 
already noticeable in 1982 (see case study two). The fact that the Left was not anymore in 
power in 1986 mattered little to some within the Right who still resented the election of a 
socialist president. Accusations of permissiveness also served to delegitimize Mitterrand. 
Radical parties behaved as expected. The communists despite being critical of any 
form of terrorism were even more critical of the government’s reaction and what they 
perceived to be a curtailment of basic civil liberties. For its part the Front National, as it 
had done before under similar circumstances, used the events of September to put forth 
its electoral program (a pro-FN demonstration was organized in Paris amid chants of “Le 
                                                
231 The socialist government set free a number of members of Action Directe and offered a sanctuary for 
former activists of the Italian Brigate Rosse. 
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Pen Président!’) and criticize the RPR for failing to live up to its promises. The assault on 
the RPR’s ownership of security related issues could not be clearer. 
 
Case study four: Assassination of Georges Besse (November 17, 1986) 
 
1) Account of the event and description of the political situation 
 
Two months after the series of attacks masterminded by the CSPPA ended, Action 
Directe committed its most infamous fait d’armes, the murder of Georges Besse, CEO of 
the state-owned car manufacturer Renault.232 George Besse was the second high ranking 
official to be assassinated by Action Directe after General René Audran who had fallen 
victim to them in 1985. 
 
The political situation was very similar to the one described in the previous case, with 
one important difference, after letting Chirac take the center stage following his electoral 
victory Mitterrand was trying to regain the upper-hand. As a consequence the 
cohabitation with Chirac and his right-wing government became tenser. 
 
2) Expectations, reactions, and implications for the model 
 
The model suggests that following this act of terror (low magnitude and high repetition) 
the opposition was likely to support the government. Yet beyond the model, the identity 
of the target (representative of the state) favoured a rally. 
 
                                                
232 The press argued that Action Directe which had not been in the spotlight for some time, had waited for 
the CSPPA to be finished with its own attacks. 
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Mitterrand, again abroad on an official visit, asked all political forces to unite in the fight 
against terrorism.233 From Chirac to Jospin, the political elite paid its respect to a man 
who gave his career to public service.234 The elite was undeniably in shock, yet aside 
from the traditional marks of respect, it was politics as usual. However, on November 19 
following an intervention by Le Pen (FN) at the National Assembly during which the far-
right leader asked the government for more actions and less rhetoric, Minister of the 
Interior Charles Pasqua replied by blaming once more the socialists for their carelessness 
and permissiveness with terrorism, and reminding everyone in the assembly that the 
socialists had released over 300 members of the Italian Red Brigade.235 Yet for the most 
part, the political elite remained silent on matters pertaining to national security. By 
November 21 Le Monde stopped running articles on the murder of Besse. The order of 
the day was the rising tension between Mitterrand and Chirac.236 
Despite being labelled an anti-capitalist terrorist organization, the far left had no 
empathy for Action Directe’s latest operation. The Communist Party condemned the 
assassination vigorously and L’Humanité, the party’s newspaper, remarked that the blood 
of a CEO will not solve the class struggle.237 Even more meaningful under the 
circumstances was the reaction of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), a trade 
union close to the Communist Party, which declared that this act of violence was against 
everything this union was standing for. As a sign of respect, the CGT called off a 
                                                
233 Le Monde November 19, 1986. 
234 Le Monde November 19, 1986. 
235 Le Monde November 21, 1986. 
236 “La cohabitation entre M. Mitterrand et M. Chirac est entrée dans une phase de concurrence 
quotidienne” – i.e. “The cohabitation between Mitterrand and Chirac has now entered a phase of daily 
competition”. Le Monde November 21, 1986. 
237 “Le sang d’un PDG dans un caniveau ne règle pas les problèmes de la lutte des classes” – i.e. “The 
blood of a CEO in a gutter does not solve issues of class struggle”. Le Monde November 18, 1986. 
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demonstration planned against the restructuring plan designed by Besse shortly before his 
death and which would have laid off numerous factory workers at the Renault plants.238 
 For his part, Le Pen traditionally very critical of the mainstream parties in similar 
circumstances asked for a national union against terrorists.239 
 
By and large the French political elite behaved as expected following the assassination of 
Claude Besse, with expressions of sympathy coming from all sides of the political 
spectrum, even from the far-left and the far-right. As hypothesized in a previous chapter, 
the murder of a well-known and well-respected agent of the state hardly represented an 
opportunity to criticize the government. However the lingering resentment of part of the 
Right vis-à-vis the Left led a prominent member of Chirac’s government to once more 
lambast the socialists for being too permissive with terrorists. Interestingly enough, this 
criticism of the socialist legacy came in response to a similar critique directed by the 
leader of the Front National at Chirac’s government, further confirming that the 
credibility of the Right on national security was a particularly sensitive subject-matter. 
Yet by November 1986 the French political elite had grown weary of  terrorist acts, and 
the controversy did not last. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
238 Le Monde November 19, 1986. 
239 Le Monde November 19, 1986. 
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6.4. The period 1990-2006 reconsidered 
 
The previous section has tested the validity of the magnitude-repetition model for a 
selection of terrorist attacks not included in the database. By and large the model 
withstood the test, and the analysis of four case studies supports the claim that both the 
magnitude and repetition variables are linked to the decision to support or be critical of 
the government. Yet these two variables represent only part of the story. Other contextual 
factors such as foreign affairs and the electoral timetable have an effect on party 
behaviour too, even in the midst of a terrorist crisis. More importantly, the analysis 
suggests that party behaviour (at least in France) might be influenced by more general 
political considerations, such as the perceived legitimacy (or lack thereof) of the 
government and head of state. To some extent the behaviour of political elites is also 
determined by previous attitudes under similar circumstances. Thus taking into 
considerations the reaction to past events might shed light on subsequent behaviour. 
These four case studies are therefore particularly informative for the period under 
consideration, namely 1990-2006. 
The following analysis focuses on cases where the reaction of the mainstream 
political elite did not conform to expectations, that is cases where the magnitude and 
repetition variables did not seem to influence their behaviour. On the basis of the 
typology presented in chapter four (see table I) 20 terrorist acts taking place in France 
over the period 1990-2006 do not conform to the ideal-type model (see table XI). They 
can be classified into five groups: 
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1. The ideal-type model predicts that the opposition is likely to support the 
government: in reality the opposition did not support the government (6 
cases). 
2. The ideal-type model predicts no support; in reality the opposition gave the 
government its support (1 case). 
3. The ideal-type model predicts no reaction; in reality the opposition gave the 
government its support (10 cases). 
4. The ideal-type model predicts no reaction; in reality the opposition did not 
support the government (1 case). 
5. The ideal-type model predicts that the opposition is likely to support the 
government; in reality there was no reaction (2 cases). 
The prediction and outcome for each case is summarized in table XI. Each category is 
analyzed separately as I try to uncover which variables might account for the observed 
divergence from the model. It should be noted that there is not a single case where the 
model wrongly predicts support. I also ask why the opposition chose to support the 
government when both the low magnitude and high repetition (likely support) gave the 
opposition perhaps more leeway to criticize the government.240 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
240 There a 13 acts falling into this category. 
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Table XI. Expected and actual reaction of the mainstream opposition based on the 
magnitude-repetition model (divergent cases – period 1990-2006) 
 
Case Magnitude Repetition Expected Outcome Actual Outcome 
Assassination of Bakhtiar and his secretary – 
linked to agents of the Iranian government  
(1991) 
Low High Likely Support No Support 
Explosion at subway station Musée-d’Orsay – 
linked to the GIA (1995) 
Low High Likely Support No Support 
Explosion at a Gendarmerie in Borgo – linked 
to Corsican separatists (2001) 
Low High Likely Support No Support 
Assassination of Santoni – linked to Corsican 
separatists (2001) 
Low High Likely Support No Support 
Assassination of two people – linked to 
Corsican separatists (2001) 
Low High Likely Support No Support 
Assassination – linked to Corsican separatists 
(2001) 
Low High Likely Support No Support 
Explosion at subway station Port-Royal – 
linked to the GIA (1996) 
High High No Support Support 
Assassination of an Iranian opposition leader 
– linked to agents of the Iranian government 
(1990) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Shootings aimed at North African immigrants 
– linked to the far-right (1994) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Assassination of Sahraoui – linked to the GIA 
(1995) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Assassination of Erignac – linked to Corsican 
separatists (1998) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Explosions in Ajaccio – linked to Corsican 
separatists (1999) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Explosion at a McDonald’s Restaurant – 
linked to the ARB (2000) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Assassination – linked to Corsican separatists 
(2000) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Explosions in Nice – linked to Corsican 
separatists (2003) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Assassination – linked to Corsican separatists 
(2003) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Explosion at the Indonesian embassy in Paris 
– linked to an Islamic group (2004) 
Low Low No Reaction Support 
Assassination of Rossi and his bodyguard – 
linked to Corsican separatists (2001) 
Low Low No Reaction No Support 
Explosion at a Turkish cultural center – linked 
to the PKK (1995) 
Low High Likely Support No Reaction 
Assassination – linked to agents of the Iranian 
government (1995) 
Low High Likely Support No Reaction 
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6.4.1. No support instead of likely support 
 
Amongst acts combining a low magnitude in terms of fatalities with a high number of 
previous attacks, six did not conform to expectations and elicited criticisms. The 
repetition of attacks (all of them were preceded by at least 6 terrorist events) might have 
played a role. Patience in some of these cases might have been running thin, particularly 
with regard to the situation in Corsica where four of these six attacks took place. The 
debate on Corsica had gradually heated up following the assassination of Prefect Erignac 
(detailed in case study six). The ‘Jospin plan’ further fuelled the debate and by the 
summer and fall of 2001 (when these four attacks took place) the French political elite 
was more divided than ever.241 Even after a large explosive detonated outside a 
gendarmerie in Borgo on July 23, 2001 (injuring 22 gendarmes) the opposition refused to 
back the government. In fact, the group that claimed the attack fuelled the debate even 
more by accusing the French ‘colonial’ state of deceiving the Corsican people with its 
pseudo-plan to give away more powers to the islanders. Criticisms were voiced as much 
by the Right as by parties from the Left.242 And when a month later François Santoni, a 
separatist opposed to the ‘Jospin plan’, was gunned down by a rival faction both the RPR 
and UDF blamed the government for its inability to maintain order in Corsica and force 
terrorists to lay down the arms.243 
 The following case study is a further illustration that political elites react not only 
to the terrorist event but also to the management or perceived mismanagement of the 
crisis by the government. 
                                                
241 Other attacks of lesser magnitude took place throughout the summer and only worsened the perception 
that the Corsican problem was spinning out of control. 
242 Le Monde July 27, 2001 
243 Libération August 18, 2001. 
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Case study five: Explosion in a subway train near the station Musée-d’Orsay in Paris 
(October 17, 1995) 
 
1) Account of the event and description of the political situation 
 
By the end of October 1995 France had gone through what was arguably one of the worst 
waves of terrorist attacks to hit the country since the Second World War. The series of 
attacks masterminded by Algerian terrorists had started in early July and had claimed ten 
lives and wounded over 200 people. One last explosion (the eighth since the beginning of 
the crisis) aboard a subway train during morning rush hour would injure another 29 
people.244 
 
After two failed attempts Jacques Chirac (RPR) had been elected President in May 1995, 
two months before the series of attacks started.245 More importantly, after 14 years in 
opposition – interrupted by two brief spells in cohabitation – the Right was once again in 
charge of both the executive and legislative branch of the state, with Prime Minister 
Alain Juppé (RPR) heading a right/center-right coalition made up of the RPR and UDF. 
The Socialist Party which had lost the 1993 legislative elections in dramatic fashion 
retaining only 68 seats – hence the second cohabitation – remained the main opposition 
party in parliament. However by October 1995, the traditional honeymoon period had run 
its course and public dissatisfaction with the government was growing, eventually 
triggering massive demonstrations throughout France.  
                                                
244 Another two terrorist acts were foiled and did not cause any casualties. 
245 In the second round of the presidential election Chirac had defeated Lionel Jospin (PS). 
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After a long and murderous summer during which the left-wing opposition never 
once failed to rally to the support of the government, a certain weariness was taking hold 
of the political elite. Signs of impatience towards the government’s inability to put a stop 
to the attacks were becoming more ominous, notably amongst backbenchers. More 
importantly, just a few days before the explosion near the Quai d’Orsay (incidentally the 
headquarters of French diplomacy), President Chirac was vehemently criticized by the 
opposition for scheduling a meeting with Algerian President Liamine Zéroual the week 
after during a United Nations summit in New York. Many within the opposition feared 
that this meeting would demonstrate even further that France was meddling in Algerian 
affairs and signal that the French government had thrown its weight in favour of the 
incumbent for the upcoming Algerian presidential election.246 
 
2) Expectations, reactions, and implications for the model 
 
As an instance of low magnitude and high repetition, support for the government was 
likely. In fact if the opposition’s recent behaviour was any indication this outcome 
appeared even more likely as the leading figures in the Socialist Party had not failed to 
rally once following the previous seven attacks. Yet in the midst of the controversy 
surrounding the Chirac-Zéroual meeting, the latest attack could also further embolden 
those critical of the government’s policy towards Algeria.  
 
Prime Minister Juppé reacted swiftly to the news of the latest attack and addressed the 
deputies present at the National Assembly mere hours after the explosion. His intentions 
                                                
246 Jospin regretted the meeting and explained that in view of the current terrorist crisis France ought not to 
be seen as a contradicting actor. Libération October 18, 1995. 
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it seems were to raise the flag and ask the opposition to rally around it, much like they 
did after each attack since the start of the crisis three months before. After a brief opening 
address in which Philippe Séguin (RPR), president of the National Assembly, announced 
the unanimous condemnation of the attack by all deputies247, Juppé declared:  
“J’en appelle à la solidarité de tous. Je veux remercier les responsables de 
toutes les formations politiques qui, depuis le début de cette crise, ont fait 
preuve, dans leurs réactions, d’un esprit de responsabilité (…). Il est dans 
la vie d’une nation des circonstances où les citoyens rassemblés doivent 
faire face tous ensemble aux défis qui pourraient mettre en jeu les intérêts 
supérieurs du pays”.248  
 
Mindful of the existing controversy, Juppé reminded the deputies that the meeting 
between Chirac and Zéroual was not a sign of support for one of the candidates, but 
merely an indication that Algeria’s difficulties could only be resolved through dialogue. 
Juppé’s appeal was initially successful and managed to dampen down criticisms.  
The opposition displayed both its solidarity with the government and its respect for the 
victims. Addressing the deputies after the Prime Minister, Laurent Fabius (president of 
the socialist group in the National Assembly) rallied unambiguously:  
“Je voudrais, M. le Premier ministre, tirant les leçons de l’expérience que 
nous avons nous-mêmes connue, sachant par ailleurs les divergences qui 
peuvent nous opposer, vous dire que dans ces moment-là, nous souhaitons, 
au-delà de toute divergence, faire prévaloir la solidarité nationale dans la 
lutte contre des violences inadmissibles.”249  
 
                                                
247 “Je suis sûr de me faire l’interprète de la représentation nationale unanime pour dénoncer 
solennellement des méthodes ignobles qu’aucune cause ni aucune passion ne saurait expliquer” – i.e. “I am 
sure to speak for everyone in the National Assembly when I solemnly denounce this vile methods that 
nothing could ever explain”. Le Monde October 19, 1995. 
248 “I call upon the solidarity of everyone. I want to thank the leaders of all political parties who since the 
beginning of this crisis have shown through their actions a spirit of responsibility (..). There are times in the 
life of a nation when the citizens gather to face together challenges that could jeopardize the country’s 
supreme interests”. Libération October 18, 1995. 
249 “I would like, Mr. Prime Minister, bearing in mind lessons from the past, and being fully aware of the 
disagreements that exist between us, to tell you that during moments such as this one we wish, beyond all 
disagreements, to see national solidarity prevail in the struggle against this unacceptable violence”.  
Libération October 18, 1995. 
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Lionel Jospin, although less eloquently than Fabius, asked for the complete solidarity of 
the national community.250 François Hollande (spokesperson of the PS) remarked that the 
PS had voiced its doubts about the meeting between Chirac and Zéroual but that today, 
faced with a new attack, the socialists should not say anything that could prove dangerous 
for the national community.251 This display of solidarity was concluded by Michel 
Péricard, speaking for the RPR, who predictably declared that in moments such as this 
our union behind the Prime Minister and the President is the only one that counts.252 
This unity was again on display when Prime Minister Juppé and the leaders of all 
parliamentary groups met to discuss the situation. Yet backbenchers were still voicing 
their scepticism with regard to the Chirac-Zéroual meeting,253 and former socialist Prime 
Minister Pierre Mauroy came out publicly against this meeting.254  
By the following day (two days after the terrorist attack) the unified front was 
already collapsing. Jospin insisted again that Chirac should not be meeting with 
Zéroual.255 Soon after, the leader of the socialist group in the Senate as well as other 
prominent socialists followed suit expressing similar concerns.256 Meanwhile other 
leading socialists such as former ministers Claude Cheysson and Jean-Pierre 
                                                
250 Le Parisien October 18, 1995. 
251 “Nous avons exprimé, il y a quelques jours, nos doutes. Aujourd’hui, face à cet attentat, nous ne voulons 
rien dire qui puisse alimenter en quoi que ce soit un processus qui serait dangereux pour notre 
communauté” – i.e. “We have expressed a few days ago our doubts. Today, following this attack, we do not 
want to say anything that could in any way sustain a process that could be dangerous for our community”.  
Libération October 18, 1995. 
252 “En ces moments, seule compte notre union derrière vous et derrière le président de la République” – 
i.e. “During these times, our support of the government and of the President of the Republic is the only one 
that counts”. Le Monde October 19, 1995. 
253 Libération October 18, 1995 
254 Le Monde October 19, 1995. 
255 Les Échos October 19, 1995. 
256 Le Monde October 20, 1995. 
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Chevènement expressed their disagreement with their colleagues arguing that a meeting 
between two heads of state was not abnormal.257 
The meeting became even more of a controversial issue after a London-based 
Saudi financed newspaper, Asharq Al Awsat, reported that in exchange for the end of 
their terrorist campaign, the GIA had allegedly asked the French government to cancel 
the meeting between the two presidents.258 Some within the RPR claimed that by 
opposing the meeting the socialists were submitting to the terrorists.259 Finally two days 
before the meeting was due, the Algerian authorities decided to cancel it, providing the 
socialists with even more ammunitions to criticize the government. Fabius who less than 
a week before had received a round of applause from the right-wing deputies for his 
support declared that the government’s handling of this affair (i.e. the Chirac-Zéroual 
meeting) was the epitome of bad decision-making.260 
As it had done previously during this crisis (see case study seven) the Communist 
Party decided to back the government pointing out through Alain Bocquet (leader of the 
communist group in the National Assembly) that democrats must join their forces to 
defeat terrorism.261 With regards to the Chirac-Zéroual meeting, Robert Hue (secretary 
general of the communist party) claimed that there was nothing wrong about heads of 
state meeting one another, adding that France’s policy could not be changed under the 
pressure of terrorists.262  
                                                
257 Le Monde October 20, 1995. 
258 This was one of four alleged exigencies. Le Monde October 20, 1995. 
259 Le Monde October 20, 1995. 
260 “[Ce qui a] commencé par une maladresse (…) s’est terminée par un camouflet. C’est l’exemple de ce 
qu’il ne faut pas faire” – i.e. “What started with a blunder (…) has ended with an affront. This is the 
example of what should not be done”. Le Monde Octobre 24, 1995. 
261 Les Echos October 18, 1995. 
262 Le Monde October 20, 1995. 
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The Front National for its part remained on the offensive blaming the government 
for trying to deliberately implicate France in the Algerian conflict,263 and claiming that 
contrary to declarations made by members of the government terrorism was on the rise.264 
After the cancellation of the Chirac-Zéroual meeting, the Front National through Bruno 
Mégret (number two in the party hierarchy) declared that Chirac had not only ridiculed 
and humiliated France, but also proven his incompetence.265  
 
The magnitude-repetition model, in view of the above declarations, is inconclusive. The 
likely support predicted by the model came through initially but despite sympathetic 
declarations by prominent opposition leaders the rally did not last more than a couple of 
days. This initial support as well as the auspicious behaviour of the opposition throughout 
the crisis suggest that the socialists were not becoming impatient with the government. In 
fact the repetition variable was probably not a factor in the decision by prominent left-
wing figures to break away from the rally. After all the GIA-led terrorist campaign was 
perpetrated in retaliation to an Algerian policy shared by left-wing and right-wing 
governments alike.266 French meddling in Algerian affairs was a collective responsibility. 
Thus apart from the Front National, none of the parties blamed the government for its 
inability to end the attacks. The rally ended because prominent members of the Left felt 
that Chirac’s meeting with Zéroual was ill-timed and ill-advised considering the ongoing 
crisis. The controversy and in particular the abrupt decision by Algerian authorities to 
cancel the meeting presented the socialists with an opportunity to criticize the 
                                                
263 Libération October 18, 1995. 
264 Le Monde October 19, 1995. 
265 Le Monde Octobre 24, 1995. 
266 In fact, the decision to side with the Algerian government to snatch the electoral victory out of the FIS 
jaw was taken by François Mitterrand (PS) in the early 1990s. 
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government for its lack of judgment without being perceived as disloyal to the country. 
Thus the key factor in ending the rally was not the duration of the crisis (or the repetition 
of attacks), much less the magnitude, but rather a basic disagreement as to how to handle 
relations with Algeria. To be sure, the difficulties experienced elsewhere by the 
government (notably with regard to the economy) and its growing unpopularity within 
the population were of course conducive to criticisms of its handling of foreign affairs. 
The Front National as it had done previously used the opportunity to ridicule the 
RPR on its own turf (i.e. national security). In addition, the identity of the terrorists 
played into the hands of a party bent on curbing immigration from North Africa. For its 
part, the Communist Party behaved unexpectedly. Not only did the party refrain from 
criticizing Juppé’s right-wing government, but they were openly supportive throughout 
the crisis and even backed Chirac’s decision to meet with Zéroual. To some extent this 
surprising behaviour was part of a wider strategy whereby the communists would try to 
offer constructive rather than systematic criticisms, which meant siding with the 
government on occasions. Besides the party had decided to give Chirac the benefit of the 
doubt during his first few months in office (see further analysis of the communist 
behaviour during this series of attacks in case study seven).267 
 
 
 
 
                                                
267 Throughout the campaign for the 1995 presidential election, Jacques Chirac had buit momentum by 
promising to address, once elected, what he called “la fracture sociale”, namely the increasing social gap 
between what former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin would later refer to as “la France d’en haut” and 
“la France d’en bas” – i.e. upper-France and lower-France. 
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6.4.2. Support instead of no support 
 
The explosion at subway station Port-Royal in Paris on December 3, 1996, provided a 
unique and intriguing case with a rally occurring despite the magnitude-repetition model 
predicting otherwise. The attack, which killed four and injured another 128 people, was 
preceded by 25 other terrorist acts all happening during Alain Juppé’s term as Prime 
Minister. Both high magnitude and high repetition were conducive to criticisms of the 
right-wing government, yet instead the opposition gave its support. Former socialist 
Prime Minister Laurent Fabius received a round of applause from right-wing MPs by 
declaring at the National Assembly: 
“Nous avons toujours soutenu les actions des pouvoirs publics qui visaient 
à lutter contre ce fléau, et nous avons récusé toute exploitation 
politicienne. Il en sera de même aujourd’hui.” 268 
 
Another socialist leader, Jospin, remarked in similar fashion that the socialists must work 
to bring the population together.269 François Bayrou (UDF) and Jean-François Mansel 
(RPR), for their part, declared that this moment called for all French people to rally 
behind the President.270 
                                                
268 “We have always backed anti-terrorist actions taken by the authorities, and we have rejected any 
political exploitation. We will not behave any differently today”. Le Monde December 4, 1996. 
269 “Notre seule attitude en tant que force de progrès c’est de continuer à souder la population et à repousser 
les actes terroristes” – i.e. “Our only conviction as a force of progress is to carry on bringing the population 
together and pushing back terrorism”. Libération December 4, 1996. 
270 “C’est le moment pour les Français de marquer leur solidarité et de faire preuve de la même entente et 
de la même capacité de se réunir derrière le président de la République, qui est en charge aujourd’hui de la 
sécurité et de l’unité de la France” – i.e. “The moment has come for French people to express their 
solidarity and to demonstrate their capacity to rally around the President of the Republic, who today is in 
charge of the security and unity of France” (F. Bayrou). “Nous saluons la rapidité et la détermination avec 
laquelle le président de la République s’est adressé à nos compatriotes et nous les appelons, dans ces 
circonstances, à se rassembler autour de lui” – i.e. “We salute the swiftness and determination with which 
the President of the Republic addressed our fellow citizens, and we ask them under these circumstances to 
rally around him” (J-F. Mancel). Le Monde December 5, 1996. 
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The communists gave a limited and essentially silent support by expressing 
through their leader Robert Hue their utmost indignation.271 However, the Front National 
as usual went on the offensive and denounced the inconsequence and weakness of an 
inept government.272  
More than a year after France was hit by a wave of attacks orchestrated by the 
GIA (see case studies five and seven), this was obviously a severe setback for the 
government, particularly at a time when President Chirac and Prime Minister Juppé were 
facing constant criticisms for their decision to embark on a policy of economic austerity 
to meet the criteria set by the European Commission for the entry into the Euro zone. 
With an unemployment rate rising, and a President and a Prime Minister at their lowest in 
the polls, the government was particularly weak and thus an easy prey for opposition 
parties. Yet surprisingly the socialists avoided criticizing a government that was growing 
unpopular by the day and decided to be openly supportive. 
The socialists’ attitude is less puzzling if one considers the magnitude and the 
sheer atrocity of the attack (four dead and 128 wounded), which made it one of the worst 
terrorist acts in recent decades in terms of overall casualties (fatalities and wounded). Did 
the magnitude variable offset the effects of the high number of previous attacks? This is 
clearly an interesting working hypothesis. It implies that a large number of victims might 
trigger a rally, regardless of whether fatalities are numerous, and regardless of the 
                                                
271 Les Echos December 4, 1996. 
272 “Une nouvelle fois, des citoyens innocents ont payé de leur vie l’inconséquence et la faiblesse d’un 
gouvernement incapable. Les propos lénifiants d’un Jacques Chirac accablé sont dérisoires au regard des 
actes criminels qui se multiplient sur notre territoire (…). Aucun commanditaire des attentats terroristes de 
ces dernières années n’a réellement été trouvé et châtié. La France n’a pas besoin de fermeté dans les mots 
mais dans les actes” – i.e. “Again innocents have paid with their life the inconsequence and weakness of a 
useless government. Jacques Chirac’s pathetic declaration is ridiculous un view of the ongoing series of 
criminal acts taking place on our territory (…). None of those behind these recent terrorist attacks have 
been found and punished. France does not need tough words but tough acts”. Le Monde December 5, 1996.  
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duration of the crisis and the number of previous attacks.273 This would suggest that 
deaths as well as wounded should possibly be factored into a magnitude index. The 
explosion at station Port-Royal was meant to kill as many people as possible. Although 
many escaped with their lives the threat to national security must have been obvious to 
most members of the political elite, hence their unequivocal support of the government. 
The French political elite was also working under the assumption that this latest 
attack was the work of Algerian jihadists, possibly even of members of the GIA, a group 
responsible for the 1995 series of attacks. As mentioned previously, Left and Right 
shared responsibility for French meddling in Algerian affairs and were thus unlikely to 
criticize one another for what was arguably a byproduct of this meddling. In any case, the 
socialists had little to gain by criticizing the government over its handling of terrorism. 
The cost of being perceived as unsympathetic to the many victims and even disloyal in 
the face of an external threat was not inexistent. The government was in enough trouble 
as it was, digging its own grave by pursuing widely unpopular economic policies.  
The Front National on the other hand was at liberty to criticize this failed Algerian 
policy and call into question the government’s credibility on matters of national security, 
unlike the Communist Party which, as it had done throughout the 1995 wave of attacks, 
refrained from criticizing the government. 
 
 
                                                
273 Other attacks that caused many wounded (see case study five) did not have similar outcomes which 
suggests that fatalities are still central to the concept of magnitude. The number of wounded at Port-Royal 
was of course off the charts. The database indicates that attacks occuring in Spain and resulting in high 
numbers of wounded triggered rallies as well: 53 wounded (no deaths) on July 20, 1996; 60 wounded (no 
deaths) on November 6, 2001; 42 wounded (no deaths) on February 9, 2005. ETA was blamed for all three 
attacks. 
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6.4.3. Support instead of no reaction 
 
Terrorist attacks of low magnitude, much like foiled attacks, are unlikely to be reported 
by the media, let alone trigger any kind of rally.274 Obviously this is only a general rule 
and certain acts of low magnitude will resonate enough to register on the media radar and 
elicit a political response. Between 1990 and 2006 ten such acts triggered a rally, 
although the ideal-type model predicted that there should be no reaction at all. 
A number of reasons can account for this outcome. The first explanation rests yet 
again on a wider definition of magnitude, one that includes fatalities but also wounded. 
The previous sub-section raised this very possibility pointing out that a high tally of 
wounded could signal an elevated threat to national security and therefore have the same 
effect on the political elite as a high number of fatalities. Out of the ten acts mentioned 
above, three injured between 8 and 16 people. The perpetrators most certainly intended to 
kill as many as possible, thus the potential number of deaths that these explosions could 
have caused is here more relevant than the actual number of victims. Le Monde certainly 
treated these attacks like any other high magnitude attack, with a front-page and in depth 
coverage. As the motto goes “if it bleeds it leads”, not “if it kills it leads”. Faced with 
destruction and mutilation, mainstream political elites are likely to react by rallying, even 
if no one died as a result of the attack. 
Another explanation for this atypical outcome points to the target. Three out of the 
ten terrorist acts were aimed at representatives of the state and thus, as suggested by the 
statistical analysis, more likely to result in support for the government. The assassination 
                                                
274 This is why I left out of the dataset acts of terrorism that claimed no lives and injured 5 people or less, as 
preliminary survey indicated that acts causing such a low number of casualties (and no fatalities) were most 
often ignored by the media. 
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of Claude Erignac, discussed in details below, is a particularly enlightening example. In 
fact, the attack on a state’s representative need not be particularly ‘successful’ to elicit 
support. The failed assassination attempt on President Jacques Chirac on July 14, 2004 is 
a case in point. The incident involving a lone amateurish gunman was sufficient to trigger 
a wave of sympathy – albeit a limited one – even though Chirac was not injured and 
never in any danger of being hurt.275 Yet the combination of the target (head of state), the 
date (Bastille day) and the location (Champs-Élysées) – three powerful symbols for the 
French Republic – made it impossible for any politician on either side of the political 
divide (even amongst radical elites) not to express their support. 
The impact of the target and identity of the victim is apparent in another case 
involving an attack on guest workers from Africa, which provoked uproar and 
indignation within political parties. Attacks against minorities – particularly ethnic, 
religious and linguistic – can represent fertile grounds for rallies, even though one must 
wonder whether in these particular cases support is given to the government or to the 
victims themselves. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
275 Both far-right leaders Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN) and Bruno Mégret (MNR) condemned the act. Mégret, 
president of the MNR – of which Maxime Brunerie, the shooter, was a member – wrote to Chirac 
expressing his “vive emotion” – i.e. “profound emotion” – and his sympathy, telling the president he was 
shocked of the risk this terrorist act brought upon Chirac and the institution he represents. Le Monde July 
17, 2002. The socialist through François Holland expressed their solidarity with Chirac, and declared that 
by targeting the president the would-be assassin had targeted the Republic. Libération July 16, 2002. 
Similar concerns and expressions of sympathy were voiced by other socialist leaders, notably the mayor of 
Paris and the president of the socialist group at the national assembly.
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Case study six: The assassination of Claude Erignac (February 6, 1998) 
 
1) Account of the event and description of the political situation  
 
On the evening of February 6, 1998, shortly before joining his wife at a concert in 
Ajaccio, Claude Erignac (prefect of Corsica) was gunned down at point blank on a 
sidewalk. Erignac, who had chosen not to have bodyguards with him, succumbed 
immediately. Corsican nationalists were blamed right away for the assassination. 
 
For the third time under the Fifth Republic, France is governed by a President and a 
Prime Minister from different sides of the political divide. However unlike the two 
previous cohabitations, this time a President from the right-wing RPR, Jacques Chirac, is 
sharing power with a left-wing government headed by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin 
(PS).276 In addition, whereas the two previous cohabitations had occurred at the end of 
the President’s seven-year tenure, this third cohabitation started relatively early in the 
President’s mandate and would go on for another five years until the next legislative 
election in 2002. 
 The Socialist Party had more seats than any other party but was still short of the 
absolute majority in the National Assembly. As a result, Lionel Jospin was forced to 
govern with coalition partners, notably the Communist Party and the Greens. Much to the 
surprise of pundits and political analysts the cohabitation was running relatively 
smoothly, and both Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin enjoyed relatively high approval 
                                                
276 From 1986 to 1988 and 1993 to 1995 François Mitterrand (Parti Socialiste) ‘cohabited’ with 
respectively Jacques Chirac (RPR) and Édouard Balladur (RPR). 
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ratings in the polls (Becker 2003). The assassination of Erignac was the first serious act 
of terrorism since the socialists’ return to power. 
 
2) Expectations, reactions, and implications for the model 
 
According to the magnitude-repetition model, the assassination of Prefect Erignac (low 
magnitude and low repetition) should have elicited no reaction from the political elite, 
and yet it resulted in one of the largest rallies in recent years.   
 
Since 1975 the French state had been targeted several times by Corsican separatists, but 
never before had one of these factions succeeded in murdering such a high-ranking 
official, indeed the highest ranked civil servant on the island. In an indication of how 
serious this attack was perceived by the higher echelon of the government, President 
Chirac reacted in person, rather than through his spokesperson, to the assassination. 
Solemnly, on the front steps of the Élysée Palace, Chirac declared to the press that the 
assassination of a representative of the state was a barbarous act of extreme gravity and 
without precedent in French history.277 Echoing Chirac’s statement, Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin declared soon after that the nation as a whole had been hit, and that the 
state had to present a unified front.278 Other majority leaders reacted in similar fashion. 
                                                
277 “L’assassinat du représentant de l’État en Corse est un acte barbare d’une extrême gravité et sans 
précédent dans notre histoire” – i.e. “The assassination of a representative of the state in Corsica is a 
barbarous act of extreme gravity and without precedent in our history”. Le Monde February 8, 1998. 
278 “Cet acte inqualifiable et abject, en frappant le représentant de l’État atteint la nation toute entière” – i.e. 
“By stricking the representative of the state, this despicable act affects the entire nation”. Le Monde 
February 8, 1998. “Nous aurons besoin de l’unité absolue de l’État” – i.e. “We will need the state to be 
completely united”. Le Monde February 13, 1998. 
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Laurent Fabius (PS), president of the National Assembly, called for the strongest possible 
condemnation by the national community.279 
The mainstream opposition was unanimous in its condemnation. Philippe Séguin 
(president of the RPR) declared that the state must chase after the assassins in order to 
defend the Republic and preserve national unity.280 Adding his voice to the chorus, 
former Prime Minister Alain Juppé insisted on the necessity to come together as a nation 
to guarantee Corsica’s civil peace. François Bayrou in the name of the UDF (center right) 
declared that such an event must rally people beyond political cleavages.281  
The rally amongst mainstream elites was complete, with the three main parties 
calling explicitly on everyone to unite. 
A week after the tragic event, during a ceremony organized in Ajaccio and 
attended by leaders of the Left and the Right, Chirac declared:  
“C’est la France unanime, c’est la France debout, par-delà les différences, 
par-delà les clivages politiques, que nous représentons ici (…) La France 
est une et indivisible”.282 
 
A similar unanimity was displayed the following day during question period at the 
National Assembly.283 
The only dissenting voice on the Left came from Michel Charasse – former 
minister under Mitterrand and a renowned loose cannon – who declared that in the last 30 
years the state and the Republic had not been doing their job and were effectively the true 
                                                
279 “C’est à la République qu’on a voulu porter un coup. Ce crime odieux appelle la réprobation la plus 
totale de l’ensemble de la communauté nationale” – i.e. “The Republic has been targeted. This odious 
crime calls for the absolute disapproval by the entire national community”. Le Monde February 8, 1998. 
280 Le Figaro February 7, 1998. 
281 “L’assassinat d’un préfet est un acte d’une portée symbolique si lourde qu’elle doit tous nous réunir” – 
i.e. “The assassination of a prefect is an act of such symbolic value that it must bring us all together”. Le 
Monde February 10, 1998. 
282 “Beyond our differences, beyond political cleavages, we represent a unanimous France, a France 
standing tall. France is one and indivisible”. Le Monde February 11, 1998. 
283 Le Monde February 12, 1998. 
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assassins of Claude Erignac.284 For his part Jean-Louis Debré (RPR), former Minister of 
the Interior, criticized Jospin for not sending more police forces on the island. However, 
both Charasse and Debré were by then minor players in French politics with no real 
impact on the political debate. 
The two main radical parties reacted in noticeably different ways. Robert Hue 
(leader of the Communist Party) declared that the Republic had been targeted and that the 
entire national community had to denounce this odious crime.285 Whereas Jean-Marie Le 
Pen, who incidentally was not invited to the ceremony in Ajaccio (unlike Robert Hue), 
voiced strong criticism at the political elite declaring that the assassination was proof that 
the social fabric of the nation was falling apart and disorder was on the rise.286 He 
concluded by accusing the different governments (left and right) of connivance with the 
Corsican terrorists. 
 
What is particularly interesting about the reaction to this terrorist act is that the distinction 
between opposition and majority was blurred once again.287 The RPR and UDF (right and 
center right) were the main opposition parties in the lower house but still retained a 
sizeable share of the executive power through President Chirac. Thus both the socialists 
and their right-wing opposition stood to gain from a rally. As it turned out, the Left call 
for unity was reciprocated by the Right. In addition, the very nature of cohabitation made 
a rally more likely, regardless of the specificities of the terrorist act, the unwritten rule 
                                                
284 Le Monde February 10, 1998. 
285 Le Monde February 8, 1998. 
286 Le Figaro February 9, 1998. 
287 See case studies three and four. 
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being that on matters of foreign affairs and security policy a cohabitation government 
speaks with one voice.288 
The breadth of the rally in terms of support across the political spectrum is also a 
consequence of the inclusiveness of the coalition government led by Jospin. Despite 
having the largest number of MPs, the socialists governed with five junior partners in 
what has been termed a majorité plurielle.289 To be fair, these parties’ commitment to the 
government was at times questionable (many programmatic differences and even 
incompatibilities existed within this plural majority, notably between the ecologists and 
communists). Yet this tragic event provided an opportunity to project an image of 
cohesion within government. 
 Both the Right and the Left had over the years been unable to deal with Corsican 
nationalists and put an end to terrorism on the island. Thus none of them was really in a 
position to voice any criticism. The rhetoric across the board was similar and did not 
oppose hawks to doves. Softer and tougher approaches had been tried over the years by 
left-wing and right-wing governments to little avail. Jospin, for instance, declared that 
negotiation was no longer an option: “il n’y a rien à négocier en Corse” – i.e. “there is 
nothing to negotiate”.290 In addition, the relatively short period of time (i.e. eight month) 
during which the Jospin government was in power prior to the assassination of Erignac 
made any criticism from the Right unlikely. 
The shortcoming of the magnitude-repetition model is absolutely not surprising 
under these circumstances. The French political elite has always been quick to rally 
                                                
288 In 1986, the opposition (socialists) was by and large supporting the government. 
289 This governmental alliance lasted from 1997 to 2002 and included five parties : Parti Socialiste, Parti 
Communiste, Parti Radical de Gauche, Les Verts, and Le Mouvement des Citoyens. 
290 Le Monde February 13, 1998. 
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whenever the state was targeted (see table V), a likely outcome in a country where the 
Jacobin tradition is still very strong. To be fair, the rally was perhaps not so much around 
the government as around the Republic and what it stands for. The need to uphold the 
authority of the state and defend its territorial integrity was here the overriding concern, 
even for the Communist Party, which let us not forget was part of the governing 
coalition. Yet this is exactly what prompted Le Pen (FN) to criticize the political elite and 
discredit its record with regards to Corsica. The Front National had little to gain from 
rallying alongside Chirac (Le Pen’s sworn enemy), and its ideological nemesis of the far-
left, and little to lose from underlying the inability of the Left and the Right to solve the 
Corsican problem once and for all. Whereas all parties seemed to behave in the best 
interest of the state, the Front National behaved in its best electoral interest and cared 
little for the patriotic imperative. 
 
6.4.4. No support instead of no reaction 
 
The assumption so far has been that attacks characterized by low magnitude and low 
repetition would not trigger any reaction one way or the other, the rationale being that the 
low number of victims did not represent a particularly worrisome threat on the national 
security, whereas the low number of previous attacks did not signal any governmental 
shortcoming in the handling of national security. Yet the assassination on August 7, 2000, 
of a nationalist and his bodyguard in Corsica (low magnitude and low repetition) 
prompted criticisms from the opposition.291 
                                                
291 Since the assassination of Erignac terrorist activities on the island were of a relatively low magnitude 
(never more than five wounded). 
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As in 1998 when Prefect Erignac was killed, France was still governed by a left-
leaning coalition government led by Lionel Jospin. However by August 2000 the power-
sharing between Chirac and his socialist Prime Minister was not running as smoothly as it 
did two years before. The governmental coalition itself was experiencing some 
turbulence, and with municipal elections just a few months away many of the junior 
partners in the government were keen to distance themselves from the socialists. The 
Prime Minister’s preferred course of action on Corsica (i.e. negotiation with the 
nationalists) gave them the opportunity they were looking for.  
The Right as well as part of the Left opposed Jospin’s idea of giving Corsicans 
greater governing power on the ground that it would set a dangerous precedent for the 
country. President Chirac himself was critical of the plan. More importantly Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement (Minister of the Interior since 1997 and leader of the Mouvement des 
Citoyens) resigned shortly after Rossi’s assassination arguing that the end of violence 
should have been a precondition for negotiations with the nationalists. Likewise Patrick 
Devedjian (spokesperson of the RPR) stigmatized the negotiation process underway 
between the government and Corsican nationalists, claiming that it amounted to a 
concession to violence.292 Others further to the right such as Charles Pasqua and his 
recently created anti-European Rassemblement pour la France (RPF) demanded that a 
state of emergency be declared in Corsica. Le Pen (FN), for his part, accused the 
government of having committed a crime by holding talks with criminal extremists (i.e. 
                                                
292 Le Monde August 9, 2000. 
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nationalists).293 Mégret (MNR) argued similarly that Jospin was undermining the nation 
with too much Europe and now too much autonomy for some.294  
The assassination of Rossi in itself did not warrant any special attention. Murders 
of this type are unfortunately common occurrences in Corsica and usually do not raise so 
much as an eyebrow within political elites in Paris. Yet on that occasion with elections 
nearing and the government’s strategy being particularly controversial, parties left and 
right had every reason to be critical. The view that the government was stuck in a dead-
end alley was again what prompted political elites to be critical following another series 
of attacks on the island a year later.295 
 
6.4.5. No reaction instead of likely support 
 
Terrorist groups are often competing for the media’s attention in an attempt to draw the 
attention of political elites to their cause. Traditionally the higher the threat posed by a 
specific group, the greater the media exposure (see notably Nacos 2007). Thus if two or 
more groups operate at the same time, media outlets are likely to give a larger coverage 
to the one causing more disruption. This was notably the case in 1995 during the 
infamous wave of attacks masterminded by the GIA, which overshadowed the activities 
of other terrorist groups such as the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). Amid the horror 
caused by the GIA operations, an attack by members of the PKK against a Turkish 
cultural center, which ‘only’ injured six people, failed to elicit any reaction from the 
                                                
293 Le Monde August 9, 2000. 
294 Bruno Mégret had left the Front National in 1999 and created a new far-right party (Mouvement 
National Republicain). 
295 See section 6.4.1. 
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political elite. Similarly, the assassination of an Iranian national was ignored by the 
French political elite altogether.296 
If terrorism is “performance violence” as suggested by Mark Juergensmeyer 
(2002, 3) than clearly the PKK was surpassed by the GIA.297 As pointed out in case study 
four, Action Directe, mindful of the competition, had probably waited for the CSPPA to 
end its series of attacks in Paris before murdering Georges Besse in November 1986. 
We now turn to a series of terrorist acts which, unlike the cases studied in the 
preceding sections, do not diverge from the magnitude-repetition model but still raise a 
few questions. 
 
6.4.6. Likely support 
 
So far rallies around the flag have been associated with terrorist acts of high magnitude 
and low repetition. But what of the 13 acts which scored relatively high on the repetition 
scale and low on the magnitude scale and prompted the opposition to support the 
government. Although the support was likely according to the magnitude-repetition 
model, the opposition given the repetition of attacks could have criticized the government 
for its inability to put an end to the attacks.  
Rallies in three of these cases can perhaps best be explained by the fact that they 
were part of the 1995 wave of GIA-led attacks. As mentioned previously, such waves are 
likely perceived by political elites as one major crisis rather than a succession of 
incidents. In other words, the repetition variable becomes relatively inconsequential 
                                                
296 These attacks were not reported in Le Monde or in any of the other national newspapers and magazine 
used for the qualitative analysis. 
297 It is possible that the Iranian national was killed (probably by Iran’s secret services) during this eventful 
summer so as to cause a minimum of controversy in the French media. 
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during waves and therefore governments are less likely to be criticized by the opposition 
(see case study seven below). 
 
Case study seven: Explosion on Avenue Friedland (August 17, 1995) 
 
1) Account of the event and description of the political situation  
 
A gas canister bomb filled with nails and bolts and planted in a trash bin on Avenue 
Friedland, near the Arc de Triomphe, exploded at the end of a summer afternoon injuring 
17 persons, including four children. The Algerian GIA-Commandement Général claimed 
responsibility for the bombing, which was linked to a series of terrorist attacks, notably 
an explosion at subway station Saint-Michel three weeks before that killed seven people. 
Elites were thus reacting on the assumption that this attack was part of a wave of attacks 
perpetrated by the same terrorist organization.298 
 
The situation is very similar to the one described in case study five, with the RPR and 
UDF in power, and the Socialist Party in the opposition. By then the new government 
was already on high alert owing to other terrorist acts linked to Algerian extremists. On 
top of these pressing national security concerns, the government was facing international 
condemnation for announcing its decision to carry out nuclear tests in the Pacific. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
298 From July to November 1995, ten attacks linked to the same group were carried out in France (see case 
study five). 
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2) Reactions and implications for the model 
 
The reaction of the government was swift. Prime Minister Alain Juppé was present at the 
scene just an hour after the explosion with a hands-on attitude that marked a noticeable 
change from the government’s immediate reaction following the explosion at Saint-
Michel three weeks before.299 
Support for the government was massive. Predictably the RPR, through its 
secretary general, indicated it had complete trust in the government’s ability to face this 
violence.300 More importantly, Jean Glavany (one of the leaders of the PS) declared that 
the socialists intended to demonstrate their sense of responsibility by supporting the 
government in its fight against terrorism.301 
No dissenting voice from the mainstream political elite surfaced during the week 
that followed. Lionel Jospin (PS), who had been defeated by Chirac in the second round 
of the presidential election a few months before, did utter a few criticisms but none of 
them were directed at the government’s response to terrorism. In fact, Jospin 
unambiguously declared that the national community should be united against the 
terrorist threat. Le Monde spoke of an “esprit républicain” – i.e. “a republican spirit”. 
However, Jospin was keen to remind everyone that back in 1982 when France was hit by 
a similar wave of terrorist attacks, the Right had failed to rally around the socialist 
                                                
299 Michel Debré’s (Minister of the Interior at the time) over-emotional handling of the situation outside the 
subway station of Saint-Michel had projected an image of a frail government clearly overtaken by the 
events. 
300 Le Monde August 19, 1995. 
301 “[Les socialistes] entendent témoigner du plus grand sens des responsabilités et soutiennent le 
gouvernement dans tout ce qu’il entreprendra pour lutter efficacement contre le terrorisme” – i.e. “The 
socialists intend to display the highest sense of responsibility and support the government in whatever it 
will do to fight terrorism effectively”. Le Monde August 19, 1995. 
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government.302 Jospin’s own willingness to support the government was in fact not 
infinite, and he lost little time to remind his socialist colleagues that they had a duty to 
oppose the government on other issues.303 He stigmatized in particular the economic 
conservatism of Chirac and his rhetoric of social exclusion. 
None of the radical parties broke the apparent unity of the political elite. Robert 
Hue (head of the Communist Party) declared that such odious acts can only trigger a 
unanimous condemnation, adding that the victims could count on the complete solidarity 
of the French communists.304 For his part, Jean-Marie Le Pen (leader of the Front 
National) was less polemical than on other occasions though he declared that once more 
the French people were taken hostage in a conflict to which they were fundamentally 
strangers.305 
 
By the end of August 1995, it was clear for both elite and public opinion that France was 
under attack by a resolute group of terrorists most likely associated with the GIA.306 This 
was not just a repetition of unconnected or loosely connected acts, this was a wave of 
attacks orchestrated by the same group over a narrow time period. Rather than separate 
occurrences this was in effect a two-month long crisis. Thus it is likely that the number of 
previous attacks did not influence the reaction. The repetition effect was also offset by 
the fact that Alain Juppé’s conservative government had been in power for less than three 
                                                
302 “Aujourd’hui, nous sommes responsables et solidaires. J’espère que nos adversaires sauront s’en 
souvenir quand nous serons à nouveau au gouvernement” – i.e. “Today we are responsible and united. I 
hope that our adversaries will remember this when we return to power”. Le Monde August 22, 1995. The 
1982 wave of attacks is analyzed in case study two. 
303 He spoke of “a devoir d’opposition, de renouvellement, de propositions” – i.e. “a duty to oppose, to 
renew, to propose”. Le Monde August 22, 1995. 
304 Le Monde August 19, 1995. 
305 “ (…) des conflits qui lui sont fondamentalement étrangers”. Le Monde August 22, 1995. 
306 Le Monde reported on August 21 that the investigating officers were convinced that this act was part of 
a series of attacks planned and perpetrated by the same group (likely linked to the GIA). Le Monde August 
21, 1995. 
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months when the attacks started. This short timeframe made it difficult for the opposition 
to blame the government for any shortcoming in the fight against terror. In other words, 
the government received the benefit of the doubt.  
It is also likely that the French political elite chose to rally around the victims as 
much as around the government. The presence of children among the victims only 
heightened the necessity for opposition leaders to show their solidarity. This need to 
project an image of responsibility and compassion probably also accounts for the 
behaviour of radical parties such as the Front National, which toned down its traditional 
rhetoric of blame. The communists, for their part, were particularly keen to be seen as 
supportive of the government (see also case study five). A member of the national comity 
reasoned that a purely negative attitude towards President Chirac would not make the 
Communist Party win anything. Their reaction was part of a larger strategy of 
constructive opposition aimed at differentiating themselves from the Socialist Party and 
giving Chirac the benefit of the doubt.307 
Yet despite unanimous support, Jospin made a point to remind everyone that the 
Right had opted out of the rally in 1982 and suggested that the rally was conditional on 
the Right reciprocating the next time a socialist government faced a similar situation. 
Eventually Jospin signalled that this was a limited rally and that being critical on other 
aspects of the government’s handling of affairs, in particular with regard to the economy, 
was very much a duty for the opposition. 
 
 
 
                                                
307 L’Humanité June 5, 1995. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter confirms by and large the validity of the magnitude-repetition model but 
also identifies several other key variables, some of which can offset the effects that 
magnitude and repetition have on the behaviour of political elites. The qualitative 
analysis contributes to our understanding of the reaction of political elites in seven 
important ways. 
 First, several of the cases analysed in this chapter (e.g. the explosion at subway 
station Port-Royal) suggest that the magnitude of an attack does not depend solely on the 
number of fatalities but also on the number of wounded. To be sure, this remark only 
applies to attacks causing a large number of wounded (tentatively put at twenty or more). 
Yet it reinforces the perception that the number of victims (fatalities or wounded) 
represents a good proxy for the level of threat on the national security. 
 Second, the qualitative analysis suggests that a caveat must be introduced with 
regards to the effects of the repetition variable. The recurrence of attacks can signal a 
suboptimal handling of affairs by the government and thus prompt the opposition to be 
critical. Corsica is a case in point.308 However, the repetition variable becomes less of an 
issue with waves of attacks (e.g. GIA orchestrated attacks in 1995) as the political elite is 
more likely to perceive these terrorist acts a continuous crisis instead of a succession of 
crises. In other words, under these particular circumstances the opposition is likely to be 
more patient with the government. 
 Third, the analysis conducted in this chapter confirms that in France, at least, the 
political reaction is determined to some extent by the identity of the target. As 
                                                
308 The disagreement on the best strategy with regards to Corsican nationalists was of course an aggravating 
factor. 
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hypothesized earlier on, attacks against representatives of the state are more likely to 
elicit a rally, particularly when the victims are high ranking officials (e.g. assassinations 
of Besse and Erignac), although the support in these cases might be intended for the 
Republic as a whole rather than the government itself. 
Fourth, the qualitative analysis confirms that the identity of the perpetrators will 
on occasion influence the reaction of political elites, as when neo-Nazi groups were 
accused (by mistake as it turned out) of setting off a bomb in the vicinity of a synagogue. 
The socialists were able to criticize the right-wing government for its perceived 
permissiveness with far-right fanatics who had been responsible for a string of attacks in 
France and across Europe. The RPR and UDF would reciprocate a few years later 
pointing out the leniency of Mitterrand with far-left terrorists. However the socialists and 
the conservatives found it more difficult to criticize one another over Middle-Eastern 
(and to a lesser extent Corsican) terrorism for which the responsibility was shared. 
Interestingly, the 1982 wave of attacks suggests that political elites will find it harder to 
criticize the government if the identity of the culprit is unknown. 
Fifth, this chapter further demonstrates that contextual variables are invariably 
crucial in understanding the behaviour of political elites. Foreign affairs can bring the 
parties together (e.g. Begin’s criticisms in the aftermath of the shooting rue des Rosiers) 
or on the contrary fuel criticisms (e.g. disagreement over the Chirac-Zéroual meeting). 
The proximity of electoral contests is also likely to affect the behaviour of parties (e.g. 
Mitterrand accusing Giscard of being permissive with terrorists a few months before the 
presidential election). 
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 Sixth, the case studies indicate that history matters and that political events, 
whether or not related to terrorism, can influence behaviour in the wake of terrorist 
attacks even years after their occurrence. French political elites, although no stranger to 
political feuding, have regularly rallied in support of the government throughout the 
1990s and thereafter. The 1980s, however, were a different story. The lingering 
resentment caused by the election of François Mitterrand in 1981 led many prominent 
right-wing politicians to question the legitimacy of a socialist president thereby creating 
an acrimonious atmosphere not conducive to rallies. Rather than abate, these criticisms 
became particularly fierce during terrorist crises. The cohabitation period resulted in an 
unforeseen scenario, namely the refusal by the governing right-wing coalition of the 
opposition’s support. Behind this rather bizarre attitude was perhaps an attempt to 
salvage the Right’s reputation on the issue of national security, particularly with an ever 
more threatening Le Pen. Years later the Left would make it a point to rally around right-
wing governments while reminding everyone that under similar circumstances the right 
had failed to support left-wing governments. 
 Finally, this chapter suggest that the behaviour of radical parties is not as 
predictable as hypothesized earlier on. 309 To a large extent the Front National behaved as 
expected, namely railing against the government and all other parties of the establishment 
(i.e. PS, PCF, RPR and UDF). The FN remained a Downsian party in the worst of times, 
using each terrorist act as an opportunity to formulate policies (e.g. curbing immigration 
and reinstating the death penalty) to win elections (see Downs 1957, 28). In other words, 
the Front National never once lost sight of its electoral interest and never once showed 
                                                
309 Hypothesis seven suggested that radical parties would not rally around the flag following acts of terror 
and would on the contrary be outspoken in their criticism towards the government. 
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any inclination to favour the national interest. The Communist Party on the other hand 
rallied almost every time (particularly from the 1990s onward), whether around left-wing 
or right-wing governments. To be fair, the communists were part of several governmental 
coalitions and thus unlikely to turn against their own partners. Their strategy might have 
been motivated by the necessity to appear less radical and more responsible at a time 
when the party was declining and looking for political allies. 
 Broadly speaking chapter six confirms the validity of the magnitude-repetition 
model, yet it is only an ideal-type model and as such remains limited in its scope. The 
qualitative analysis suggests ways of improving it by notably integrating variables such 
as the type of target and the identity of the perpetrators. Ideally the magnitude in terms of 
fatalities should be replaced by a magnitude index based on the number of fatalities and 
wounded. Finally the repetition variable should also be amended to take account of waves 
of attacks.  
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
“Fear is the foundation of most governments; but it is so sordid and brutal a passion, and 
renders men in whose breasts it predominates so stupid and miserable, that Americans 
will not be likely to approve of any political institution which is founded on it” (John 
Adams, President of the United States 1797-1801) 
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Having reached at long last the closing stages of this inquiry into the logic of political 
behaviour in times of terror, I find it tempting to agree with John Adams. Then as now, 
fear might well be the foundation of most governments, a claim made all the more 
compelling in the aftermath of 9/11 as Americans rallied en masse around their president 
amid warnings of more terror to come. As a seemingly endless cycle of terror alerts 
began, many succumbed to what John Adams termed a “sordid and brutal passion” and 
entered in a frenzy of patriotism. Meanwhile, the political elite in Washington, moved by 
a similar combination of fear and devotion to the nation, and in some cases blatant 
political opportunism, gave the Bush administration all the necessary leeway to wage a 
war which the president assured us would only end with the demise of nothing less than 
terrorism itself. With political debates on Capitol Hill virtually halted for several weeks, 
party politics became the first collateral damage of the war on terror. 
To be sure, not all acts of terror impact party politics to the extent 9/11 did. Yet 
the effect of terrorism on party politics can never be stressed enough, for terrorism is 
nothing less than the repudiation of party politics. Regardless of who the immediate 
targets are, the gun sight is always pointed towards the legitimate holders of powers, 
which in representative democracies are the parties. Terrorism is about political 
ascendency, and from the terrorists’ point of view parties stand in their way, as evidenced 
in one of the inaugural acts of modern terrorism when Auguste Valliant threw a bomb 
into the hemicycle of the French National Assembly. 
In the end, political parties are at once the prime targets of terrorists and the first 
line of defence against terrorism through their ability to legislate and govern (e.g. pass 
and implement antiterror bills). Understanding how political parties and their elites 
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behave during terrorist crises – the objective of this thesis – is therefore anything but 
trivial. Following a summary of my research and of the main results, I present a series of 
substantive and methodological implications. I conclude by suggesting avenues of 
research and offering a final remark. 
 
7.1. What have we learned? 
 
Chapter one introduced the notions of ordinary and extraordinary politics, and underlined 
the innate tension within each political party between the need to defend particular 
interests while at the same time remaining mindful of the national interest. In particular, I 
pointed out that the electoral rationale put forth by Downs (1957) and his successors 
could not necessarily make sense of party behaviour during extraordinary times, that is 
times when the national interest is threatened. Although the Western world is relatively 
more peaceful now than it was a half-century ago, military and diplomatic crises are still 
recurring phenomena, making it unlikely for party elites to ignore them and focus solely 
on electoral objectives. Three case studies presented at the end of the chapter suggest that 
the national interest matters for parties, and that political elites are likely to rally around 
the flag when the threat is perceived as imminent. 
 Chapter two presented the paradox that is terrorism: an ancient phenomenon that 
scholars have only recently begun to study, a common occurrence that we find impossible 
to define. I remarked that despite the obvious implications of terrorism on party politics 
and electoral politics, studies on the effects of terrorist activities on parties and elections 
are scarce.  
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Chapter three began with a discussion of what rallies around the flag are and how 
they come about in the context of foreign policy crises. I presented both the ‘patriotic 
reflex’ explanation put forth by John Mueller (1973), which centers on the type of events 
likely to trigger rallies, and the ‘opinion leadership’ explanation put forth by Richard 
Brody (1991), which focuses on the control of sensitive information by the government. I 
argued that Mueller and Brody’s views were particularly relevant to the study of parties’ 
reactions to terrorist acts, and hinted that terrorist crises, much like diplomatic and 
military crises, were likely to trigger rallies around the flag. I then presented the 
magnitude-repetition model for analysing the reaction of parties. I argued that the 
magnitude of the attacks in terms of fatalities and the repetition of attacks were likely to 
be the two main explanatory variables, and could either activate the patriotic imperative 
and trigger a rally, or activate the partisan instinct and lead to criticisms of the 
government. I then presented a series of hypotheses based on these two variables and a 
host of secondary variables. 
 Chapter four presented the methodology used to analyse the reaction of political 
elites to terrorism in five countries (France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) and across nearly two decades, and the database created for that 
purpose. I introduced an approach combining both quantitative and qualitative analyses, 
which would allow to determine broad behavioural trends while at the same time 
detailing the reaction through case studies. 
 Chapters five and six presented results of respectively the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. The findings – based in large part on the eight hypotheses presented 
in chapter three – are the following: 
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Mainstream opposition parties rally around the flag following terrorist attacks 
The overwhelming majority of terrorist acts analyzed in this thesis triggered rallies. To be 
more precise, mainstream political parties have not been critical of their government’s 
handling of terrorism and national security related issues in 84 percent of the cases 
included in the dataset (up from 33 percent during non-terrorist periods). These findings 
suggest that the patriotic imperative, rather than the partisan interest, determines party 
behaviour when the national security is threatened. Furthermore, these results suggest 
that party politics becomes less conflictual in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks. 
However, a couple of caveats must be introduced. First, this finding only applies to the 
five-day period that follows the attacks and thus any conclusion for the longer term 
would be premature. Second, results vary from one country to the other. Whereas 
German, British and American mainstream political elites very rarely criticized their 
governments in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, French and Spanish political elites were 
slightly more vindictive. 
 
Mainstream opposition parties are more likely to rally when the terrorist act causes a 
larger number of casualties 
The number of victims – referred in this study as the magnitude – represents a strong 
predictor of party behaviour. Relatively high numbers of fatalities or wounded underline 
the gravity of the crisis and the threat on national security, making a rally all the more 
likely. Attacks of lesser magnitude on the other hand are more likely to be ignored by the 
political elites. 
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The recurrence of terrorist attacks makes a rally less likely 
Governments are expected to limit the occurrence of terrorist acts. Failure to do so is an 
indication that those in charge of governing the country are not handling national security 
well, and will encourage opposition parties to be critical. However, political elites are 
likely to be more patient and forgiving when the government faces a series of attacks 
perpetrated over a relatively short-time period by the same group. Such a wave of attacks 
tends to be perceived as one major crisis – thereby making the threat to national security 
more obvious – rather than a succession of crises. 
 
In general, political elites are not more likely to rally when a representative or 
representatives of the state are victim of terrorist attacks 
By and large governments cannot expect opposition parties to be more supportive when 
an agent of the state is targeted by terrorists. However this remark does not apply to 
French political elites which, perhaps as a result of the prevailing Jacobin political 
tradition, are more likely to rally under these circumstances (particularly when high 
ranking officials are targeted). 
 
International terrorism is more likely to trigger a rally than domestic terrorism 
Terrorist attacks originating from abroad are likely to be perceived as particularly 
threatening to national security and thus encourage political elites to present a unified 
front. In other words, international terrorism triggers the same reaction as conventional 
threats on national security (e.g. military conflicts). When facing domestic terrorism, 
opposition parties can criticize the government’s handling of affairs without necessarily 
running the risk of being accused of siding with a foreign foe. To be fair, domestic 
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terrorism is usually associated with longer lasting terrorist campaigns (e.g. FLNC, IRA, 
ETA, BR, RAF) than international terrorism, and therefore tends to give opposition 
parties more reasons to criticize the government’s failure to handle a recurring security 
problem. 
 
Since the events of 9/11 political parties are more likely to support their government after 
terrorist attacks 
The multiple attacks of 9/11 had an impact not just on American party politics but also in 
France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom where political elites are now more 
likely to rally around the flag than before that fateful September day. A heightened sense 
of urgency with regards to national security and the realization that some terrorist groups 
operating today (e.g. jihadists) do not refrain from large-scale attacks are a probable 
explanation as to why now more than ever terrorism is likely to initiate rallies. 
 
In general right-wing governments are not more likely to benefit from rallies after 
terrorist attacks than left-wing governments 
Despite their reputation for being too soft with regards to terrorism, left-wing parties are 
not criticized more by opposition parties in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. However the  
situation varies from one country to the other (e.g. in Spain the Left benefits from more 
rallies than in the other four countries) and overtime (e.g. in France left-wing 
governments were heavily criticized throughout the eighties for being too permissive but 
less in the nineties). 
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Far-right parties are almost always critical of their political adversaries in the aftermath 
of terrorist attacks 
This finding is based on an analysis of the behaviour of the Front National (FN) and the 
Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) and is thus only valid for France. Not only 
have these two parties been repeatedly critical of the French government (right-wing and 
left-wing alike) but their criticisms have also been directed at other parties in the 
opposition, notably the far-left. In addition, the FN and MNR have regularly used the 
opportunity created by terrorist attacks to put forth segments of their electoral program 
(e.g. reinstatement of the death penalty). To a large extent this was part of a strategy to 
discredit the main right-wing parties and take over from them the ownership of the 
national security issue. Interestingly, criticisms by far-right elites can provoke a reaction 
by mainstream elites and stir up controversy between the government and the main 
opposition party. 
 
The far-left almost always supports the government after terrorist attacks 
This finding is based on an analysis of the behaviour of the Parti Communiste (PC) and is 
thus only valid for France. Unlike the far-right, the PC has been in government two times 
during the period studied. However even during its years in opposition, the PC was 
always prompt to support left-wing and right-wing governments alike, sometimes in the 
most explicit manner. This unexpected behaviour was to a large extent strategic and 
aimed at finding political allies and differentiating itself from other left-wing parties in a 
period of continuing electoral decline. 
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The presence of a formal antiterrorist pact increases the likelihood of a rally 
The period during which the two main Spanish parties formerly agreed to support one 
another in the fight against Basque terrorism resulted in a noticeably higher percentage of 
rallies. In retrospect, this antiterrorist pact seemed effective only as long as the 
conservatives were in power and only as long as terrorism remained linked to ETA. 
Furthermore, the particularly high rallying rate in the United Kingdom suggests that the 
existing informal agreement between the main parties at Westminster is also likely to 
favour rallies. 
 
Rallying around the flag can be an electoral strategy 
The last two findings suggest that rallying can be strategic. Obviously it can be a strategy 
to defeat a terrorist group by projecting an image of unity throughout the political elite. 
Recent history is replete with instances when the patriotic imperative has led opposition 
parties to support the government rather than seek electoral objectives. Yet rallying can 
also be an electoral strategy. Indeed if terrorism can represent an opportunity for the 
opposition to rail against the government – instead of becoming a rallying issue, the crisis 
becomes a disputed issue – it can also represent an opportunity to make electoral gains by 
rallying. In other words, defending the interest of the nation becomes part of the electoral 
rationale. The French Communist Party (PC) is a case in point as it repeatedly joined 
rallies, even in support of right-wing governments, in an attempt to halt its electoral 
decline and project an image of responsibility during critical situations. Finally, the 
behaviour of the French Socialist Party (PS) throughout much of the period under 
consideration also seems to indicate a willingness to rally with right-wing governments in 
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order to set an example and promote consensus during critical periods. Rallying after all 
is first and foremost a collective strategy to overcome a crisis. 
 
To be fair, other variables could influence the dynamic of behaviour during terrorist 
crises. In particular, contextual variables such as foreign policy crises and elections seem 
to affect the behaviour. Diplomatic and military crises tend to favour rallies but have on 
occasion stirred domestic controversies thereby ending the rallies. Electoral campaigns 
on the other hand seem unfavourable to rallies. Finally, the case studies suggest that 
lingering resentments during transition periods, such as the one linked to an electoral 
defeat, can affect elite behaviour and prevent certain individuals from rallying. 
 
This study contributes to our understanding of party behaviour by demonstrating that 
party politics is not only about electoral and partisan objectives, but also about the 
national interest. These results suggest that there is an emergency behaviour and a routine 
behaviour, and that the former will be activated whenever the country is perceived as 
being under threat. Yet rallies are fragile and the Downsian rationale always lurks behind 
the patriotic imperative ready to cease the opportunity created by terrorism.  
 
7.2. Substantive implications 
 
Through this dissertation I have tried, to paraphrase Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, to 
be a ‘student of combustion’ and to understand how the terrorist fire spreads into politics. 
I have also tried to contribute to our understanding of party politics during critical times, 
and see to what extent political elites are likely to promote by their joint endeavours the 
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national interest valued by Edmund Burke rather than defend their own specific and 
partisan interest.  
The first implication which I wish to underline is that research on party behaviour, 
and indeed electoral behaviour in general, would benefit from becoming more context 
sensitive, rather than relying too much on the ceteris paribus expedient. The political 
context changes, constantly, at home and abroad. National and international crises, 
whether or not related to terrorism, matter and should be taken into account by those of 
us studying the dynamics of party and elite behaviour. In other words, the Downsian 
party cannot always be taken for granted. The electoral rationale is bounded and cannot 
account for party behaviour each time. Other rationales such as the raison d’État play a 
role. 
If students of party and electoral behaviour should take into account the context in 
which domestic political actors evolve more often, scholars working on the response to 
terror should be mindful of how terror impacts party politics. In the end, the response to 
terrorism is in the hands of these parties and their elites. It is therefore crucial to 
understand how terrorism affects their behaviour. One could venture to say that high 
magnitude terror is likely to facilitate the passage of anti-terror bills whereas the high 
recurrence of terrorist acts will be more likely to impede the passage of laws as it creates 
dissent within the political elite. 
The third implication follows from the previous one. Terrorism is likely to have 
repercussions not just on the response to terror, but more generally on the functioning of 
representative democracies. Terrorist acts of higher magnitude, which considering the 
current trend are unfortunately increasingly likely, could lead to more domestic political 
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consensus, whereas the repetition of acts of terror could lead to more conflictual 
exchanges between parties, and crucially between the government and the opposition. 
This research should add to the ongoing reflection on the effects of terrorism on the 
quality of democracy. The tragic example set by the Uruguayan elite in the face of the 
Tupamaros-led terrorist campaign in the early 1970s should serve as a reminder that 
parties, and the democratic structure they uphold, can crumble down just as easily as any 
mastodon of steel and concrete. 
These implications all point towards the necessity to know more about rallies 
around the flag. To be sure, our knowledge of rallies has greatly benefited from the works 
of John Mueller (1973) and Richard Brody (1991), to name just the two pioneering 
figures, and this research tends to validate as much the patriotic interpretation as the 
opinion leadership explanation. Yet despite the large body of research on rallies, we still 
know too little on the effects of rallies on the political game. 
  
7.3. Methodological implications 
 
Just like Adam Przeworski I consider myself a “methodological opportunist” who will 
use what he considers to be the best method for the work at hand, whether quantitative or 
qualitative (in Kohli et al. 1996, 16). Yet I am increasingly convinced that an approach 
combining and even integrating both methods is not only possible but advisable. Of 
course I am not a precursor and others before me have chosen to take this ecumenical 
path, yet I feel that we are still too hesitant to make that step.  
The quantitative method I used was based on both descriptive and inferential 
statistics and allowed me to test variables and identify behavioural trends. Based on these 
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results I was then able to identify outliers, that is divergent cases that did not fit neatly 
into the categories of my magnitude-repetition model. The qualitative analysis allowed 
me – through in-depth case studies – to uncover additional variables and account for the 
divergence observed previously. It also allowed me to reinforce certain conclusions and 
nuance others. The process does not have to end here and can lead to a new round of 
statistical analysis, and so forth. One method serves the other one. 
The absence of a ready-to-use-and-analyse database is often cited as a reason for 
avoiding the quantitative approach, yet a dearth of databases in certain fields of social 
sciences should not be an insurmountable challenge that stands in the way of statistical 
inquiry. This thesis is a case in point. Terrorism studies are not blessed by an abundance 
of relevant databases, and the sort of dataset I needed combining terrorist activities and 
political reactions did not exist. Thus if I wanted to use a methodology integrating 
statistics and qualitative analysis, I had to create that database by expanding an existing 
dataset of terrorist events and adding the missing information. The data was there for me 
to collect, notably through time consuming content analysis of newspapers (in four 
languages). The process was also a unique way to immerse myself into the subject-matter 
of my thesis. 
 
7.4. Avenues of research 
 
The interplay between terrorism and politics has existed for centuries, and yet studies on 
the interaction between terrorism, party politics and electoral behaviour only started in 
earnest in recent years. It is fair to say that much remains to be done. Based on this 
doctoral dissertation, I envisage four avenues of research. 
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 First, the impact of terrorism on countries other than established democracies 
needs to be addressed. In particular, we need to look at how political elites in 
authoritarian regimes and newly established democracies react to terrorist attacks. It is 
doubtful that terrorism affects elite behaviour in autocracies the way it affects elite 
behaviour in open societies. Obviously under autocratic forms of government the 
opposition will have far less leeway, if any, than its democratic counterparts, and might 
actually be the prime instigator of terrorist activities. In some cases, the fear of repression 
might prompt regime opponents to rally around the flag. Yet the opposition is more likely 
to view terrorism as an opportunity to reach its political objectives by undermining the 
existing regime. Evidently, a wide array of regimes fit into the category of autocratic, 
with some tolerating a limited opposition and others rejecting any form of disagreement. I 
would suggest that with more repressive regimes, the opposition has little to lose and is 
therefore more likely to criticize even further the government during terrorist crises. Of 
equal interest is the reaction to terrorism in countries undergoing a transition towards a 
democratic form of government. Here again elites are likely to play politics with 
terrorism. Those who stand to lose most under the new regime – such as members or 
supporters of the former regime – might be less inclined to rally around the government 
when terrorists strike and are therefore likely to impede the transition process.  
Second, the impact of terrorism on intra-party dynamics, whether in established or 
new democracies, needs to be explored further. In particular, we need to understand 
whether terrorism favours consensus within parties or whether it leads to disagreement 
and even fragmentation of the party system. This dissertation suggests that the reaction 
within certain parties might not always be homogeneous and might for instance oppose 
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doves to hawks. This tension is notably illustrated in France by the debate on Corsica, 
which created a rift within the French left in 2000 and led the then Minister of Interior, 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement, to leave the government following a wave of attacks 
perpetrated by the separatists. Similarly, the British Labour Party split over the decision 
to send troops to Iraq as part of the war on terror and led Robin Cook to resign from his 
position as Leader of the House of Commons in 2003. Any number of reasons could 
account for this type of behaviour, but these two examples suggest that the decision to 
leave a party or quit a position of authority is linked to political ideology. 
Third, the question of diffusion and habit-forming needs to be addressed. We 
know from the findings presented in this thesis that political elites across the five 
countries studied here were more inclined to rally after the events of 9/11. What this 
suggests among others is that political elites from different countries who share a similar 
experience with terrorism adopt a similar reaction. In particular, since 9/11 western elites 
might find it more difficult to avoid rallying in the aftermath of an attack perpetrated by 
Islamic terrorists. We need to examine other terrorist waves (euroterrorism, nationalist-
separatists, etc.) and determine whether a pattern of behaviour emerged there to. 
Finally, a comparative analysis of the impact of different types of crises on party 
politics and elite behaviour needs to be conducted. Domestic politics might be usually 
associated with peaceful times, but a fair amount of it takes place during and in the 
aftermath of extraordinary events such as military conflicts, diplomatic crises, terrorist 
attacks and natural catastrophes (earthquakes, hurricanes, floodings, etc.). Some 
groundbreaking work has already been done on crisis and postcrisis politics (Boin et al. 
2005; 2008) but a specific effort must be made towards understanding how these crises 
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affect party politics, notably in the longer term. In particular we must ask ourselves 
whether behaviour during critical times affects the conduct of politics during ordinary 
times, for instance by rendering it less conflictual. The question of the impact of terrorism 
on party politics and elite behaviour is of course closely linked to that of the effects of 
terrorism on voting behaviour and electoral results (see the pioneering works of Berrebi 
and Klor 2006; 2008; Montalvo 2007). In the end we need to recognize that context 
matters and that politics during extraordinary times deserves far more scholarly attention 
than what it is accustomed to. 
   
7.5. Final remark 
 
As I write these last words I cannot but think of my last glimpse of the World Trade 
Center while onboard a ferry to Staten Island, surrounded by commuters enjoying the late 
afternoon sun on the deck. That was on September 10, 2001. I suspect that for some of 
them this was their last ever sunset. For the rest of us who made it through at least 
another day, it was a cruel reminder that the world in which we live in is never as 
appeased as it seems. For me, a member of generation x, born not only on the right side 
of the twentieth century, but on the right side of this otherwise still troubled planet, 
September 11 was a frightening glance into the everyday horror that had befallen some of 
my European relatives a mere sixty years before. Buildings crumbling down on 
thousands of civilians, blank stares and frightened attitudes where before there was 
laughter and insouciance, and the feeling that this calamity did not belong to this time and 
place, an anachronism if ever there was one. In the midst of it all, I must admit to have 
lost some of my bearings. Yes we were all Americans on that day, and I do not suppose 
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that political affiliations and past debates mattered at all for some time after that. We 
shared a tragedy and had somehow become similar, no longer diverse. 
 Today as I reminisce over this experience I wonder what will happen if large-
scale terrorism were to become our common lot, if high-yield weapons were to fall into 
the wrong hands, would we rally and freeze into a permanent state of terror? 
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 Annexe A: Comparative table of databases on terrorist events 
 
Database 
Period  
Covered 
Observations  
(N) 
Domestic 
International 
Definition 
Terrorism 
Knowledge 
Base (TKB) 
1968 – 2006 About 30,000 
Domestic & 
International 
Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, 
calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and 
alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others 
into actions they would not otherwise 
undertake, or refrain from actions they desired 
to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many 
would also be violation of the rules of war if a 
state of war existed. This violence or threat of 
violence is generally directed against civilian 
targets. The motives of all terrorists are 
political, and terrorist actions are generally 
carried out in a way that will achieve maximum 
publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists 
often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist 
acts are intended to produce effects beyond the 
immediate physical damage of the cause, having 
long-term psychological repercussions on a 
particular target audience. The fear created by 
terrorists may be intended to cause people to 
exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the 
importance of the cause, to provoke 
governmental overreaction, to discourage 
dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby 
enforce compliance with their demands. 
Global 
Terrorism 
Database 
(GTD)310 
1970 – 2004 
GTD 1 
(from 1970 
to 1997)311 
GTD 2 
(from 1998 
to 2004) 
About 80,000  
Domestic & 
International 
GTD 1: The threatened or actual use of illegal 
force and violence by a non-state actor to attain 
a political, economic, religious or social goal 
through fear, coercion or intimidation. 
 
GTD 2: No set definition; configurable 
approach covering several definitions of 
terrorism. 
                                                
310 Not available at the time the project started. 
311 The year 1993 is missing. 
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International 
Terrorism: 
Attributes of 
Terrorist 
Events 
(ITERATE) 
1968 – 2004  About 10,000 International N/A 
Terrorism in 
Western 
Europe: Events 
Data 
(TWEED) 
1950 - 2004 About 10,000 
Domestic (18 West 
European countries) 
As an act of terrorism is counted an act that has 
inflicted personal injury, or attacks against 
material targets (property) if the act is of a 
nature that could have led to personal injury or 
in another way would have a noticeable impact 
on an audience, while at the same time the act 
was committed to direct demands of or raise 
attention from others than those immediately 
inflicted with personal or material injury. 
Worldwide 
Incidents 
Tracking 
System 
(WITS) 
2004 – 2005  N/A 
Domestic & 
International 
Terrorism occurs when groups or individuals 
acting on political motivation deliberately or 
recklessly attack civilians/non-combatants or 
their property and the attack does not fall into 
another special category of political violence, 
such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence. 
Triton 
(restricted 
access) 
2000 - 
present 
N/A N/A N/A 
La base de 
données sur les 
actes 
terroristes 
1965 - 2003 About 1,500 France N/A 
 
 
